Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

222. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

US/MC/30

Paris, September 3, 1959, 9:30 a.m.

PRESIDENT’S TRIP TO EUROPE

August-September 1959

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.
  • The President
  • The Secretary
  • Ambassador Burgess
  • Mr. Merchant
  • Mr. Nolting, Reporting Officer
  • Col. Walters, Interpreter
• NATO
  • Paul-Henri Spaak, Secretary General of NATO
  • J.M.A.H. Luns, Dutch Foreign Minister, in capacity as President of the North Atlantic Council

SUBJECT

• President Eisenhower’s meeting with Foreign Minister Luns and Monsieur Spaak

The President opened by referring to his talks with President De Gaulle, saying that the most important thing from NATO’s point of view was the warm endorsement given to NATO by De Gaulle.¹ De Gaulle had said he had no intention of weakening the Alliance. The President remarked that that’s good as far as it goes; but of course they would have more conversations on this subject.

Concerning Algeria, the President said the US position conveyed to De Gaulle was that we would look at the program when it is made precise by De Gaulle and see if we could support it. The President remarked that heads of other French Community governments were apparently influencing De Gaulle towards a more liberal policy in Algeria. Later on, he said that he had suggested to De Gaulle that French Community leaders could be very helpful to him in popularizing a liberal program for Algeria, inasmuch as they could view such a program from an objective point of view and some of them had certain ties with the Arabs. De Gaulle thought this suggestion an interesting one. Re the UN aspect of Algerian problem, the President said De Gaulle had stated he would not allow French representatives to participate in the UN debate but he will outline his plan and program for Algeria and say what he has done there already. The President characterized this as a move in the right direction.

Touching upon conversations in Bonn, the President said there was nothing new to report, that everything went fine.

On London talks, the President said Macmillan is inclined to the position that, regardless of substantive progress or lack of it, there must be a summit meeting. The President said that Adenauer and De Gaulle agree with him that there must be some prospect of substantive achievement at a summit meeting before such a meeting should be laid on. He said that other problems discussed in the UK were mainly “local”, but that of course both the UK and Germany support NATO strongly.

The President said his trips had given him an opportunity to say again that he was not intending to negotiate with Khrushchev, kbut that he was frankly trying to “soften him up a little”. He emphasized that the exchange of visits did not indicate any new US policy.

The President said that Adenauer seemed vague on what to do next concerning German reunification and Berlin problems. The President said that he felt it necessary at some point to find ways to eliminate the need for occupation forces in Berlin, but as of now the US is going to stand firm.

Reverting to his talks with De Gaulle, the President said he personally thinks De Gaulle’s program for Africa and his Community plan are good and deserve US support. De Gaulle had talked about the principles of the French Community as (a) self-government (excluding foreign affairs and defense); (b) economic and social improvement; (c) a “fixed commitment” concerning the right to independence. He had said that he would see whether the same problem could not be applied to Algeria after pacification. The President added that he was not given further details as to how De Gaulle expected to do this, and appreciated his political difficulties in spelling out his program.

Foreign Minister Luns said it was necessary to agree on what Spaak and he could tell NATO Council regarding the President’s talks with others as summarized above.

Secretary Herter thought that no specifics should be given. Mr. Spaak agreed that he and Luns should be very cautious in informing the Council of what the President had told them.

Luns said that the Netherlands were worried lest the French links with North Africa should be cut as a result of failure to solve the Algerian problem and were looking for ways to help.

The President said that the US, he believes, will be in a better position in the next two or three weeks to evaluate the French program for Algeria. He can’t be sure as to how this will evolve but feels better about the problem as a result of his meetings with De Gaulle. He said that if the US sees a reasonable proposition of the French, we will support.

Luns said he does not see how, given the political situation and the position of the army in France, De Gaulle can spell out his program. The President said if de Gaulle can lay out a reasonable plan before the UNGA opens, friends of France can do much to support. That’s as far as he can go as of now.

On the Khrushchev visit, Luns said the vast majority of NATO countries endorse the President’s position that there must be clear signs of progress before a summit meeting should be laid on. The President said that he was frankly not optimistic about what he would get out of Khrushchev. He remarked that Khrushchev himself had said that in a war both sides would be destroyed, and that this marked a recognition of the facts which in itself was something. The President further remarked that Khrushchev was bringing most of his family with him, and he supposed that a man who was intent on making trouble would not bring his family along.

