Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

110. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower⁰

Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, May 2, 1959, 11 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

• Secretary Herter
• Major Eisenhower

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

Mr. Herter then told the President of an unpleasant meeting which he had with Debre.¹ [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

One of the matters on which de Gaulle has been intransigent is that of providing the nuclear warheads for seven squadrons of U.S. fighters which are based in France. Without these warheads, these fighters would, of course, be useless. Debre had informed Mr. Herter that de Gaulle could not give agreement pending the solution of three outstanding problems:

1. The full implementation of the tripartite organization which de Gaulle had proposed in his letter of September 10th.² In this regard, Mr. Herter had pointed out that our regularly-held tripartite meetings in Washington had been quite successful. This statement seemed to satisfy the French, who regarded this matter as of secondary importance.

2. Acceptance of proposals included in the very tough letter sent recently from Debre to Houghton.³ This letter sets forth the French position that Algeria is as important to the security of France as is solution of the Berlin crisis. [2–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

3. The attainment of nuclear equality by the French and the other three nations. In this connection, de Gaulle feels that we are not nearly so generous as we should be. Here Mr. Herter pointed out the limitation imposed upon our Executive by existing legislation. This legislation requires that we deal only with nuclear capable powers, and leaves us helpless to share secrets with France until they have furnished proof of an independently-developed capability. As to French requests for a nuclear submarine, Mr. Herter informed de Gaulle that the unilateral withdrawal of the French fleet from NATO command completely scuttled any possibilities of persuading Congress to aid France in developing this equipment. We have made progress, in that we are supplying the French with certain amounts of enriched uranium. The President agreed with Mr. Herter in the conclusion that there is no connection between these three points of de Gaulle and the nuclear warheads for the seven squadrons based in France.

Logic notwithstanding, the French believe that a close connection between the nuclear warheads and de Gaulle’s three points actually does exist. Mr. Herter pointed out to the French that their attitude should not leak to the press, since it would have most unfortunate effects on our mutual security policy. In connection with these matters, Mr. Herter told the President that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are studying the possibility of redeployment of forces from France. If the French maintain their attitude for an extended period, this must be done. Couve de Murville had agreed on this matter with Mr. Herter.

The President expressed sympathy with the French in that we are handcuffed when the Congress places senseless limitations on the Executive. We depend heavily on an ally like France, if for no other reason than for their important geographical position in Europe. Therefore, if we cannot share secrets freely with the French, we are placed in an extremely awkward position. We have, of course, shared secrets freely with Britain. The President agreed with Mr. Herter that the French position is illogical; however, he also pointed out his opinion that there is no connection between helping the French develop a nuclear submarine and the French views on the NATO command setup. The French regard Algeria as part of metropolitan France. Therefore, they have a problem. In the President’s view, de Gaulle is going to cause great difficulties. The question we must face is whether we can accommodate to those difficulties sufficiently to sustain the NATO concept. De Gaulle will work to block us at every point, including insistence on further changes in the command structure.

Mr. Herter pointed out the anomalous situation that the French Air Force is still separate and not under NATO command. He feels that the difficulties over NATO command structure are bound to drag out. Couve de Murville had indicated that the French are concerned over two main areas. First, global strategy, and second, NATO. Couve de Murville further expressed the opinion that the only solution to this matter is for the President and de Gaulle to get together. The President is practically the only individual in the world that de Gaulle respects. To this the President pointed out the inconsistency that de Gaulle has been unwilling to visit the U.S. for talks. He then reviewed some of his former relations with de Gaulle, adding that at the end of World War II neither Roosevelt nor Churchill would even speak to de Gaulle. This had left the President, as Supreme Allied Commander the only link with the French nation. The President then reviewed the difficulties he had with de Gaulle over the matter of holding Strasbourg at all cost during the German winter offensive in 1944. De Gaulle had threatened to withdraw French troops from allied command, and the President had informed him that the French had received their last ounce of logistical support. The matter had been resolved, of course, with Strasbourg being held, but with de Gaulle taking no steps to remove French forces from allied command. The President expressed the view that de Gaulle had been right in his basic point on this item. He wondered about the use in pursuing negotiations against the Russians with the French in their apparent frame of mind.

