Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

223. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

September 25, 1959, 11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Second-Generation IRBMs for Europe

PARTICIPANTS

• Department of State
  • The Under Secretary
  • Robert Murphy, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
  • Livingston T. Merchant, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
  • G. Frederick Reinhardt, Counselor
  • Gerard C. Smith, Assistant Secretary for Policy Planning
  • Ivan B. White, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
  • James Wilson, U/MSC
  • John W. Tuthill, EUR/RA
  • Robert N. Magill, EUR/RA
  • Raymond Courtney, S/AE
  • Graham Martin, U
• Department of Defense
  • John N. Irwin, II, Assistant Secretary for ISA
  • Robert H. Knight, Deputy Assistant Secretary for ISA
  • Brig. General James F. Whisenand, Special Assistant to Chairman, JCS
  • Brig. General James H. Polk, ISA
  • Major General John A. Dabney, ISA
  • William M. Leffingwell, ISA
  • Alvin G. Waggoner, Special Assistant for Guided Missiles and Space Operations
  • Colonel Charles Billingslea, Deputy Director, European Region, ISA

Mr. Irwin cited the President’s offer at the NATO Heads of Government Meeting in December 1957 to provide United States assistance for coordinated NATO development and production of IRBMs.¹ He observed that this offer represented a United States commitment and that an early decision was needed as to how we should go about implementing this commitment. Mr. Irwin set forth the range of political questions involved in this decision. Those included the question of NATO versus independent national control of the IRBMs, [4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified], Mr. Irwin referred to the recent conversation that he and Secretary Gates had had in London with Sir Richard Powell on this subject, and said that Powell had expressed serious reservations regarding any program that might lead to an independent German IRBM force, or even to the deployment of IRBMs in Germany under NATO control.² Powell had indicated that the UK would be satisfied, on the other hand, with a dual control over IRBMs in Europe similar to that obtaining with respect to the Thors in the UK. When Mr. Irwin had suggested that the UK might help by placing their Thors under NATO, Powell had said that, while the position of the Thors was negotiable, such a move would raise questions about the status of the UK V-bomber force and that there could be no question of assigning this force to NATO. Mr. Irwin described the Germans as (a) being willing to participate in an IRBM program, but (b) reserving their position on the question of deployment in Germany. He observed that a German requirement for deployment would undoubtedly develop in due course and he thought General Norstad probably had German deployment in mind for second-generation IRBMs. Mr. Irwin said that the French quite clearly were determined to proceed independently, if not within NATO, on an IRBM program, and that they, along with the British, would be insistent on having an independent IRBM capability in addition to whatever IRBMs might be placed under SACEUR’s control. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

Mr. Irwin then pointed out that, leaving aside the political questions, there were three concrete approaches available to us. The first was the Meili plan, which called for U.S. technical assistance for a long-term, indigenous European development and production program, under which the first increment of IRBMs (estimated by Meili but not confirmed by Norstad at approximately 100) would be assigned to NATO, with production over and above that figure for independent national requirements. Such a program would probably take from 8 to 10 years. Mr. Waggoner said that if such a program were not based on an existing U.S. missile design, the development cost to the Europeans would range between $500,000,000 and $1,000,000,000, depending on the extent to which they undertook to develop a new type of missile and on the extent of U.S. technical assistance. The second approach would be to sell or grant Polaris missiles solely for the purpose of meeting SACEUR’s 1963 requirements, with the Europeans to produce the ground support equipment. General Norstad favors such an approach. He has also indicated that he would not support a long-term European production program geared to the French range requirements of 2,500 to 3,000 nautical miles, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. The third approach would be a variation on the first two. Mr. Irwin indicated that this might be accomplished along the lines of a proposal which he has been informed will be made shortly by the NATO International Staff. This proposal reportedly will provide for meeting SACEUR’s requirements through U.S. provision of 30 to 50 Polaris missiles and technical assistance, with the balance of requirements, both NATO and national, to be met from European production.

