Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

794C.0221/8–553

No. 668
Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson) to the Under Secretary of State (Smith)

top secret

Washington, August 5, 1953.

Subject:

• Material for your Telephone Conversation with Mr. Kyes Concerning the Japanese Treaty Islands.¹

1. The NSC action was taken on June 29 in NSC 125/6 (Tab A).² The recommendation that we relinquish civil administration over the Amami group to Japan was subject to the understanding that “in view of the current situation in the Far East” implementation would be deferred pending review of the situation by the National Security Council on the recommendation of the Secretaries of State and Defense within ninety days.

2. Now that there is an armistice, it is important that we move rapidly to take this action. Ambassador Allison points out (Tab B)³ that much of the psychological gain will be lost if there is any advance leak of our intention to return the Amami group. In addition, there is the possibility that the Russians may make a major gesture of some sort to improve their relations with Japan. If our action on the Amami group follows this gesture, it will appear defensive and will almost completely lose its value, particularly since we are not prepared to relinquish control over Okinawa and the other islands outside the Amami group.

3. The Secretary plans to stop in Japan on August 8 on his way back from Korea. This furnishes an excellent opportunity to make the announcement of our intentions, and we can have the NSC at its meeting tomorrow give him the necessary authorization. A draft of a statement is attached (Tab C).⁴ It emphasizes three points: (a) return of the Amami group as soon as the necessary procedural details are worked out; (b) retention of the other islands during the present international tensions; and (c) reviewing present arrangements for civil administration in these other islands in order to encourage the development of closer economic and cultural ties with Japan. All of these points are consistent with the NSC action.

4. We should not delay the announcement until after base rights are negotiated. If we attempt to negotiate first, knowledge of our intentions will leak and we lose the advantage we otherwise gain. We do not believe there will be any difficulty in arranging with the Japanese for the necessary base rights on the Amami group.⁵

1. No record of this planned conversation has been found in Department of State files.
2. Document 657.
3. Tab B is telegram 8 from Tokyo, Aug. 4, supra.
4. The draft statement differs in several particulars from the statement as transmitted in Tedul 10 to Seoul, Aug. 5, infra. The following statement in the draft is omitted from Tedul 10: “Recognizing the close economic and cultural ties that exist between the peoples of these islands and Japan and that residual sovereignty over these islands rests in Japan, the United States has determined that it will not propose that these islands be placed under the trusteeship system of the United Nations.” Also omitted in the version in Tedul 10 is a résumé of Article III of the Peace Treaty.
5. The following handwritten note by Robert J.G. McClurkin appears in the margin of the source text: “8/5. Action taken & 8–453 decision made before NSC meeting, to make announcement. RJGM”.