Spaak, reverting to NATO, said that the only serious problem in NATO is the French problem. The French Government has taken a very difficult attitude and has blocked many things, mostly in the military field, which the other members consider necessary. It is difficult to know what the French want. On Algeria, Spaak said that it was impossible and unreasonable to expect the US to give the French a blank check. Mr. Luns indicated his agreement. Both Mr. Luns and Mr. Spaak emphasized the importance of having the French program for Algeria set forth in specific terms. But Spaak stressed his view that it will continue to be very difficult in NATO if NATO members cannot give the French “some support” on the Algerian problem. De Gaulle is the only man who can bring off a liberal solution, but he has a difficult political situation and Spaak was not sure that he would make a clear statement of liberal policy. Spaak said that on the general question of handling relations between the East and West, NATO’s attitude was good and solid. Spaak stressed, however, that a clash in the UN on Algeria will be a very bad thing for NATO.

The President said that De Gaulle had brought up the subject of the NATO command, saying that the NATO command structure was “amorphous” and not good for instilling a national patriotic spirit in the people and troops. The President had told him that he had foreseen this point of view many years before, and had said at the outset of NATO that he believed the greatest patriot was the greatest supporter of NATO; further that De Gaulle’s thought if pushed to a logical conclusion would fracture all alliances. The President said De Gaulle understood but apparently did not agree. On this point the President said De Gaullesaid that “for a country such as ours” his diagnosis was correct. The President replied that “we are talking about Western Europe”, implying that strictly national defense is impossible. The President said he had pointed out to De Gaulle that he was supporting European integration in economic fields; why not in the military as well?

Luns interjected that integration means to the French France’s leadership. This is true in the economic field, and he believes the same would be true in the military; i.e., if the French have a great share of NATO leadership things will be okay from their point of view. Spaak said that he felt we shouldn’t get into a battle of semantics between “close cooperation” and “integration”. The President agreed but pointed out that it was De Gaulle who had raised the problem.

The President said the discussion of NATO led to a discussion regarding the nuclear position. He described to De Gaulle how US forces are built around nuclear power but said it was a false assumption that any fight would start a nuclear war. The President repeated that De Gaulle seemed to him vague on what he wants concerning global strategy. The President said he told De Gaulle that the only basis for keeping US divisions in Europe is NATO. The main purpose of NATO strategy is to deter war. The President said that while in his view De Gaulle hasn’t thought through the problem clearly, he undoubtedly wants a bigger voice. The President said he thinks these difficulties can be ironed out. Algeria is the main problem. Spaak asked what De Gaulle means when he asks for a bigger voice. The President replied that he meant a bigger voice in the formation of global policy. He said he had told De Gaulle that we are perfectly willing to discuss, but will not “talk NATO affairs outside NATO”. We would talk Africa or New Caledonia, but not NATO affairs. The President said De Gaulle first wanted an institution, an organization, to direct global strategy, but that now he seems to have abandoned this idea. The Secretary agreed that the French position on a tripartite directorate has shifted. Luns hit at a three-power directorate as unacceptable to NATO, and returned to Algeria as the main point where satisfaction might be given to the French, stressing Debré’s strong view in this matter.

The Secretary gave clear warning against giving details of the Eisenhower–De Gaulle conversations to the North Atlantic Council. He added that De Gaulle’s problem on Algeria was how to translate his broad principles into a program.

The President summed up by saying that he was encouraged by his talks with De Gaulle. He had thought De Gaulle would make great demands upon him, but he hasn’t done so as yet.

The President then said he wanted very much to make his “bow” to the North Atlantic Council; and that he was going to assure them that there was no inner circle or coalition trying to run NATO.

It was agreed between Spaak and Luns that they should report this conversation to NAC only in general terms, leaving the impression no great or insuperable difficulties have been encountered by President Eisenhower on this trip.

0. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Nolting, cleared with Merchant, and approved by Herter on September 10 and by Goodpaster on September 11. The meeting was held at the U.S. Embassy Residence.
1. Regarding Eisenhower’s talks with European leaders during his trip, see Part 2, Document 129.