Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

258. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

June 13, 1960, 3—4:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

• NATO Long-Range Planning: Views of NATO Secretary-General Paul-Henri Spaak¹

PARTICIPANTS

• M. Paul-Henri Spaak
• M. Andre Saint-Mleux
• Ambassador Burgess
• EUR—Mr. Kohler
• S—Mr. Bowie
• S/P—Mr. Smith
• S/P—Mr. Owen
• RA—Mr. Fessenden
• RA—Mr. Tobin
• DOD/ISA—Mr. Haydn Williams

1. General Approach and Timing.

After introductory pleasantries, Mr. Kohler asked M. Spaak to give us the benefit of his views on NATO long-range planning.

M. Spaak opened by saying that this is a difficult problem. The Alliance has existed since 1949 with its primary purpose to stop the communist advance. Whether the Soviet intention is to wage cold war emphasizing military threats or peaceful co-existence stressing economic warfare the ultimate communist aim is the same. No matter how one examines the problem, he comes to the conclusion that an absolute necessity for the Alliance continues to exist. What is needed now is to maintain and adapt NATO to present and future circumstances. It is not necessary to think of altering the Treaty, which would both be very difficult and also unnecessary in view of the flexibility of the Treaty provisions. Actually the effectiveness of the Alliance largely rests more upon the spirit of its members than in strict observance of Treaty obligations.

At the close of his statement, Spaak observed that the 10-year planning report might in its introduction indicate that nothing revolutionary is required, but rather that the Alliance, in setting its course for the next ten years, should determine to continue doing what it is already doing—but to do it more audaciously and more effectively.

Spaak further said it is his intention during the early part of July to call together the Permanent Representatives for a discussion of NATOlong-range planning. He would present to them a memo incorporating his ideas as expressed to us, and asking them in return to submit their governments’ views early in September.

In response to a question from Mr. Owen, Spaak said that he intended to urge other countries to make serious preparations for the long-range planning exercise, but that to date only Canada and the UK had been making such preparations.

Mr. Smith observed that the atmosphere for long-range planning should now be better since the non-summit.² Spaak responded that the reaction in some ways was improved, but he referred to the very animated discussion of the “directorate” in last Wednesday’s Council meeting and to what he considered to be the unsatisfactory Western response to the latest Soviet disarmament note,³ and implied that some of the ground gained was now being lost.

2. Political Consultation.

The rule to be followed on political consultation, M. Spaak suggested, is that of the most intimate possible consultation in accordance with the recommendations of the report of the Three Wise Men.⁴ However, a number of questions are posed:

(a) The geographical boundaries of consultation should be extended as widely as possible. This would involve more cooperation with CENTO and SEATO, but a clear distinction would have to be drawn between the broadening of the Alliance for the purpose of political consultation and any extension of military obligations, concerning which many members are very hesitant.

(b) The form of consultation will have to be decided. There are four alternatives, of which Spaak openly expressed his preference for the first: (1) Standing Committees of the Council set up on a regional basis, as for example, Africa, the Far East and Near East, and having varied composition with the three principal world power members on all committees and two additional members chosen on the basis of regional interest. These committees would exist for the exchange of information, to develop common policies for the respective regions, and to prepare discussion in the Council as a whole. (2) Establishment of a committee along the lines of the UN Security Council composed of the five larger members permanently, that is, the US, UK, France, Germany, and Italy with two other members being elected on a rotating basis. In such a committee, the major powers might be willing to expose their thinking at an early stage since it would be rather more intimate than the Council. The committee also would prepare subject matter for discussion in the Council. (3) A NATO observer in a committee of three (US, UK, France) following the precedent set in the recent summit preparatory period. This might perhaps work out in connection with proposal (1) above. Finally, (4) the notion of a “directorate”, which M. Spaak rejects. In the first place, he doubts that there could be such a directorate, since unanimity could not be reached and De Gaulle in particular would not submit to a majority of the other two. Second, because establishment of such a directorate would set in motion a disastrous trend toward neutralism among the smaller members.

Mr. Bowie⁵ having raised the impact of the development of the European community on NATO relationships, Spaak responded that until now this has been a conflict between the Six and the Seven which has had no impact on NATO and to which he thinks a solution will be found. In answer to a more pointed question from Mr. Bowie, Spaak stated that the impact of growth of the Six on relations between the US and Europe would depend upon the spirit in which the Six developed. He went on to be more specific with regard to the De Gaulle problem. He was prepared to admit that De Gaulle was not a European in the image of Robert Schuman,⁶ but in discussing De Gaulle’s policy, as in discussing Khrushchev’s, one is very dependent upon hypothesis. Certainly a very great deal depends upon the way in which the US asserts its leadership in the Alliance.

Ambassador Burgess observed that there is now a much better feeling between the Six and the Seven, so that he is fairly optimistic about a reconciliation. He further mentioned as a perplexing factor De Gaulle’s concept of a Europe united from the “Atlantic to the Urals”. Spaak responded that it is interesting that this is the second time De Gaulle has used this expression, but this time it is to be found in a different, more historic and theoretical, part of his speech. On the other hand his favorable mention of a Western European confederation appeared immediately after his allusion to the decision of the Six to accelerate.

