Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

277. Telegram From the Delegation to the Western Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State⁰

Paris, April 28, 1959, 8 p.m.

Secto 4. Secretary met with de Gaulle for thirty-five minutes afternoon April 28. Talk devoted virtually entirely to Germany.

Secretary opened stressing need for Allied unity and expressed hope next few days would see progress in this regard. De Gaulle indicated belief that since Soviets had created crisis and asked for negotiations, we should not rush forward with proposals but should await Soviet ideas.

Secretary reiterated our position that Berlin not be discussed in isolation but rather as part of whole German problem. Therefore we should keep Berlin in that context.

De Gaulle expressed doubt anything definitive could be decided now but agreed we should keep on trying. De Gaulle added he thought Khrushchev’s principal objective in summit meeting was to divide West. He believed that the more precise were our proposals to Soviets, the greater success Khrushchev would have in attaining his objective since West would never agree on all details. He thought we should not be intimidated on German problem because U.S. remains strongest world power and accordingly there is little Khrushchev can do under present conditions.

De Gaulle then outlined his view that we should meet Soviets on some new ground and abandon present ground (i.e., Germany) which was terrain on which Khrushchev desired to operate. Accordingly we should meet Soviets on ground which would embarrass them, along lines of common plan for developing under-developed countries. Soviets could be invited participate in such scheme along with other civilized countries. He suggested plan for Africa in this context. U.S. which had long and successful experience in this field would of course play important role. In response to Secretary’s query, de Gaulle said his idea should be reserved for possible Summit meeting.

Secretary referred to May 11 conference and package which Working Group had put together. He had no illusions this package would be acceptable to Soviets but thought it had public appeal and responsibility for refusing it should be placed on Soviets.

De Gaulle then asked if Secretary believed we should go to Summit Meeting if Foreign Ministers’ meeting produced nothing. Secretary replied in negative saying Foreign Ministers’ meeting should produce as minimum modus vivendi for Berlin which would last for some time.

De Gaulle then referred to Macmillan talks here¹ and in Washington² and said British Prime Minister appeared somewhat affected (marqué) by his trip to Moscow and determined to find ground for negotiations. He thought this was element to bear in mind re the future. Secretary agreed Macmillan was somewhat more hopeful of having genuine negotiations with Soviets than we were. Also British believed we should jump to summit because only Khrushchev appears able undertake meaningful discussions. De Gaulle expressed view that if we met Khrushchev without some progress made by Foreign Ministers, and became engaged in a battle with him, result would be unfortunate.

He thought Foreign Ministers’ meeting important. Secretary said President had similar ideas and thought Foreign Ministers’ meeting represented important probing operation.

De Gaulle added that French position on Germany already known. German settlement not currently possible in his view. German reunification might be achieved one day in future but this is not urgent matter for West, East or for Germany. In meantime we must hold firm. We should encourage practical contacts between two Germanies, not however to extent recognizing East Germany. Re German frontiers we must not change Oder-Neisse Line. Germany had lost war so it was normal she should pay certain price. Furthermore if we changed Oder-Neisse frontier, we should lose Poles, while finally there were few Germans in area anyway. France also believed there should be no special status for Germany as to armament limitations. Germany should have right belong to alliance of her choice.

Secretary referred to de Gaulle’s statement on German frontiers, and said he thought West Germans might be willing make statement on this subject but wanted something in exchange. De Gaulle said in exchange they would get independence including freedom choose their alliances, what armaments they would have and later achieve unity.

De Gaulle added we must not accept neutralization of Germany as this would weaken Atlantic Alliance. Secretary inquired if de Gaulle meant this would weaken NATO. De Gaulle said it would weaken NATO but also would have wider meaning of weakening whole Atlantic Alliance. Secretary and de Gaulle agreed negotiations would consume many months and that there was no hurry.

In response to de Gaulle’s inquiry on situation in East, Secretary indicated fear situation in Iraq moving towards communism, particularly in areas security and administrators. He expressed doubt Kassim³ able reverse trend. De Gaulle expressed view Soviets might make move during Geneva Conference on Germany in some other area of world. He also stated he felt Soviets’ real interest not in Iraq but in Africa and present actions merely designed open corridor to that continent.

De Gaulle noted Warsaw Pact Meeting and asked our view on meaning of invitation to Communist Chinese.⁴ Secretary gave view Soviets under pressure from Chinese Communists to include latter in international gatherings.

De Gaulle said if meetings enlarged he believed Italy should be included, presumably if Poland and Czechoslovakia included. He favored maintenance four-power formula but said we should not forget Italy if others included. Secretary agreed saying U.S. position was that Italy should be added if anyone else were.

Secretary concluded saying we believe progress had been made in recent tripartite talks on Africa in Washington⁵ along lines which we believed General desired. He noted Working Groups set up to study specific projects, and believed this concept was advancing. De Gaulle had no comment whatever on tripartite talks.

In conclusion, de Gaulle asked after President and expressed regret at illness former Secretary Dulles.

Atmosphere of meeting excellent. General was lucid and unemotional in his presentation and appeared in good health.⁶

Herter

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–HE/4–2859. Secret. Transmitted in two sections and repeated to Bonn, Moscow, and London. A memorandum of this conversation, USDel/MC/1, indicates that the meeting began at 4 p.m. and Ambassador Houghton was also present. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1274)
1. See Document 213.
2. See Documents 234–241.
3. Prime Minister Abdel Karim al-Kassim of Iraq.
4. The Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers met at Warsaw, April 27–28. Included in these meetings was the Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China.
5. U.S.-U.K.-French talks on Africa took place at Washington, April 16–21.
6. Secretary Herter repeated these sentiments in a very short note to the President transmitted in Cahto 1 from Paris, April 28 at 8 p.m. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series)