Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

794.5 MSP/7–653

No. 659
The Ambassador in Japan (Allison) to the Department of State

secret
No. 23

Tokyo, July 6, 1953.

Ref:

• Tokyo’s Desp. No. 2540 of May 29, 1953¹

Subject:

• Japanese Request to Negotiate for United States Military Assistance.

The Japanese Government, after having carefully prepared its position, wants aid under MSA. This fact is the upshot of weeks of careful consideration of all angles involved and of testing of political and public opinion. The note exchange of June 26² followed by the Foreign Office request of June 30 to start talks was a crystallization of the Government’s opinion that MSA is politically feasible and economically desirable.

The note exchange made public on June 26 was a turning point in the attitude of the Japanese Government not only toward MSA but also toward the problem of defense. The notes cleared the air, pretty well wiped out the inclination for further haggling over the meaning of the word “negotiation”, and turned attention from the desirability of an agreement to the terms of an agreement with the United States. The Cabinet decision to start talks on MSA appears to have strengthened the Government’s position so far as Progressive support is concerned and the Government’s firm attitude should go a long way to obtaining approval of an agreement when signed.

The note exchange of June 26 answered a number of questions to the satisfaction of many political figures and the press. First, they appeared happy to be reassured that a mutual security agreement would be intended to contribute to Japan’s domestic security and would impose no requirement on Japan to use its forces other than in self-defense, although critics claim that the United States reply was vague on the meaning of self-defense and could be broad enough to mean creation of military forces which might be sent outside of Japan. Second, the Japanese Government interpreted the United States reply to mean that Japan’s military obligations would be those contained in the Security Treaty and these obligations were promptly interpreted by the Foreign Office to mean only Articles I and II of the Treaty providing for the right of United States forces to be disposed in Japan and for prior approval by the United States before armed forces of other countries could enter Japan. The Foreign Minister also stated in the Diet that the preamble of the Security Treaty, in particular that part regarding Japan’s increasing assumption of responsibility for its own defense, was not an obligation but only an expectation by the United States. Third, the Foreign Office interpreted the United States reply to mean that Japan’s economic position would be considered an “indispensable condition” to development of its defense capacity. Japanese commentators were also quick to point out that the United States reply raised the likelihood of substantial procurement in Japan.

Diet and editorial observers nearly all pointed out that the note exchange was silent on the burning issue of increase of Japan’s forces. The Liberal Party claimed that the notes were consistent with Yoshida’s theory of gradual increase of defense forces, while opponents including the Progressives said that the big string which the United States will attach to MSA is a request for increase of Japan’s defense forces. Yoshida said that after reading the United States note of June 26 he could see no objection to a MSA agreement but he later stated that Japan should not as a general matter agree to increase of the NSF. Diet questioners also wanted to know whether a United States military advisory group would be set up in Japan, a point which has been raised a number of times in the Diet. The Foreign Office replied that an advisory group would probably be set up after conclusion of an agreement but would not interfere with Japan’s domestic affairs.

The Japanese decision to request talks on MSA has been the result of lengthy consideration. Secretary Dulles’ statement before Congressional Committees on May 5 that the mutual security program contained funds for Japan took the Japanese public by surprise. They could not understand why the United States was going to give Japan money if their Government had not asked for it, and if there had been no request they could not understand why the United States was going to give them the money. After laborious explanations by Government officials and a flood of statements out of Washington, a somewhat clearer understanding of how MSP works began to develop. Ambassador Allison’s speech of June 21 cleared up a number of doubts. Foreign Office statements and newspaper articles served to clarify and sharpen the issues. Many important papers remain opposed to MSA, such as Asahi, while others like Nihon Kaizai say Japan must wait and see what the United States has in mind. Mainichi has done a great deal to explain the issue and a valuable commentary by Kisaburo Yokota on June 20 was particularly helpful in analyzing the questions most Japanese ask, namely, what are the strings attached. Business groups have for some time been favorable to the idea of MSA. They have put considerable pressure on the Government to take a receptive position. One important influence on popular thinking is the fear that the Korean procurement will shortly end and, therefore, Japan must find a substitute, which they see in United States procurement under MSA.

Basically the Yoshida Cabinet says MSA fits the Government’s position on defense, especially if interpreted to mean that United States will not “demand” increase of the NSF, amendment of the Constitution, or dispatch of Japan’s forces overseas. The Liberal Party has also sought to interpret the United States position to mean that Japan’s economic position will be given prior consideration before measures to strengthen its defense capacity are considered, although this position is probably designed mostly for public consumption.

Certain tentative conclusions appear possible.

1. Japan will be reluctant to agree to any immediate substantial increase of its defense forces. See Emb despatch no. 2814 of June 30³ on the Kimura⁴ defense plan.

2. The Japanese Government will attempt, at least for domestic consumption, to limit application of 511 (a) assurances to obligations contained in Articles I and II of the Security Treaty and to the concept of self-defense rather than cooperation with the free world.

3. Japanese negotiators will emphasize Japan’s economic needs rather than its defense requirements in the hope of expanding procurement rather than emphasizing the need for military end items produced in the United States.

4. The Japanese may be reluctant to agree to establishment of a military advisory group on any large scale.

Certain by-products of the MSA debate are also apparent. First, there appears to be a growing feeling held by many Japanese that increase of Japan’s forces will enable United States forces to be reduced and eventually withdrawn from Japan. Several recent newspaper polls appear to support this view. Prime Minister Yoshida also stated that withdrawal of United States forces is an objective of his gradual increase of the defense program. Hitoshi Ashida and other Progressives have been more outspoken along this same line. Second, the Japanese Government remains very wary of any plan for a Pacific defense organization. Foreign Minister Okazaki has recently reported his view that Japan’s present system does not permit participation in a broader defense alliance. The action [of] the United States House of Representatives in endorsing the principle of collective security in the Pacific in connection with the Mutual Security Act for 1953 received little attention in Japan. It would appear that the Japanese public is not prepared for collective defense efforts and that Japan’s entry into a Pacific defense organization will require considerable development in Japan of both public understanding and defense capacity before further steps can be effectively considered.

For the Ambassador:

John M. Steeves

First Secretary of Embassy

1. Not printed. (794.5/5–2953)
2. See despatch 2790 from Tokyo, Document 656.
3. Not printed. (794.5/6–3053)
4. Tokutaro Kimura had been Director of the National Safety Agency since Oct. 30, 1952.