793.00/10–554: Telegram
No. 320
The Ambassador in the Republic of
China (Rankin) to the Department of
State
niact
244. Eyes only for Assistant Secretary Robertson and Drumright. Department’s 2011 re decision submit offshore islands question to UNSC studied most carefully by Cochran and myself. Inability discuss it with Chase and Duggan is handicap and it is also difficult foresee all aspects of Chinese reaction. In latter regard, seems only prudent to expect violently unfavorable reception. Within these limitations, following comments are offered:
- 1.
- Unless other offsetting steps are taken previously or concurrently it may be anticipated Government of Republic of China will regard action as another Yalta by which free China, this time at British behest, is to be sold down river as result of secret deal made behind Chinese backs.
- 2.
- Placing offshore islands question before UNSC presumably will be interpreted by GRC not only as intended appease UK, which to them synonomous with appeasing Communists, but also as evidence of US desire evade direct responsibility for these islands. (Chinese Communists might be expected take similar view.)
- 3.
- If initial effect of step is to discourage GRC and encourage Communists, conquest by latter of some or all of islands might be precipitated. Chinese probably would not expect US to take effective action while matter before SC and certainly no one else would help GRC hold or retake islands.
- 4.
- GRC almost certainly will regard US connection with submission of matter to SC as complete reversal of US policy from 1950 to date which has encouraged “limited offensive” against China mainland from islands in question. Next step in Chinese thinking would be that US preparing to abandon any intent to give GRC offensive capabilities, even most limited, which in turn would be taken to imply definite US acquiescence in a Communist conquest of China mainland and eventual liquidation of free China—a retreat from containment to appeasement.
- 5.
- Chinese unlikely be attracted by alternative of possible procedural victory for them in UNO as against almost inevitable opening up new and fertile fields of opportunity for Communists to exploit situation inside and outside UNO.
- 6.
- In sum, GRC probably would see as primary US motive appeasement of UK and hence of Communists, with all but disastrous psychological and perhaps military results to free China and corresponding benefits to Reds.
Since step in question apparently already agreed upon, there remain only considerations of timing and of possible previous or concurrent action which might mitigate effects or even for longer term tip balance in favor of United States and free China. Following recommendations are in this sense:
- a.
- Reassurance that prospective action does not forecast lessening of US determination to help defend free China could be accomplished by nothing less than immediate undertaking to sign mutual security pact covering Formosa, Pescadores and, in appropriate fashion, other areas under GRC control.
- b.
- Reassurance that US does not acquiesce in Communist conquest of mainland China and does not exclude possibility of its eventual liberation would best be conveyed by immediate allocation of increased aid to free China for fiscal year 1955 (over fiscal year 1954) sufficient to permit significant expansion of military program (reserve training, et cetera) in manner at least comparable to Korea. All official information so far relayed to GRC suggests cut in aid for fiscal year 1955, with depressing effect which would be compounded by impending action in United Nations Organization.
- c.
- GRC should be informed soonest of prospective step in UNO, before leak occurs in manner suggesting consultation rather ex post facto notification but not before a and b (above) acted on.
I am on record in Department as unenthusiastic about guerrilla raids against mainland since Korean armistice ended their diversionary value. I believe development of significant offensive power on Formosa, which it might never be necessary to use, would have far more influence on events behind Curtain, on offshore islands and Far East as whole than any feasible guerrilla or commando operations or bootleg blockade conducted from islands by GRC. (It appears implicit in US agreement to submit islands question to SC that guerrilla activities must be liquidated completely before such submission.)
On assumption impending action in UNO more likely to precipitate successful Communist operations against islands than otherwise, I recommend postponing such action until November, when weather more favorable to defense, and in any case until steps a and b (above) have been taken. Course of events in all probability will compel US to take these steps eventually. Why not now?