Mr. Herter advanced the opinion that de Gaulle is capable of thinking in two distinct compartments. One compartment involves negotiations against the Russians and the other compartment involves Algeria and associated problems. De Gaulle is extremely resentful of our action in vote abstention last year in the UN.⁴ In addition, a subordinate of Lodge in the UN had talked to an individual of the FLN, and the U.S. Government had refused to withdraw visas of FLN members in the U.S. While we assured de Gaulle that these actions were not significant, he remains intensely sensitive.

During the period, Mr. Herter had an interview with de Gaulle.⁵ In this interview, the latter had insisted that the USSR has no interest in Iraq nor in Mid-East oil. The USSR merely wants an entry to Africa. de Gaulle’s big idea, which he will push with vigor, is that of coordination of economic help for underdeveloped nations by the West and the East. In this regard, de Gaulle has Africa on his mind. In pursuing this matter with the Russians, he does, of course, want the U.S. to be committed to him first, and he may be right. The President pointed out his misgivings with regard to aid to underdeveloped countries through the UN, and Mr. Herter agreed. He had told Debre that we could never sell the idea to Congress of using U.S. funds in any matter in which the USSR would have a voice.

The President then asked about the attitude of the U.K. in this whole matter. Mr. Herter said that the U.K. had conceded the African interests to France. They had said, “It is your hunt” and indicated they would go along with French projects.

Mr. Herter indicated that de Gaulle plans to make two military commands including Africa. One will include the Sahara and the other will include areas to the South. He stressed the significance of an oil strike in the Sahara and the fact that the French will construct one pipeline which will carry 14 million tons of petroleum per year. The French are fighting with the rebels over the area covered by this pipeline. Also significant is the fact that the U.S. has found oil in Libya, although we are keeping this quiet. In this area have been located 100 feet of oil-bearing sand. The reserves are estimated at some 15 billion barrels. This fact may drastically change the entire Middle East picture.

Mr. Herter then continued his discussion of de Gaulle by saying that the General had sent the President kindest regards. In the initial interview which Mr. Herter had held with de Gaulle prior to his last meeting with Debre, the General had appeared affable, clear, and unemotional. When Mr. Herter pointed out the success of the tripartite talks, de Gaulle had made no comment. It is obvious, however, that all of de Gaulle’s aides are terrified of him, and he is the only government in France.

The President then speculated on the possible results of our switching the 7 squadrons to new locations. If this is necessitated, we may have to take another look at NATO and may have to confine U.S. participation to aid on the same basis as Burma. He felt, however, that Europe would go neutral if we were to pull out U.S. troops. The difficulty lies primarily in the personality of de Gaulle. The President stated that he knows of no single soul who can influence de Gaulle. He described de Gaulle’s attitude as that of a Messiah complex, picturing himself as a cross between Napoleon and Joan of Arc. He knows all the answers, and thinks only in terms of “Glory, Honor, France.”

Mr. Herter voiced his belief that French commitments in Algeria are infeasible. Among other difficulties, France is now encountering resistance from the Colons. They are attempting to keep these settlers straight through the use of the Army. De Gaulle has the best chance of any Frenchman to solve the Algerian problem, though even his hope may be slight. Actually, de Gaulle believes that the sentiment in Algeria will change within six months. Others are not so optimistic. To complicate matters, the French asked us to support overflights of Libya in the area of their long common border. The difficulty brewing in this area stems largely from the discovery of new oil. This surprised the President somewhat, but he did express sympathy for the French position in considering Algeria as part of France. He drew a parallel to a situation in which Alaska and Hawaii, now that they have been admitted as states, would see fit to declare themselves independent.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

John S.D. Eisenhower

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Major Eisenhower and initialed by Goodpaster.
1. See Document 109.
2. Herter is referring to de Gaulle’s September 17, 1958, letter to Eisenhower, Document 45.
3. See footnote 8, Document 109.
4. See footnote 6, Document 81.
5. An account of Herter’s conversation with de Gaulle about Berlin and Germany, April 28, is printed in vol. VIII, Document 277.