221. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower0
OTHERS PRESENT
- General Norstad
- General Goodpaster
The President said the purpose of his meeting with Khrushchev is to bring about some lessening of tension, try to find some step toward disarmament, and bring some measure of confidence and relief to the minds of our people.1 Progress in these discussions has been miniscule to date, with only the Austrian Treaty to our credit. Some conflicts have been resolved over the last few years around the world, but generally not through negotiation. The President thought he personally might make an appeal to Khrushchev in terms of his place in history, point out that if he wants to gain such a place through making a change to improve the international climate, the President is confident that something can be worked out. If he does not wish to make such a change, then there is not much use in talking further. The President said by such a discussion he could try to satisfy his own conscience.
The President recalled that he had initially thought the other Western nations would recommend a Western summit, and in fact they did initially. De Gaulle then opposed it, however, saying it would look like a preparation for the President to speak for all of them. As a result he is having to visit the capitals singly. In addition De Gaulle is making his visit to France a State visit, in order to build up French prestige.
General Norstad said that De Gaulle is counting a great deal on this visit. He added that Adenauer wants the United States to give some gesture of support to France. He added that Adenauer’s thinking seemed to be confused on the matter of a “tripartite directorate for the free world.” Initially Adenauer said he supported De Gaulle’s demands. When told that there exists no established joint organization between the United States and the United Kingdom, Adenauer changed his position. The President said he is ready to tell Adenauer and De Gaulle that we are quite ready to have the same consultations with the French as we do with the British. General Norstad expressed opposition to a tripartite organization. He felt that De Gaulle would not push this too hard. Norstad said he had had a good talk with Joxe, and had stressed to Joxe that the [Page 478] meeting between the President and De Gaulle should be one of discussion and not demands by De Gaulle.2 He added that Joxe and others of the French hope that the President will take the opportunity to give De Gaulle a lecture on the true meaning of collective security and its application on a worldwide scale. De Gaulle apparently has no conception of the need for integration of forces. In fact, his military thinking stopped with World War II. The President said he intends to stress that we are all partners in this operation, and that no one is trying to dictate to others.
General Norstad suggested a theme that we have two aims—first to work with France, and second to do this without detracting from our relations with other countries. He said the outstanding item on De Gaulle’s list is the Algerian situation. There are indications that De Gaulle is toying with the idea of making an explicit statement of his program for Algeria. He is going there on August 27th to take the pulse of the people and especially the young officers, and also to try to recondition their thinking away from “peace by force” and toward a liberal solution. General Norstad said he hoped that the State Department could find something the United States could say to support the French; however, first we must know what their policy and program are for Algeria. The President recalled that the French want to walk out of the United Nations General Assembly on the grounds that Algeria is an internal affair, but they want us to stay in the Assembly and fight their case for them. General Norstad said there is great bitterness that we are “helping France’s enemies” as the French term it, by allowing the presence of Algerian representatives in the United States. He suggested the President might say that the American people have put great effort and expense into strengthening peace in the world, that they support the rule of law and accommodations through negotiation and that the United States is not supporting the use of force in Algeria.
The President recalled that Ambassador Dillon and others have stated that we would support France in anything peacefully agreed with its colonies. However, they must understand the depth of our anticolonialism. There is the question of how to “square” the actions of French troops in Algeria with these statements. It can be said that they are there to maintain peace and order, but that the final solution must be a peaceful one.
General Norstad thought that the French would lay less stress on atomic questions than had earlier seemed likely, perhaps merely expressing regret rather than making demands for such weapons. He said that he personally thought that giving NATO atomic weapons might be [Page 479] a very good step although the French would not be keen on this, since they want them on a national basis.
General Norstad said he understood why the President is not going to NATO on this trip, since Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers would then come in and make a Roman holiday of the meeting. He said the Permanent Council would be most appreciative of a visit, however. The President said he would turn over in his mind the possibility of limiting his talk with Luns and Spaak to about thirty minutes and then going over with them to the Palais de Chaillot. He asked me to talk to Mr. Herter about this. As the President thought about it he said he liked the idea very much but there could be absolutely no advance notice.
The President then commented that we have stocks of soft currencies in many countries, including France, Germany, Belgium and others. He is very anxious to find ways of carrying on our overseas activities without draining our own gold reserves. He asked me to check with Treasury and Defense if they are finding every possible way to use these funds and save a drain on U.S. gold.
The President next told General Norstad that he felt there is strong reason for the United States to start pulling some of its forces out of Europe. We went there in 1951 to cover the period until the Europeans could form forces of their own. He thought the British, Germans and others are taking advantage of us. General Norstad said he hoped this could be started within the next few years, probably in connection with disarmament steps. If effective control and inspection existed we could safely contemplate pulling some forces back. We sent our divisions to Europe to help them over an emergency. Now if we talk about taking out one division they claim we are deserting them. He said we are spending too many billions all around the world without the Europeans taking a commensurate load. General Norstad thought it would be quite appropriate for the President to stress this to De Gaulle. The President said he intends to talk to Adenauer also as to why the Germans are being so slow. He does not want to wait for disarmament. He thinks some of the countries should take some responsibility. General Norstad agreed with all of this but said it will be a most difficult job to carry out. The President said we must do something along these lines, since the United States lost $4.3 billion in gold last year.
Brigadier General, USA