Mr. Waggoner estimated that $100 million would cover the cost of U.S. technical assistance and 30 to 40 missiles, while the cost to the Europeans for achieving an initial operational capability would be on the order of $400-$500 million (exclusive of production costs). He indicated that such a program could meet SACEUR’s requirements in the time frame from 1963 to 1965. In response to Mr. Dillon’s questions, Mr. Waggoner said that this assumed European production of Polaris without significant modification. He said any significant modification of Polaris would involve time slippage and increased cost to the Europeans. U.S. provision of full technical assistance, special tooling and a few sample missiles for a European Polaris production program (without providing any missiles for deployment), would cost about $50,000,000 and the program could be completed by 1966 or 1967. If we did not provide some portion of the Polaris missiles for deployment, the Europeans might be expected to modify the design somewhat rather than to produce a “Chinese copy” of Polaris. Mr. Waggoner indicated that the scope of U.S. technical assistance could be varied considerably and that the cost to the Europeans would depend on the scope of this assistance. He emphasized that the estimates he had cited were “in the ball park”.

Mr. Dillon asked how the question of country deployment would be handled, and Mr. Irwin said that he thought this should be worked out by SACEUR on the basis of a prior general commitment by the participating countries to accept deployment. Mr. Dillon observed that he thought this was a question that might have to be worked out carefully in advance, with reference also to non-participating countries in which deployment might be desirable. He also asked whether any consideration had been given, in consultation with General Norstad, to the impact that the various approaches might have on the meeting of MC 70 requirements.³ Mr. Irwin observed that either a long-term, indigenous European program or a Polaris program should undoubtedly involve some diversion of resources and consequent cut-backs in the achievement of MC 70. He added that he thought General Norstad would be willing to accept some delays in achieving MC 70 goals if the IRBM program were developed to meet his time-phased requirements.

[5 lines of source text not declassified] Mr. Dillon observed that our decision should take into account the prospects for reaching a disarmament agreement and the question of whether the building of independent strategic nuclear forces prejudice the possibility, or the implementation, of such an agreement. [8-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

Mr. Smith asked what consideration had been given to hard sites versus mobility in deployment of the IRBMs, and was informed that any early deployment would probably have to be with hard sites. Mobility would be more expensive and could only be developed for later deployment; the cost and time scale of mobile deployment would depend on whether it involved railroads, or barges, or was designed for general cross-country mobility.

Mr. Dillon asked what position Defense would like to have the Department take, and Mr. Irwin said that he would like State approval of an offer of U.S. technical assistance for the NATO program. He said that such an offer would honor our commitment and would enable progress to be made in practical arrangements. Mr. Dillon asked what the timing should be and what procedure would be used in making the offer. Mr. Irwin thought the offer should be made as soon as possible and through NATO Assistant Secretary General Fiske⁴ to the Working Group.⁵ Mr. Dillon suggested that there were a number of political conditions that would have to be attached to the offer. [6 lines of source text not declassified] Mr. Irwin observed that implementation of our technical assistance could be used as an effective lever in the development of acceptable political arrangements, and Mr. Dillon added that the extent of our political leverage would depend on the magnitude of our aid. Mr. Merchant asked whether a failure by the U.S. to provide technical assistance would be regarded by the Europeans as defaulting on our December 1957 offer. Mr. Irwin said he thought the French in particular would consider this to be a major policy reversal.

Mr. Dillon concluded the discussion by saying that the Department would make every effort to reach an early decision, but that he thought whatever agreed State-Defense position was worked out should probably be reviewed by the President.

Mr. Irwin said that meanwhile Defense would undertake to draft a telegram indicating their views on what the instructions to USRO should be.⁶

0. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D199. Secret. Drafted by Magill and approved by Dillon on October 1. The meeting was held in the Department of State.
1. For text of the U.S. proposal on IRBMs at the 1957 NAC Heads of Government Meeting, December 16, 1957, see Department of State Bulletin, January 6, 1958, p. 9.
2. No record of this conversation between Irwin and Powell, which probably took place during the President’s visit to the United Kingdom, has been found.
3. Regarding MC-70, see Document 131.
4. Robert B. Fiske succeeded Meili as Assistant Secretary General for Production and Logistics, International Staff/Secretariat, NATO, in June.
5. Documentation on the NATO Working Group on IRBMs, which was created in late January, is in Department of State, Central Files 740.56, 740.5611, and 740.5612.
6. Not found.