66. Memorandum of Conversation0
PARTICIPANTS
- M. Jean-Marc Boegner, Diplomatic Advisor, Cabinet of General de Gaulle
- Randolph A. Kidder, Counselor of Embassy
De Gaulle Proposals for Tripartite Organization and Reorganization of NATO
When I called on Boegner today to deliver the original of President Eisenhower’s letter of October 20,1 Boegner gave me a monologue on the reasoning behind de Gaulle’s position. He said that one must accept the fact that in the world of today great powers have certain responsibilities; this must be recognized by everyone. The United States, for example, has greater responsibilities than France, but France has worldwide responsibilities itself and must be in a position where decisions affecting its interests will not be taken without advance consultation and coordination—he referred in this regard to Quemoy. France was accepted as one of the great powers in 1945, in spite of the period of trial and tribulation through which it had just gone, but as a result of a series of weak and unstable governments it let its position slide. It now has a strong and stable government and must return to the position lost [Page 113] through years of weakness. The present flap, resulting from publicity about General de Gaulle’s proposals, may be in a sense unfortunate but at the same time it may be serving a useful purpose by bringing the issue to a head. Germany, which is less important militarily than France, and Italy, as well as the smaller countries, will have to get used to the fact that France will play the leading role on the Continent. Boegner expressed the view that these other countries would in the end accept de Gaulle’s views and that, as a result of closer cooperation between the United States, the United Kingdom and France, the Free World would be in a better position to face the monolithic structure of the Communist world.
Boegner commented that there is little logic in the argument that the United States should not make decisions affecting other countries on a tripartite basis with the United Kingdom and France without consulting those other countries. He said the way it is now the United States takes decisions affecting other countries on a unilateral basis, or sometimes, as in the case of Lebanon and Jordan, on a bilateral basis with the United Kingdom. He termed the practice of “informing” NATO about our decisions in other parts of the world, such as Quemoy, as inadequate and as being really little but a gesture of courtesy.
On the subject of the Secretary’s suggestion to Couve de Murville in Rome that Couve write a supplementary letter to the Secretary, Boegner explained that the General’s opposition was based on his belief that such a letter would represent a watering down of his original proposal.
[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]
- Source: Department of State, WE Files: Lot 61 D 30, Memos of Conversation—1958. Secret. Drafted by Kidder.↩
- Document 63.↩