Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 1

793.5/10–754

No. 325
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State

top secret
eyes only

[Washington,] October 7, 1954.

Subject:

• Importance of Immediate Conclusion of Mutual Defense Treaty with the Government of the Republic of China (GRC)

Problem:

For the past seven months the question of a mutual defense treaty with the GRC has been under consideration. The decision to raise the question of the off-shore islands in the Security Council has made settlement of this question a matter of extreme urgency.

Discussion:

In his telegram commenting on the decision to submit the off-shore islands question to the United Nations Security Council (Tab A),¹ Ambassador Rankin stresses that “unless other offsetting steps are taken previously or concurrently it may be anticipated GRC will regard action as another Yalta”. Ambassador Rankin believes that the GRC will regard such a move in the UN as appeasement and as a “complete reversal policy from 1950 to date”. He feels that the “almost inevitable opening up new and fertile fields of opportunity for Communists to exploit” resulting from such a move would outweigh in Chinese eyes a possible procedural victory for them in the UN.

Ambassador Rankin believes that the disastrous effect on the morale of the GRC and the serious damage to our relations with that Government which would flow from the contemplated action in the UN could only be offset effectively by an immediate U.S. undertaking to sign a mutual defense treaty “covering Formosa, the Pescadores, and in appropriate fashion, other areas under GRC control”. He recommends that we notify the GRC of our intention to negotiate the treaty before discussing the prospective step in the UN. Both subjects should be discussed with the GRC as soon as possible.

Conclusion of a mutual defense treaty with the GRC is not only an essential move to offset the effects of the contemplated action in the UN, but is also the best means of deterring a Communist attack against Formosa. As pointed out in my memorandum to you of August 25 (Tab B),² the violent Chinese Communist propaganda campaign promising “liberation” of Formosa has pointed up the need for making U.S. intentions to defend that territory absolutely clear. This need is further emphasized by recent speeches of Chinese Communist leaders and particularly by the public support given them by N.S. Khrushchev. In the atmosphere created by these speeches it is highly dangerous to allow the Communists any room for doubt that an attack on Formosa will result in bringing into action all U.S. forces necessary for defense of that territory. Although our determination to defend Formosa has been publicly reiterated by both the President and yourself in recent weeks, the Communists cannot but note that despite the known agitation by the GRC for a mutual defense treaty, Formosa remains the only territory in the Pacific island-chain not covered by such a treaty. In fact the Communists in their propaganda have warned the United States not to conclude one. Thus withholding of the treaty could lead to a grave miscalculation by Peiping and Moscow. Conclusion of the treaty on the other hand would make it clear that not merely the 7th Fleet would be involved if Formosa were attacked, a point stressed by Ambassador Bohlen (Tab C).³

As to the difficult question of the Chinese territory to be covered by the treaty, FE believes that a sound formula which should be acceptable to the GRC would be one which precisely reflects the existing situation as to U.S. military commitments to that Government. Thus conclusion of the treaty would neither extend our present military commitments nor reduce them. Specific language defining the territorial extent of U.S. military commitments to the GRC is suggested in a draft text of Article IV and a protocol attached as Tab D.⁴

Recommendation:

That you approve negotiation of the mutual defense treaty with the GRC and that President Chiang be informed of this decision at the same time as the contemplated move in the UN Security Council is discussed with him.

1. Telegram 244 from Taipei, Document 320.
2. Document 262.
3. Telegram 483 from Moscow, Document 315.
4. The tabs are not attached to the source text, but see footnote 1, Document 327.