794C.0221/8–453: Telegram
No. 667
The Ambassador in Japan (Allison) to the Embassy in Korea1
priority
8. For the Secretary. Reference Embassy telegram 52, July 6.2 As you will recall from NSC 125/63 which was approved by the President, it has been decided relinquish control of Amami group but not to implement this decision or make any public announcement thereof pending NSC review the recommendation of Secretaries of State and Defense within 90 days of June 29.
My telegram 52, July 6 urged promptest possible action in view danger that any leak would deprive us of immense psychological advantage which we may expect to derive from this decision.
We have now learned informally from Japanese Foreign Office official that in his opinion Russians are preparing make bid any day to improve relations with Japan. There have already been several minor gestures and our contact thinks Russians may soon want to talk peace treaty. He is unable to judge whether Russian motives serious or merely for propaganda purposes to exacerbate US-Japan relations. However possibility of some overt friendly gesture by Russians is yet another important reason for us to announce NSC decision regarding Amami group soonest. If announcement were made only after Russian move, it would look like hasty defensive action on our part rather than genuine initiative by us. Under such circumstances psychological benefit to us would be nil.
This morning subject of islands came up in talk I had with Admiral Stump4 and Vice Admiral Briscoe. They both agreed that if we have decided to take action envisaged in NSC decision, we should move quickly.
[Page 1469]My staff recommends and I concur that urgent consideration be given to possibility your making announcement in Tokyo this Sunday. If this could be arranged I believe we would obtain maximum favorable reaction. Announcement of this importance while you are in Japan would have additional value of demonstrating you had important mission to carry out in Japan as well as in Korea. I continue to believe it is neither practical nor advantageous to attempt to tie this decision to some specific concessions from Japanese. On the other hand announcement should help in promoting Japanese awareness they are increasingly on their own and therefore must develop capacity for self-defense.
This recommendation would require NSC concurrence in waiver of balance of 90 day period. In view dangers involved in waiting full 90 days I would urge that action be expedited in any event even if it should prove impracticable to make announcement this weekend. I trust Department will give you Washington reaction soonest and repeat to me. Believe important announcement should include reference to Okinawa along lines suggested paragraph 3 of reference telegram, particularly regarding plans of administration to take action looking toward improvement in conditions indigenous population. Department will wish also decide questions raised paragraphs 3 I (and II) of reference telegram regarding demarcation line at 27 degrees and notification to other governments.5 Here Secretary would have opportunity inform Yoshida at Embassy dinner Saturday6 evening prior to public release.
- Repeated for information priority to the Department as 322, which is the source text.↩
- Not printed. (794C.0221/7–653)↩
- Document 657.↩
- Adm. Felix Stump had been designated Admiral Radford’s replacement as CINCPAC.↩
-
These paragraphs read as follows:
↩- “(i) Unless Defense has overriding objections, we would favor setting demarcation line of present decision at 27 degrees to include Okino Erabu Shima and Yoron Jima, historically with rest of Amamis part of Kagoshima prefecture.
- “(ii) We cannot appraise from Tokyo desirability of advance confidential notice to certain friendly and interested governments. If this should be considered indispensable, we recommend briefest period, say 48 hours, to minimize security jeopardy.”
- Aug. 8. Dulles arrived in Japan on that day (local time) from Korea.↩