S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D
351, NSC 146 Series
No. 321
Memorandum by the Secretary of
Defense (Wilson) to the Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs (Cutler)1
top secret
Washington, October 5, 1954.
Subject:
- Paragraph 10, NSC 146/2, “U.S.
Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Formosa and the
Chinese Nationalist Government”.
I am attaching for your information a copy of the comments of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff on the above subject.
I have also forwarded to you a memorandum in regard to our NSC policy with respect to Formosa.
I am not in full agreement with the recommendations of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in regard to their views as outlined in the attached
memorandum and will be prepared to discuss this matter at the NSC meeting on Wednesday, October
6th.
In view of the nature of the agenda for the NSC meeting on October 6th, I recommend that the
Secretaries of the military departments and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff be invited to attend this meeting.
[Attachment 1]
Memorandum by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense
(Wilson)
top
secret
Washington, 1 October
1954.
Subject:
- Paragraph 10, NSC 146/2,
“U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to
Formosa and the Chinese Nationalist Government”
- 1.
- This memorandum is in response to a memorandum by the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 28 September
1954,2 subject as above, which informed
the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the President, for the time
being, has suspended that portion of paragraph 10, NSC 146/2, which provides that
the United States should “encourage and assist the Chinese
Nationalist Government …3 to
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raid Chinese Communist territory and commerce.” The
memorandum requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
as to (a) the advisability of making this suspension
permanent and (b) the general desirability of lessening the
chances of Chinese Nationalist actions provoking increased
hostilities with the Chinese Communists.
- 2.
-
The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the
question of whether the foregoing suspension is to be
made permanent should be decided in the light of the
over-all policy which the United States elects to adopt
toward Communist China. The statement of policy
contained in subparagraph 1 c, Section I, of NSC 5429/2 (Communist
China), which is quoted below, awaits further
consideration in light of review by the Secretary of
State and report to the NSC, which report has yet to be made:
“1. Reduce the power of Communist China in Asia
even at the risk of, but without deliberately
provoking, war:
- “a.…
- “b.…
- “c. Maintaining political and economic
pressures against Communist China, including the
existing embargo and the support for Chinese
Nationalist harassing actions.”
The course of action set forth in
paragraph 10 of NSC
146/2 (in effect since 6 November 1953) is consistent
with the foregoing United States policy, which while
tentatively adopted on 20 [18]
August 1954, still awaits review and report to [by] the Secretary of State.
Further, the raiding of Chinese Communist territories
and commerce provided for in NSC 146/2 represents about the only
harassing action now open to and within the competence
of the Chinese Nationalist forces.
- 3.
- In terms of positive results, the raids on the Chinese
mainland, and the threats of such raids, are factors which
have contributed substantially to the buildup of a system of
defenses along the Fukien and Chekiang coasts and to the
immobilization of troops in significant strength in manning
those positions. The raids have provided valuable combat
training and experience for the Chinese Nationalist forces
involved, and have been the source of intelligence regarding
Chinese Communist activities, strength, and
dispositions.
- 4.
- Raiding of Communist shipping bound for Communist China
ports has, from the standpoint of the Chinese Nationalists,
more than justified the efforts and resources expended. The
confiscation of valuable cargoes has deprived the Chinese
Communists of badly needed commodities and equipment. Of
greater importance, however, has been the impact upon the
pattern of seaborne traffic to the Chinese Communist ports.
Since early 1953, shipping has from time
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to time been diverted from
ports of destination to Whampoa (Canton) for discharge, and
weeks have elapsed before North China port calls were
resumed. Since June 1954, no merchant ships loaded from
Communist ports in Europe have delivered any cargo to
Communist China ports north of Canton. The port of Whampoa
has become so congested as to result in turn-around delays
of from 25 to 30 days and it has been necessary to resort to
use of junks, lighters, and other forms of floating storage,
in order to avoid greater turn-around delays and demurrage
costs. The problem for Communist China has been complicated
further by the necessity of relying to a greater extent upon
shipments by rail north from Canton and from the USSR, thus placing additional
burdens on an already overtaxed rail system.
- 5.
- The scope and tempo of the foregoing raids are subject to
the guidance and control of the United States. As indicated
in paragraph 13 of NSC
146/2, the Chinese Nationalist Government is committed to
refrain from any such operations which are considered by the
United States as inimical to the best interests of the
United States.
- 6.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that a
categorical answer to the question of whether it is
desirable to lessen “the chances of Chinese Nationalist
actions provoking increased hostilities” would not be
meaningful. The answer must be related to the course the
United States intends to follow in dealing with the problem
of Communist China. The application of a positive policy,
such as has obtained until now, inherently involves certain
risks, including the risk of increased hostilities. These
risks can and have been minimized by the judicious exercise
of the United States prerogative of guiding and controlling
the scope and tempo of Chinese Nationalist offensive
operations. If, on the other hand, the United States were
now to decide that these risks are unacceptable and that a
more conservative approach should be adopted, its new
position should be reflected in a general revision of United
States policy in the Far East rather than in isolated action
to impose permanent restrictions upon certain operations of
the Chinese Nationalists which would tend to undermine their
will and capability of resisting further Chinese Communist
aggression.
- 7.
- In the light of all of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff recommend against the permanent suspension of the
policy set forth in paragraph 10 of NSC 146/2 with respect to United States
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encouragement and
assistance to the Chinese Nationalist Government to raid
Chinese Communist territory and commerce.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Arthur
Radford
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of
Staff[Attachment 2]
Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense
(Wilson) to the Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs (Cutler)
top
secret
Washington, October 5,
1954.
- 1.
- Our present NSC policy in
regard to Formosa, in particular paragraph 10 of NSC 146/2, seems to me to be
out of date. Our position could be defended while the Korean
War was going on and perhaps as long as the war in
Indo-China continued, but does not seem to me to be sound
now and is likely to actually lead to a war with China.
These policies should be reviewed and brought up to
date.
- 2.
- The off-shore islands and our confused policy regarding
them (at least confused in some people’s minds) have real
possibilites of precipitating a war with China.
- 3.
-
I understand the present position in regard to Formosa
and the Pescadores has developed through the following
sequence of events:
December 1, 1943—Roosevelt,
Churchill,
and Chiang
went on record at Cairo as favoring the return of
Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores to the
Republic of China.4
July 1945—Reaffirmation of the above at
Potsdam.5
October 25, 1945—National Government took over
Administration of Formosa after 50 years of
Japanese occupation.
December 10, 1949—President Chiang set up his
government in Taipei after the defeat of the
Nationalists on the mainland.6
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January 5, 1950—President Truman ordered
neutralization of Formosa.7
September 1951—Japanese Peace Treaty signed,
formalizing the Cairo and Potsdam declarations
with respect to Formosa.8
February 1953—President Eisenhower
deneutralized Formosa and guaranteed protection by
7th Fleet.9 (It
is my understanding that this last decision also
affected the degree to which U.S. military
assistance material to the Chinese nationalists
could be used in defense of the off-shore
islands.)10
While these points may overly simplify
the matter and there may be a considerable legal and
technical position in regard to Formosa and the
Pescadores which is distinctly different from the
off-shore islands, I think the thing should be very
carefully looked over from this angle. Consideration
might be given to putting Formosa and the Pescadores
under the mandate of the United Nations or setting them
up as an independent, autonomous State.
- 4.
- If the course of action proposed by the Secretary of State
and listed in NSC record of
action #1224, sub-paragraph b,11 does not work out or introduces
unacceptable complications, then some other plan must be
worked out, giving thorough consideration to Items 1, 2 and
3 of this memorandum in order to implement paragraph 9 of
NSC 146/2.
