Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 125/6

No. 657
Note by the Acting Executive Secretary (Gleason) to the National Security Council

top secret
NSC 125/6

Washington, June 29, 1953.

United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Japan

References:

A.

NSC Action Nos. 761,¹ 823 and 824²

B.

NSC 125/5

C.

Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject “The Japanese Treaty Islands”, dated June 15, 1953

D.

NSC 125/2,³ and Annex to NSC 125/3

E.

Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated August 7, 1952, April 27, 1953⁴ and June 23, 1953

F.

NIE–52⁵

The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director, Bureau of the Budget at the 151st Council meeting on June 25, 1953, adopted the statement of policy contained in NSC 125/5 subject to the following amendments (NSC Action No. 823–a):

Page 2, subparagraph 3–a-(1): Revise the last sentence to read: “However, it is not probable that this issue can be resolved until favorable Senate action is taken on the NATO agreements.”

Page 3, subparagraph 3–b-(1): Revise the last sentence to read: “Nevertheless the United States should continue to encourage the Japanese to develop defense forces consistent with the economic capability of Japan.”

The National Security Council at its meeting on June 25, 1953, also adopted the recommendation of the Department of State, contained in paragraph 18–a-(2) of the report on the Japanese Treaty Islands transmitted by Reference C, to relinquish civil administration over the Amami group to Japan as a matter of policy, subject to the understanding set forth in NSC Action No. 824–a (see the footnote to paragraph 4 of the enclosure). In addition, the Council agreed that the Secretary of Defense, in collaboration with the Department of State, the Bureau of the Budget, and other interested agencies, should recommend for Council consideration a policy on the civil administration of those Ryukyu Islands remaining under U.S. jurisdiction, which would reduce U.S. responsibility for such civil administration as rapidly as compatible with U.S. military requirements (NSC Action No. 824–b).

The President on June 26, 1953, approved the statement of policy contained in NSC 125/5, as amended and adopted by the Council, and the action of the Council with respect to the Japanese Treaty Islands. The statement of policy contained in NSC 125/5, as amended and approved, is enclosed herewith. The action of the Council with respect to the Japanese Treaty Islands is incorporated in paragraph 4 of the enclosure. The President directs the implementation of the enclosure by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government under the coordination of the Secretaries of State and Defense.

The enclosed statement of policy sets forth proposed courses of action to which the United States should give special emphasis at the present time. It does not supersede the objectives and courses of action set forth in NSC 125/2.

S. Everett Gleason

[Enclosure]

Statement of Policy by the National Security Council on United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Japan

1. The statement of United States objectives and courses of action with respect to Japan in NSC 125/2 (approved August 7, 1952) is reaffirmed.

2. In the long term, Japanese economic viability is of critical importance to the security of the United States. This viability will be extremely difficult to achieve. Unrestricted trade with Communist China would not of itself solve Japan’s economic problem. Although Japan may achieve substantial gains in foreign trade, those gains will not, for the foreseeable future, be so great as to remove the necessity for substantial direct or indirect assistance, part of which could come from expenditures in Japan for U.S. forces. (See paragraph 7–c of the Progress Report attached to NSC 125/5.⁶)^*

3. In carrying out the policy in NSC 125/2, the United States should give special emphasis to the following courses of action at the present time and in the near future.

a. Political

(1) Endeavor to resolve the question of criminal jurisdiction over U.S. and UN forces in Japan in a way which will help to eliminate friction between the Japanese Government and countries which have troops in Japan. However, it is not probable that this issue can be resolved until favorable Senate action is taken on the NATO agreements.⁷ (pp. 5–6)

(2) Continue to explore the possibilities of collective security arrangements in the Pacific area which would include Japan. (pp. 68)

(3) Continue to offer U.S. assistance, when appropriate, on reparations and fishery problems between Japan and the Philippines, Indonesia, the Associated States and Burma; and undertake other measures which would help eliminate friction between Japan and other free Far Eastern nations. (pp. 2, 8, 35)

(4) Impress upon the Japanese and Republic of Korea Governments the desirability of resuming negotiations for the establishment of normal relations and the settlement of outstanding issues. (p. 7)

