Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

259. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France⁰

June 15, 1960, 9:01 p.m.

Topol 2492. Paris pass Thurston. Spaak and Acting Secretary discussed MRBM’s at length June 13. Covered also problem of tripartitism, reported separately.¹

1. Spaak made strong appeal for his compromise proposal along lines set forth in his paper, Polto 2394.² Stressed importance US making gesture of good will by offering sell certain limited number of Polaris missiles (without warheads) to French to induce French to participate in NATOMRBM program. Spaak stressed that he could not guarantee De Gaulle would accept, but felt it had some chance success and could be helpful in bringing about more cooperative French position on NATO matters generally, [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. Spaak emphasized everything of course depended on De Gaulle’s own reaction. Spaak added that he had not discussed his suggestion specifically with De Gaulle. Spaak stressed that rejection Gates’ offer would result in failure develop NATO-wide program, which Spaak considered essential. Result would be series of bilaterals. Alliance should rather be moving in direction of greater integration, particularly in developing common nuclear policy.

2. Acting Secretary stressed that US position as set forth in Gates’ offer based on belief that, if we made available national nuclear capabilities for France, result would be harmful to Alliance. [1 line of source text not declassified] Acting Secretary queried whether only alternative to French non-participation was a series of bilaterals. It should be possible to organize multilateral program of interested countries minus France.

3. Spaak felt there would be great reluctance other countries proceed on this basis. Adenauer’s strong ties with De Gaulle and UK reluctance proceed in view of UK-French differences in Six-Seven dispute would make questionable whether Germany and UK would be willing proceed without France. Would also be difficult for Belgium and Netherlands accept MRBM’s if there is to be no French participation. Any chance of Norwegian or Danish cooperation would be further prejudiced. Spaak felt, however, that if US made offer to sell certain limited number to France along lines his suggestion and if France rejected this, would then be much easier to organize multilateral program without France. Other countries would feel that US had made generous effort to meet French desires and that French had nonetheless refused. Given fact that all countries now generally impressed with importance meeting military requirement as result excellent Norstad briefing,³ would be quite possible proceed. Spaak also stressed that other countries would not be resentful of US offer permit France buy limited number missiles and unlikely that such offer to France would set in motion similar requests from other countries. Other NATO countries, although not at all agreeing with French determination have small independent deterrent, accept French desire for this as fact of life which must be somehow dealt with. WEU Treaty in effect prohibits Germany from independent nuclear weapon program of its own, and BENELUX countries and Italy unlikely press for independent national deterrent.

[1 paragraph (8-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

5. Acting Secretary expressed appreciation for frank exchange of views, cautioned that did not wish give impression that US had changed its position but promised that we would give serious consideration to Spaak’s points. Summarized Spaak proposal by saying that he understood Spaak to mean that US should give some help to French in gaining independent deterrent capability without modifying Atomic Energy Act and that in exchange we would obtain greater French cooperation in NATO.

6. Spaak agreed with this, emphasizing that his proposal involved step which US could take without amendment in Atomic Energy Act. Felt other NATO countries generally would be favorably inclined towards such step by US, but would not want or expect us to go so far as to modify Act to meet De Gaulle point. Spaak emphasized that sole question is what De Gaulle himself will think. Said he could give no guarantee on this score but stressed that pro-NATO elements in France, including French military, would be heartened by such offer from US.

[2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

Dillon

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5612/6–460. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Fessenden on June 14, cleared with Kohler and McElhiney, and approved by Acting Secretary Dillon. Repeated to London and Bonn.
1. Spaak’s conversation with Dillon on June 13, where Spaak reiterated the opposition of most NATO countries to tripartitism, is summarized in Topol 2493 to Paris, June 15. (ibid., 740.5612/6–1560)
2. Polto 2394 from Paris, June 4, transmitted the translation of the text of a note from Spaak to the U.S. Government concerning Secretary Gates’ proposal on MRBMs at the NATO Defense Ministers Meeting on April 1 (see footnote 6, Document 254). In his note, Spaak said he was convinced that neither of Gates’ two alternatives on MRBMs would be accepted by all the NATO countries, and the rejection of Gates’ proposal would “bring about real military and political dangers.” Spaak added that “the most certain opposition will come on the part of France, and I must say that I understand it. (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5612/6–460)
3. See footnote 7, Document 258.