Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

794.5 MSP/7–253: Telegram

No. 658
The Ambassador in Japan (Allison) to the Department of State

secret
priority

Tokyo, July 2, 1953—5 p.m.

22. For the Secretary. Department distribution only. Re Department telegram 8, July 1,¹ and Embassy’s telegram 3, July 1.² I discussed problem briefly with Robertson just prior his departure Tokyo for Korea.³ I gained impression his principal worry was one of timing and not wishing to create conditions which might adversely affect General Clark’s present concentration on Korean situation, but that in principle Robertson agreed with position in present draft agreement providing for MAAG to come under Embassy rather than under Commander-in-Chief Far East.

If question of responsibility for MAAG was exclusively internal United States matter, as Department seems to indicate, it would be simple matter as relations here between Commander-in-Chief, Far East, and Embassy are good and I should not anticipate any friction whether or not MAAG is responsible to CINCFE or Embassy. However, I cannot agree with Department that this is entirely internal United States matter as it is definitely not so regarded by Japanese.

Question assignment to Japan of MAAG as result of MSA agreement has often been raised in the press as well as in Diet discussions. Japanese Government officials have closely scanned other MSA agreements and know that in all other cases MAAG comes under Embassy. One of principal reasons why Japanese Government has been slow to take definite position on expediting rearmament and on accepting MSA has been real fear of Yoshida and others in government that this would inevitably mean domination of civilian elements by the military. This point has also been frequently raised by opposition parties in Diet and elsewhere. Present organization of Safety Advisory Group for Japan, which is under CINCFE, bears in Japanese mind close relationship to old occupation days and if any MAAG group set up as result of ment were also to be under CINCFE this would increase belief held by many that occupation is only continued under another name. Japanese also Have expressed fear that if MAAG kept under CINCFE group will have tendency to remain large, whereas if entirely new MAAG organization set up under Embassy if could be reduced to minimum.

There is great sensitivity in Japan over continuing domination of certain fields of activity by US military and while real effort has been made by top US military officials to create understanding of new relationship with Japan, nevertheless it is only too apparent here that many of present US training group adopt parental attitude toward the Japanese. I greatly fear that is allowed to remain under CINCFE it will only further increase oppostion in Diet to present government policy of cooperation with US and would strengthen hands of those who claim US treats Japan as satellite rather than equal partner.

In view of urgency expressed by Japanese Foreign Office officials in beginning negotiations on draft MSA agreement (they have told us they hope agreement can be concluded by July 15), I believe it important we present them with complete draft agreement at earliest possible moment. I am fearful that if we begin by showing Japanese officials draft agreement which omits reference to position of MAAG, it will be difficult for State to obtain later Defense agreement to reinsert this sentence in its present form. While I realize CINCFE is opposed to this procedure and would so express himself strongly if queried by Washington, nevertheless I do believe there is real matter of principle involved here and that best thing to do is face it. I, therefore, strongly urge Department use all influence at its command to obtain presidential approval for MAAG in Japan to be placed under Embassy as it is in every other country. It will be most difficult, if not impossible, to explain satisfactorily any other action to the Japanese.

Allison

1. In this telegram, drafted in NA, the Department had suggested that since the Departments of State and Defense had been unable to resolve the question of whether any MAAG set up under a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement should be responsible to the Embassy or to CINCFE, the U.S. draft might omit mention of the subject entirely. “Although similar language included other agreements seems unnecessary retain sentence since purely internal US matter and omission can be explained Japanese on that basis.” (794.5 MSP/7–153)
2. In this telegram, the Ambassador had stressed the eagerness of the Japanese Government to commence negotiations for an MDA Agreement and urgently requested an agreed U.S. draft. He had, however, stated his feeling that it would be “extremely difficult to obtain official confidential agreement by Japanese Government to force goals approved by JCS. Japanese Government agreement, either formal or verbal, to meet limited force goals over five-year period or to increase defense forces as political and economic situation permits, is in my opinion best US can expect from approaching negotiations.” The Ambassador concluded that discussion of force goals, while it might take place concurrently with or soon after MDAA negotiations, should not impede conclusion of a standard MDAA. (794.5 MSP/7–153)
3. Robertson left Washington for the Far East on June 22. For documentation concerning his trip, see vol. xv, Part 2, pp. 1237 ff.