3. Military Problems.

The long-term NATO military problem, in M. Spaak’s view, centers on the question of atomic arms. As a general proposition it is clear that national armies of the traditional type are outmoded for European defense, and greater integration, or perhaps better stated cooperation, is needed. We must in fact accelerate the cooperation of member countries. The solution lies in establishing atomic arms under NATO control and with common financing on the same basis as infrastructure. This would facilitate cooperation and avoid inequities in bearing financial burdens. This is not only a military problem but also a political one, which quite frankly has to do with the French problem. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

Mr. Smith asked about M. Spaak’s references to a common NATO nuclear armament and asked whether M. Spaak’s thinking had gone as far as a multinational strike force. Spaak indicated that this was the only possible solution to the problem. Mr. Smith made clear that he was asking about the possibility of a genuinely multi-national force, in which personnel of different nations would be intermingled so that no single country would have a national capability readily at hand—an EDC transplanted to the nuclear field. M. Spaak said that this was how he had understood the question and, provided that the term “EDC” was not used, he believed that was a feasible—as well as necessary—solution. He came back, however, to France as being at the heart of the atomic armaments question, and said he could not envisage a solution to the atomic problem without some solution of the French relationship. He particularly felt that this was so after the briefing of the Council by General Norstad the previous Friday.⁷

[2 paragraphs (21 lines of source text) not declassified]

Mr. Kohler wondered whether, thinking over the next 10 years, we would have to review the NATO Command Structure—a question which De Gaulle has raised.⁸ We had not, of course, envisaged from the beginning that SACEUR would always have to be an American. Spaak replied that most Europeans would not wish any change, that they would like to have an American, but that it would be interesting to know if the NATO Commander could not be divorced from any US command. He thought this an important question but not one involved in the 10-year plan report.

[1 paragraph (11 lines of source text) not declassified]

4. Economic Cooperation.

Here M. Spaak accented the problems proposed by the creation of the OECD, particularly in relation to aid to uncommitted underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa. A common Western approach is needed, based upon political considerations, and he doubts that such a common policy can be drawn up by an organization like the OECD, which includes a considerable number of neutrals. We must get rid of the complex that NATO is an alliance limited strictly to the military aspect. NATO should become the forum where economic policy, that is political-economic policy, is examined and where “broad directives” can be drawn up, execution being left to technical bodies such as the IBRD. Furthermore, a policy must be adopted for coordination of aid to the five “under-developed” countries within the alliance (including the southern area of Italy) and also the certain countries in Africa which are rather closely linked to the alliance.

Mr. Kohler expressed surprise that Spaak had omitted mention of economic relations and competition with the USSR, with particular reference to the extension of credits to the USSR and the organization of competition, as for example through preclusive buying or the stabilization of prices. Spaak responded that until now he has failed to arouse any interest in implementing Article 2.⁹ There is no common approach among the members with regard to credits, and all governments backed away from his suggestion at Istanbul with regard to stabilization of prices.¹⁰ Ambassador Burgess commented that credits would provide a good case study of the alliance capability to work together, and suggested that it would be helpful if the other member governments would raise the level of their representatives in ECONAD and be prepared to instruct their representatives with greater attention to political than commercial considerations. Spaak said that it is interesting to compare the rise in credits from the West to the USSR with the rise in USSR credits to the under-developed areas, and suggested the possible conclusion that the West in this way is financing Soviet penetration of the under-developed areas.

5. Joint Production and Science.

M. Spaak then referred to two remaining fields of cooperation within the alliance, that is, the “common production of certain things” and science. In both of these fields, he felt that results so far had been meager. He made no further mention of the first of these two, but went on to say particularly with reference to science that the Macmillan–Eisenhower declaration of interdependence should increasingly be translated into deeds.¹¹ A beginning had been made in the science field, but as Dr. Ramsey¹² had said at the end of his two years as the first Science Adviser, so far there were only some drops in the ocean. It is hard to know what should be done, but it definitely seems that this is a matter of will in the first place, and then the translation of that will into action.

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, NATO. Secret. Drafted by Irwin M. Tobin (EUR/RA). The meeting was held in the Department of State.
1. According to a memorandum from Kohler to Under Secretary Dillon, drafted on June 11, “Spaak’s primary purpose in coming to Washington is to discuss how we should proceed in the NATO Council considering Secretary Gates’ MRBM proposal.” (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5611/6–1160)
2. Reference is to the summit meeting in Paris May 16–17; see footnote 1, Document 257.
3. Concerns of Council members about a possible tripartite directorate following a U.S. report on the meeting of the British, French, and U.S. Foreign Ministers in Washington on June 1 were summarized in Polto 2418 and Polto Circular 13, both from Paris, June 9. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-WA/6–960) For text of the Soviet disarmament note, submitted to the Heads of Government on June 2 and to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee on June 7, see Documents on Disarmament, 1960, pp. 100–111. No formal Western response to this proposal before June 13 has been found.
4. See footnote 4, Document 139.
5. Robert R. Bowie was hired by the Department of State during the summer of 1960 to prepare a report on long-range planning in NATO. Extracts from that report are printed as Document 266.
6. French Foreign Minister, 1948–1953, and author of the Schuman plan for a European Coal and Steel Community in May 1950.

7. Norstad’s briefing of the NAC on the MRBM situation on Friday, June 10, and the ensuing Council discussion were summarized in Polto 2440 from Paris, June 10. As reported in this telegram, Norstad concluded his briefing as follows:

   “Filling IRBM requirement is something that must be done. There is no choice. Either this is done or there is no defense within the time period. That is a message to be passed back to governments. If this is not done, there will be no NATO in relatively few years, without saying specifically 1963,’64 or ’65 but in the relatively near future this could be so. It is a matter of most vital importance within this Alliance and particularly vital to the European members. He remained ready to discuss the matter later with this group or any other.” (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5611/6–1060)

8. See Document 198.
9. Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty provided, among other things, that the parties “will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.”
10. Spaak’s suggestion has not been identified.
11. Reference may be to the Camp David declaration of March 29, in which Eisenhower and Macmillan agreed to a coordinated research program for improving methods of detecting nuclear tests. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, April 18, 1960, pp. 587–588.
12. Dr. Norman F. Ramsey, Scientific Adviser to the NATO Secretary General.