284. Despatch From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State0
SUBJECT
- Call on Prime Minister
After waiting for two months to make my formal initial call on Prime Minister Salazar, I was finally received by him yesterday afternoon for half an hour at his residence.1 The Prime Minister apologized for having kept me waiting so long, saying that he had been prevented from receiving me because of his illness (which had previously been described to me as a serious case of pneumonia), and he said he hoped I would understand the reason for the delay. He seemed in good spirits though he looked tired and somewhat drawn and his voice was not very firm. However, he was very alert and responsive and our conversation covered a large variety of subjects in which he displayed an interest.
I thanked the Prime Minister for having received me and expressed gratification over his recovery. I said that when I had seen President Eisenhower before my departure from Washington the President had recalled his visit to Lisbon some years ago2 and his meeting with Salazar and asked me particularly to give the Prime Minister his best wishes. Salazar seemed very pleased and made several very friendly references to the President, whose visit he also recalled with great pleasure. He asked me to convey his best wishes to the President for his future health and happiness and for the prosperity of the United States. He said that the President is carrying a very heavy burden and he asked about his health. I told him that the President continues to be extremely active and that, on the occasions when I had seen him, he appeared to be in the best of health and in excellent spirits.
The Prime Minister then asked about Secretary Dulles’ health and I told him that we had had very good reports of the progress he is making. I said that his illness had not prevented him from continuing a very active interest in affairs and that we all hoped that the treatment he is now undergoing would prove effective. Salazar expressed some concern about a possible successor for the Secretary in the event the latter might feel obliged to step down as Secretary of State. He said that the [Page 631] Secretary is a man of great ability and character. He had always followed a very straight line, said the Prime Minister, in the formulation and execution of foreign policy and this was to be admired even though he felt there may have been times when the line was too straight and too rigid. His six years of experience as Secretary of State made him invaluable to the Western cause and he felt it would be most difficult to replace him at this critical time in history.
Salazar broached the subject of Western relations with the Soviets and the Berlin situation. I said that the Western powers in conjunction with West Germany were preparing a reply to the Soviet note of March 23 and that there were indications that a four-power Foreign Ministers meeting might be proposed in the near future to discuss the various aspects of the German problem. I said that this might be followed by a meeting of Heads of Government if the Foreign Ministers conference gave promise of real results. I could not say that I was very sanguine of results. It appeared that the Soviet Union had no intention of withdrawing from East Germany or permitting reunification on the basis of free elections for fear that such action would prejudice the Soviet position in the satellite countries. Salazar said that he felt the Soviets have us at a great disadvantage in Berlin and he felt that they could continue to make trouble for the West at any time. He did not feel that the Soviet Union wished to push matters to the point of provoking a war, however. I agreed that the situation is most difficult and that we do operate at a disadvantage as compared with the Soviet Union because we in the West must consult public opinion and must take the views of our Allies into account before taking any action. Khrushchev, on the other hand, can do or say anything at any time without any such restraint. Salazar said he was not in possession of all the facts, due principally to the fact that he had been confined to his house for some time, but he felt that the Western powers would find it extremely difficult to get out of this present situation. He felt that it had been a mistake originally to divide Germany as it had been divided, and it was particularly a mistake to leave Berlin completely surrounded by the Soviet Zone, a subject on which he dilated for some time. While I agreed that a most difficult task confronted the West, I said that an important objective of the Soviet Union is to divide and weaken the Western Alliance. In these circumstances it is all the more vital that the Western Allies present a united front on the Berlin situation. We felt most strongly that the Soviet Union should not be allowed to divest itself unilaterally of its responsibilities in Berlin and that the Western countries should all see eye to eye on this matter. Salazar [Page 632] agreed that it was important that the Western powers present a united front.
The remainder of the conversation was devoted to matters of lesser importance. Throughout the visit I felt that Salazar was interested and that his mind was very alert. At the end of the interview he escorted me to the door where a photographer snapped our picture. Judging from the publicity in this morning’s press, consisting of front-page photographs showing a smiling Salazar, I take it that one of the purposes which he hoped to accomplish by this meeting was to scotch growing rumors of his serious illness and incapacitation. This purpose, I would say, was effectively served. Though he is tired and weakened by his illness he is still extremely active mentally and, barring any unforeseen developments, should increasingly resume his personal direction of affairs of state as his convalescence progresses.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 753.13/3–1259. Official Use Only.↩
- Elbrick transmitted a one-page summary of the conversation in telegram 323 from Lisbon, March 12. (Ibid., 611.53/3–1259)↩
- For documentation on Eisenhower’s visit to Lisbon January 16–17, 1951, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. III, pp. 431–436.↩
- For text of the Soviet note, March 2, and the Western reply, March 26, see Department of State Bulletin, April 13, 1959, pp. 507–511.↩