(5) Combat neutralist, communist and anti-U.S. sentiment in Japan, particularly by immediate implementation of the “Psychological Strategy Plan for Japan” (PSB D–27, January 30, 1953),⁸ which stresses efforts to influence the Japanese intellectual classes, support for anti-communist groups, support of those favoring speedy rearmament, and promotion of mutual understanding between Japan and other free Far Eastern nations. (pp. 11–15)

(6) Encourage and support the anti-Communist elements of the labor movement in Japan in order to counter Communist penetration into Japanese trade unions. (pp. 11–13)

b. Military

(1) Continue to assist the Japanese Government in the development of defense forces to the levels now considered appropriate for Japan by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and discuss with the Japanese Government on a broad basis these levels and the timing of a program for reaching the levels which are mutually agreed as a result of these discussions. Constitutional restrictions, current political developments, and Japanese reluctance, for both political and economic reasons, to make the necessary effort, indicate that at the present rate the Japanese defense forces will not reach the ten-division force by June 30, 1954. Nevertheless, the United States should continue to encourage the Japanese to develop defense forces consistent with the economic capability of Japan.⁹ (pp. 1820)

(2) Further develop joint planning with the Japanese for the defense of Japan, and in particular work out a command structure for the Japanese National Safety Forces which would permit joint tactical use with U.S. forces in case of emergency. (pp. 20–21)

c. Economic

(1) As soon as developments with respect to the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act permit, seek Japanese accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and negotiate with Japan for tariff reductions. In the meantime, refrain from raising duties or applying other restrictions on Japanese exports to the United States. (pp. 28–30)

(2) Obtain a treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation, and treaties for the avoidance of double taxation. (p. 31)

(3) Exercise U.S. good offices to further Japanese participation in trade and investment arrangements; assist Japanese access to resources; encourage private American investment in the technical assistance arrangements with Japan; and foster Japanese productivity. (pp. 30–31, 34–36)

(4) Facilitate sound loans by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Export-Import Bank for economical projects improving Japan’s productivity. (pp. 36–38)

(5) Review from time to time with the Japanese Government, the respective United States and Japanese contributions to security, and adjust the arrangements governing (a) support of United States forces in Japan, (b) grant or sale of military equipment for Japanese forces, (c) offshore procurement of military equipment in Japan in order to provide a maximum Japanese contribution and to render assistance required by Japan’s financial position. (pp. 2228, 32–34)

(6) Develop with the Japanese, a program for Japanese industrial mobilization for defense, and support such a program by United States offshore purchases with Defense and Mutual Security funds. (pp. 22–23, 32–34)

(7) Use United States influence and bargaining power to obtain the following measures on the part of the Japanese:

(a) Non-inflationary fiscal and monetary policies. (p. 37)

(b) Maximization of domestic investment channeled into most important areas. (p. 37)

(c) Avoidance of forms of organization and practices tending to restrict productivity and impair Japan’s trading position. (pp. 38–39)

4. The United States should relinquish civil administration over the Amami group to Japan, subject to agreement with Japan on U.S. military rights in this group, but maintain the degree of control and authority now exercised pursuant to Article 3 of the Peace Treaty with Japan, over all the other islands mentioned in Article 3, during the present international tensions in the Far East.^†

1. See footnote 10, Document 642.
2. See footnotes 6 and 10, Document 655.
3. Document 588.
4. Not printed. (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 125 Series)
5. Document 567.
6. See Document 646.
7. Subsequent parenthetical references are to the Annex to NSC 125/3. [Footnote in the source text. The Annex is not printed.]
7. In NSC 125/5, this sentence reads as follows: “However, it is not probable that this issue can be resolved until Senate action on the NATO agreements.”
8. See Document 628.
9. In NSC 125/5, this sentence reads as follows: “Nevertheless, the United States should continue efforts to persuade the Japanese Government to accelerate the development of its defense forces.”
10. The National Security Council adopted this recommendation of the Department of State as a matter of policy; subject to the understanding that, in view of the current situation in the Far East, implementation of this policy and any public announcement as proposed in paragraph 18–b of the report transmitted to the Council by memorandum of June 15, 1953, will be deferred pending review of the situation by the Council on the recommendation of the Secretaries of State and Defense within 90 days. [Footnote in the source text.]