Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

192. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Herter⁰

August 10, 1960, 12:15 p.m.

The President telephoned to say he had just read the letter from DeGaulle¹ and at least it brings out now in the open what he had really been talking about—which he had always talked to the President about in fuzzy terms—that what he really wants is a triumvirate that makes decisions and agrees on action in political bodies like the U.N. The President said DeGaulle is even a little sarcastic about the U.N. The President said in these political terms, we have to act as a unit whether we like it or not. The President said as a matter of fact DeGaulle has a couple of things which the President didn’t understand like where he talks about what happened in the Congo being due to divergencies of the West. The Secretary said this makes no sense. The President said he must be talking about the fact we would not vote in the U.N. to take up the Algerian question.² The Secretary said he didn’t really know what DeGaulle is talking about; that as the President recalled, at the beginning we had an appeal from the Congo to send in troops independently and we immediately took the position it was a matter for the U.N. and that the original appeal had been made to the U.N. and we have stuck with this.³ The Secretary said what DeGaulle seems to be implying is that if the British, French and ourselves had gone in with troops and upheld the Belgians, everything would be fine. The President referred to DeGaulle’s statement about voluntarily submerging our responsibilities in the composite structure of the U.N., and the President agreed DeGaulle may mean we should have supported the Belgians. The Secretary said it is a curious way of putting on the back of our necks his concern with regard to the French communities in Africa with which France has these separate agreements that the same thing will happen and they won’t honor those agreements. The Secretary said the Belgians had made agreements with the Congo just a few days before the independence which were never ratified, but how we could possibly have prevented the revolt of the Congo troops against the Belgian officers he could not imagine. The Secretary said one thing that is puzzling is the report we have gotten of the DeGaulle-Adenauer talks which indicates that DeGaulle assured Adenauer he would not press tripartitism any further which is very extraordinary.⁴ The Secretary said the rest of NATO is very worried about this tripartite business and the Secretary said he just can’t believe in just a week’s time after saying this to Adenauer that DeGaulle is now in effect saying we have to immediately set up this tripartite business. The President referred to DeGaulle’s statement that we have the possibility to organize a real political and strategic cooperation of our West, and the President said he uses “our West” several times and he doesn’t know what he means. The President referred to his statement that if all three together came to grips we could arrive at a common action. The President said DeGaulle is asking for several things; to reform NATO so that France—and the President recalled DeGaulle’s long complaint that France has nothing with which to defend herself. The President said DeGaulle is trying to do two or three things all at once. The Secretary agreed and said it has been fuzzy ever since his September 15, 1959 letter;⁵ that DeGaulle just never comes to grips with what he has in mind except for nuclear capability. The President said on nuclear capability, he really was sympathetic. The Secretary said he understood Norstad had talked a little to the President about this, and the Secretary said Norstad is bitterly opposed to giving nuclear capability to any one nation.⁶ The Secretary said we have this very real problem of what happens in NATO if we set up a tripartite arrangement, particularly with the Germans.

The Secretary referred to the last paragraph of DeGaulle’s letter suggesting a meeting. The Secretary said Macmillan is now in Bonn talking to Adenauer and a copy will presumably be forwarded to Macmillan there.⁷ The President said he must say that he is a little confused because how we can set up ourselves to do all this and throw out the Italians, Germans, Belgians—which are already mad—Dutch, etc. The Secretary said they would be crazed. The Secretary said what we had arranged in accordance with the President’s previous letter was this group composed of Mr. Merchant, Lucet for the French and Hoyer-Millar for the British, and they were already working on an agenda for the Foreign Ministers meeting in New York at the time of the UNGA. The Secretary said it was not clear whether DeGaulle wanted the Heads of Government meeting before or after the Foreign Ministers meeting, but the Secretary said it might be desirable to get the Foreign Ministers to meet first and find out what the issues are. The President said we might put a series of questions to DeGaulle, couched in friendly language, like how do we try to strengthen our alliance by offending the Germans, Italians, etc.? How is this to be accomplished? The President said he has got something in talking about allies around the world, although the President said he had divested himself of most except he thought he still has Caledonia. The Secretary said he thinks DeGaulle wants nuclear weapons only by the three on a joint control basis. The President said when you come down to it, what he wants is to get the three together who agree with the basic policies and agree to take common action. The Secretary said it is curious because for instance in the disarmament conference in Geneva, at the end when the American plan⁸ had been tabled all came up and supported it so it really became a Four-Nation plan, with the French holding out. The Secretary said it always comes down to DeGaulle never agreeing with anyone else but wanting everybody to agree with him. The President said he really believes we ought to tell DeGaulle in some way that the U.S. does not want command in Europe; that we would be glad to see them take over and will pull out our troops. The President said it was the Europeans who insisted there be an American command. The Secretary said even in this last discussion with Adenauer, it was agreed they wanted American and Canadian troops in Europe.⁹ The Secretary said he wondered whether it might not be well to hold this letter until Macmillan gets back from Bonn and we can get his reactions before we draft a definitive reply. The President said he didn’t want to discuss this by phone with Macmillan and asked that the Secretary get a series of questions—how do we do this; what does this mean; suppose we have a combined tripartite policy, then nobody can take any action without agreement of the other two, which the President said he thinks will be a committee for inaction rather than for action. The President said then we can say if all they want is American troops to show the flag, we can leave only one division. The President said to say that since Macmillan is closer, to spell out in detail what he wants. The President said if we could get Macmillan to say what things could be done and what couldn’t be done then he can go to Paris and show our exchange of correspondence to DeGaulle and see what next. The President said he will just keep his copy of the letter from DeGaulle and won’t do anything until he hears from the Secretary further. The Secretary said he thinks it is so important we should go slow, and see what reaction Macmillan has. The President asked when Macmillan returned from Bonn, and the Secretary said in a day or two. The President said the middle of next week was all right.

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Transcribed in the Secretary’s Office.
1. Document 191.
2. The Afro-Asian resolution recommending negotiations between Algeria and France toward a peaceful solution of the conflict failed to pass the U.N. General Assembly on December 12, 1959, in a vote of 35 to 18 with the United States and 27 other countries abstaining.
3. On July 12, Patrice Lumumba, President of the Congo, requested U.S. troops. The United States supported the U.N. Security Council resolution passed on July 14 authorizing the immediate dispatch of a U.N. military force to the Congo and requesting Belgium to withdraw its troops. See vol. XIV, pp. 293 ff.
4. In Polto 239 from Paris, August 5, Wolf reported on the Adenauer-de Gaulle talks at Rambouillet, July 29–30, and said Adenauer told de Gaulle he could not accept tripartitism. Wolf stated that according to Blankenhorn, de Gaulle had agreed that he would not insist further on this issue. (Department of State, Central Files, 651.62A/8–560)
5. Presumably this reference is to de Gaulle’s letter to Eisenhower of September 17, 1958, Document 45.
6. A copy of the memorandum of conversation covering Norstad’s conversation with Herter, McCone, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Douglas, August 2, is in Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. An August 3 memorandum of conversation between Norstad and the President is printed in Part 1 as Document 263.
7. Macmillan, accompanied by Lord Home, visited Bonn August 10–11 for talks with Adenauer and von Brentano. A copy of the report on Macmillan’s talks with the German leaders, sent to Herter by Caccia in his letter of August 12, is in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204.
8. For text of the U.S. paper submitted to the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament meeting in Geneva on June 27, see Documents on Disarmament, 1960, pp. 126–131.
9. Not further identified.