Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

28. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

June 27, 1958.

SUBJECT

• The Secretary’s Forthcoming Meeting with General de Gaulle

PARTICIPANTS

• M. Hervé Alphand, French Ambassador
• Mr. Charles Lucet, Minister, French Embassy
• The Secretary
• Mr. C. Burke Elbrick, Assistant Secretary
• Mr. Matthew Looram, WE

The French Ambassador said he had been informed that his Government was in agreement that the Secretary’s talks with General de Gaulle should consist of a general exchange of views with no fixed agenda and that there should be no final communiqué. The French Government considered, he said, that the following subjects might be discussed between the Secretary and the French Prime Minister: (1) preparation for a summit conference and East-West relations, including COCOM; (2) disarmament; (3) IRBM’s and nuclear weapons; (4) the Middle East; (5) the Far East. The Ambassador observed that the French Government evidently attached considerable importance to the question of missiles and nuclear arms. He also noted that his Government wished to discuss the question of East-West trade, which had not been originally envisaged.

The Secretary stated that with regard to East-West trade, it was his understanding that considerable progress was now being made in the negotiations, which it was hoped would soon result in an over-all agreement reflecting substantial liberalization of trade. He added that given the complexity of the subject, he would not be in a position to discuss the matter in great detail.

M. Alphand stated that a very important topic would be the question of a summit meeting. For instance, he asked, what should we do if Gromyko refused to continue negotiations with the Ambassadors? Should we then have a meeting of the Foreign Ministers?

The Secretary replied that he had no intention of transferring to the Foreign Ministers the task that was properly that of the Ambassadors. He had too many world responsibilities to permit embarking on another Palais Rose conference¹ lasting for an extended period of time. The Secretary stated that he had long been convinced and recent developments tended to confirm this conviction that the Soviets were unwilling to negotiate seriously with the West unless it was solely to their advantage. In every instance when we had tried to deal with a question on its own merits, the Soviets lost interest. Their conduct with regard to the Geneva conference has been extraordinary: on June 24 they were agreed to the conference and the following day they reversed themselves and stated that they were unwilling to have such a conference unless an agreement on the cessation of tests was obtained in advance.

With regard to the amendments to the McMahon Act,² the Ambassador stated that he had recently discussed this matter and how the amendments might be applied to France with various members of the Administration and the Congress. In every instance, he said, he had found that there was much good will toward France and that cooperation with France in this field was generally favored as soon as France became qualified for such assistance. The interpretation of this last phrase, however, could constitute a significant obstacle. The Ambassador thought that in his talks with General de Gaulle, it would be very helpful if the Secretary could say that cooperation with France in this field would be possible once France demonstrated that she had a stable government.

The Secretary said that he was giving a great deal of thought to this matter. It must be recognized, he said, that when these amendments were formulated, there was not much sympathy for France becoming a nuclear power.

The Ambassador agreed, but said that Senator Anderson had recently indicated to him that he was quite sympathetic to France now. He had told the Ambassador that he was against a great many nations sharing U.S. secrets, but that this did not apply to a country such as France. He had added that he could not commit the Administration, but that should the Administration decide to exchange information on these matters with France, he personally would not object.

The Secretary warned the Ambassador that remarks made socially were not always confirmed by subsequent actions. Mr. Elbrick added that the basic issue was not merely opposition to a fourth country producing nuclear weapons, but the fact that this might lead to fifth, sixth and seventh countries entering the field.

The Ambassador stated that with regard to IRBM’s, he did not really know what position General de Gaulle would take. He understood that de Gaulle had told General Norstad that he was in favor of having IRBM’s in France, but had indicated that the agreement with France on this subject should follow the pattern of the U.S.–U.K. agreement, which constituted a strictly bilateral arrangement without SACEUR being involved.³

M. Alphand stated that he supposed that General de Gaulle would also raise the question of the NATO command structure. The Secretary suggested that this might better be discussed with the U.K.

On the Middle East, the Ambassador stated that he could officially deny recent rumors to the effect that General Catroux might undertake a mission to Nasser. The U.S. and the French positions in regard to Nasser therefore remained the same, and there was no desire on the French part to seek Nasser’s assistance with regard to Lebanon.

The Secretary stated that he certainly hoped that a political solution would be possible in Lebanon. However, he said, we must be sure that such a solution should not in any sense constitute a step in an irreversible trend towards Nasser’s domination of the Middle East.

The Ambassador said that we were in agreement that President Chamoun should continue serving until the end of his term, but no longer.

The Secretary agreed, but said it was important that there be a good successor to President Chamoun and there did not appear to be many people qualified for this role. The next president should be a Christian and oriented toward the West. Moreover, the election of a new president presupposed a period of calm in order to permit the normal constitutional processes to follow.

The Ambassador asked whether the Secretary had any more information with regard to Mr. Hammarskjöld’s recent visit to the Middle East.⁴ The Secretary replied that we had been informed that Mr. Hammarskjöld felt that his visit might result in bringing an end to Syrian military assistance and that a period of calm might then follow to permit moving ahead with the normal constitutional processes.

The Secretary asked what de Gaulle wished to discuss on the Far East, which was listed among the topics. The French Ambassador stated that he really did not know, but supposed it would concern Indonesia and possibly IndoChina.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.51/6–2758. Confidential. Drafted by Looram and initialed by Elbrick.
1. Documentation on the Four-Power Exploratory Talks on European Security at the Palais Rose, Paris, March 5–June 21, 1951, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. III, pp. 1086–1138.
2. An amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 permitting the transfer of nuclear materials and information to other nations passed Congress and was signed by the President on July 2, 1958. (72 Stat. 276)
3. Reference is to the agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom on the supply of Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles to the United Kingdom effected by notes exchanged at Washington on February 22, 1958. (9 UST 195)
4. Hammarskjöld traveled to the Middle East June 18–26 to confer with leaders in London, Beirut, Amman, and Cairo about the crisis in Lebanon.