Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

29. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State⁰

Paris, June 30, 1958, 7 p.m.

6270. Embtels 6127, 6173.¹ Reftels discussed problems of constitutional reform and North African relations under de Gaulle government. This message pertains to East-West problems and related questions.

Among factors motivating de Gaulle’s attitude with regard to these problems are (1) his almost mystical belief in special “mission” of France and France’s grandeur and prestige; (2) his determination that France should play leading role in international relations, admittedly not on par with U.S. and USSR, but certainly as equal of U.K. and conceivably as balancing power between U.S. and USSR; (3) his appreciation as military man of facts of Soviet military force and danger which this represents; (4) his own role as historical figure, which induces him to wish play distinctive part in world events.

All of these factors taken together point up problems we may anticipate for the Atlantic Alliance in days ahead. However, in few weeks since de Gaulle’s investiture he has given no signs of intending to embark on spectacular initiatives which would have effect of rupturing Atlantic Alliance.

Whatever his preferences may be fact is that de Gaulle has assumed power this occasion at period when France is bound by network of Alliances (NATO, European treaties) which have developed in last decade and there is to date no evidence he will not respect accords which France has signed. This would be consistent with his reputation as “man of honor”; also, far-reaching consequences of actual break with NATO would so add to de Gaulle’s already enormous burden it is difficult believe he would seriously contemplate such steps. Where problems will come in immediate future is in de Gaulle’s attempts enhance France’s role in existing organizations, to seek special benefits for France, or to undertake steps which, while perhaps not constituting actual rupture with existing policies, may strain them pretty far.

On NATO itself, de Gaulle has already suggested that he will wish to have some changes made in command structure to give French more substantial role. Embassy is commenting separately on his attitudes concerning such matters as IRBM’s, atomic stockpile, and nuclear weapons cooperation.² On all of these matters, de Gaulle’s preoccupation with France’s prestige and “mission” as well as determination not to take back seat to anyone, especially U.K., are important motivations. These attitudes need not seriously jeopardize NATO, however, and it seems doubtful that he contemplates breaking with Alliance over them.

De Gaulle apparently has not reached any firm conclusions concerning matters relating to European security and German reunification. We are told that to date his reaction to briefing on Western position on these questions was not hostile, but neither was it enthusiastic. His position as expressed in those paragraphs which we understand he personally prepared in draft French note in reply to Khrushchev’s June 11 letter³ is indicative of his determination press independent point of view when he regards it in French interests. De Gaulle is said to be somewhat intrigued by idea of working through Poles, possibly by variation of Rapacki plan, to loosen Soviet hold in Eastern Europe. There is also talk that he may consider recognition of Oder–Neisse line as gesture support Poles. There is absolutely nothing concrete to any of these stories, however, and it probable that de Gaulle’s thinking has not jelled on security problems. So far, he has given every indication of being willing listen attentively advice his experts and there has been no evidence that he is attempting to implement policy of “equilibrium” between East and West. Statements of his Foreign Minister have, in fact, indicated contrary.⁴ His military advisors are said to be solidly opposed on military grounds to disengagement in Europe and this presumably will impress de Gaulle.

Like previous premiers, de Gaulle is under no strong public pressures to negotiate with Soviets. Nagy execution⁵ and recent examples of Soviet intransigence diplomatic field reduce still further appeal of sitting down at conference table with Soviets. While de Gaulle would probably feel that his participation in summit conference would enhance French prestige and fit his own position as historical figure, there are no signs that he is greatly tempted by thought of such conference under present conditions. It seems reasonable assume that brutal facts Soviet conduct since World War II have revealed to de Gaulle extent Soviet menace and dangers dealing with Kremlin.

De Gaulle, whose immediate and major preoccupations are with North Africa, constitutional reform, and economic readjustment, seems to be proceeding slowly and cautiously on East-West matters. Although he may eventually feel impelled to take drastic actions, particularly if internal stability and solution of North African problems are not achieved (and these are very big “ifs”), his interviews with Spaak and General Norstad,⁶ while raising certain storm signals, have been reassuring.

Prospects are that going may be somewhat rough at times, but Embassy’s conclusions, based on evidence to date, is that there is good reason hope that de Gaulle will not undertake major changes in France’s policy on East-West problems, and that he will be inclined to be cool toward Soviet blandishments. In view of apparently tentative state his thinking on many of these problems, it is certain that discussions with Secretary on East-West matters will be of utmost importance.

Houghton

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751.00/6–3058. Secret.
1. Document 26 and footnote 1 thereto.
2. See Document 30.
3. See footnote 5, Document 25.
4. In telegram 6181 from Paris, June 26, Houghton reported that Couve de Murville at a diplomatic press luncheon on June 25 confirmed that France would observe its European treaty commitments. (Department of State, Central Files, 751.00/6–2658)
5. On June 17, it was announced in Budapest that M. Imre Nagy, Prime Minister of Hungary during the October 1956 uprising, had been executed.
6. No records of de Gaulle’s talk with Spaak on June 23 or his talk with Norstad on June 24 have been found.