Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 1

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

No. 322
Memorandum of Discussion at the 216th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 6, 1954¹

top secret
eyes only

Washington, October 6, 1954

[Extracts]

Present at the 216th meeting of the Council were the Secretary of State, presiding; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Item 4); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; Admiral Duncan for the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; General Twining for the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; the Executive Secretary, NSC; the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC; the Coordinator, NSC Planning Board Assistants.

Following is a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security²

. . . . . . .

Mr. Dulles then indicated the belief of the Defense Minister of the Chinese Nationalist Government that a Communist assault on the Quemoys was now a distinct possibility. There was also a good deal of Communist activity in the area of the Matsu Islands. This situation was always critical because it would be so easy for the Communists to seize this group of islands at any time. There was also increased Communist activity in the Tachens area. The Communist build-up around the Tachens seemed actually greater than that around the Quemoys. In brief, concluded Mr. Dulles, within a week or two, Communist strength could be brought to bear on any one of these three island areas, but there was no hard evidence of immediate likelihood of attack.

Mr. Dulles stated that the celebration of the anniversary of the Communist conquest of China had reached its peak the last day or two in Peking. Khrushchev’s speech regarding the liberation of Formosa had sounded dramatic, but CIA is inclined to look on Khrushchev as rather a brash fellow who for some reason is permitted a lot of latitude by Malenkov. Accordingly, this rather extreme statement by Khrushchev in support of Chinese Communist aspirations respecting Formosa should be taken with a grain of salt. It was not as significant as what Malenkov might say on the same subject.

. . . . . . .

3. Review of U.S. Policy in the Far East³ (NSC 5429/2; NSC Actions Nos. 1148 and 1206;⁴ Note on Revision of Annex A to NSC 5429/2, dated October 1, 1954⁵)

. . . . . . .

After the Council had agreed to the creation of the ad hoc committee and had accepted a statement of its terms of reference,⁶ Mr. Cutler said that he wished to move on to the larger consideration of United States policy respecting China and United States policy with respect to the offshore islands and to Formosa, which were scheduled subsequently on the agenda.

Mr. Cutler pointed out that the courses of action on page 3 of NSC 5429/2 (Review of U.S. Policy in the Far East) were inconsistent with paragraph 10 of NSC 146/2 (U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Formosa and the Chinese Nationalist Government). Moreover, they were not in tune with NSC 166/1 (U.S. Policy Toward China). The courses of action on page 3 of NSC 5429/2 were more belligerent in tone than were the corresponding courses of action in NSC 166/1. After illustrating his contentions by reading the pertinent paragraphs from these policy reports, Mr. Cutler inquired of the Secretary of State whether he was prepared to report to the Council his final decision with respect to U.S. policy toward Communist China called for by NSC Action No. 1206-e.

Secretary Dulles replied that he was not as yet ready to report to the Council the final results of his review of the statement of policy on Communist China contained in NSC 5429/2. He was prepared, however, to make some preliminary comments if the Council thought these would be useful. He added that in so significant a field of policy it was of doubtful value to come to any decision in the absence of the President.

Secretary Dulles then pointed out that paragraph 1–a of the policy on Communist China, set forth on page 3 of NSC 5429/2, read as follows:

“Reduce the power of Communist China in Asia even at the risk of, but without deliberately provoking, war:

“a. (1) React with force if necessary and advantageous to expansion and subversion recognizable as such, supported and supplied by Communist China.”

Secretary Dulles indicated that he doubted whether paragraph 1–a as read offered a very useful formulation of policy. The word “lawful” should be added alongside of “necessary and advantageous”. It was wrong to decide in advance to take bold actions which the Executive Branch cannot carry out without going to Congress. Furthermore, continued Secretary Dulles, any U.S. action based on Formosa is becoming more and more tenuous as time goes on and the Korean armistice continues more or less in effect. The continuation of this armistice plainly curbs the freedom of the United States to use its armed forces to protect Formosa and the Pescadores. Also, we should give increasing consideration to the conclusion of a security treaty between the United States and Formosa. A purely defensive treaty would have many advantages. Unfortunately, however, the Chinese Nationalists want to go beyond this to take offensive action against Communist China, and this desire greatly complicates the problem of a security treaty.

In various other areas of the world—Germany, for example—we have tried with some success to impose our view that these nations should not resort to armed force to secure their objectives. We have also been successful so far in the same endeavor in Korea. However, it would be much harder to do this in Formosa, since Secretary Dulles said he doubted if Chiang Kai-shek really wanted a purely defensive treaty covering Formosa.

As to paragraph l-a-(2), which read: “React with immediate, positive, armed force against any belligerent move by Communist China.”, Secretary Dulles said he did not know whether this paragraph was supposed to cover the Nationalist-held offshore islands, but in any case he believed that the situation in these islands was not one which called for the use of the armed forces of the United States.

As to paragraph 1–b of NSC 5429/2, which called for the development of political, economic, and military strength of the non-Communist nations, including the military strength of Japan, etc., Secretary Dulles said that he had discussed this matter when he was last in Tokyo. On this occasion he had detected a feeling among the Japanese that we were pressing Japan a bit too hard on her military contribution. We might, accordingly, lose the vital political sympathy of Japan in our effort to get the desired military levels. On balance, this would be a net loss. Accordingly, Secretary Dulles predicted that we might have to lower our sights a bit on the Japanese military contribution. While in Japan the Secretary said he had also noted mounting pressure for wider trade between Japan and Communist China. There was marked resentment over the fact that Japan was singled out for different treatment from the European powers with respect to trade with Communist China. Finally, said Secretary Dulles, it was becoming harder and harder for the United States to hold to its old position against the admission of Communist China to the United Nations. We could probably hold out for a while longer on this position, but certainly not for the indefinite future.

At the conclusion of Secretary Dulles’ preliminary observations, Mr. Cutler suggested that the Council defer action on this item and turn its attention to the Chinese Nationalist offshore islands, on which the Secretary of State was also to make a report.

The National Security Council:⁷

a. Agreed to establish an ad hoc committee, composed of officials at the Assistant Secretary level from the Departments of State (Chairman), Treasury, Defense, and Commerce, the Foreign Operations Administration, the Office of Defense Mobilization, and the Bureau of the Budget, with the Central Intelligence Agency as intelligence adviser and the Executive Officer, Operations Coordinating Board, as observer, to prepare and submit to the Council proposed courses of action to carry out the broad policy stated in paragraph 3 of NSC 5429/2, with the understanding that:

(1) The work of the committee will not suspend the preliminary actions now underway; but the committee will take into account, and consult with the appropriate departments and agencies regarding, actions being taken prior to its report.

(2) No financial commitments will be made prior to the committee’s report without consideration by the Council.

b. Noted the “Note on Revision of Annex A to NSC 5429/2”, as distributed at the meeting.

c. Noted the interim comments of the Secretary of State on Part I of NSC 5429/2, relating to Communist China, and deferred further consideration until a subsequent meeting.

Note: The action in a above, as approved by the President, subsequently referred to the departments and agencies concerned for appropriate implementation.

4. Chinese Nationalist Offshore Islands (NSC 5429/2; NSC Actions Nos. 1224 and 1228)⁸

Mr. Cutler reminded the Council of the decision taken at the Denver meeting, to authorize the Secretary of State to explore and report back to the Council on the possibility of taking action in the UN to stabilize the status quo with respect to the offshore islands (NSC Action No. 1224-b). Mr. Cutler then called on the Secretary of State to report the results of his exploration to date.

Secretary Dulles explained that he had talked this problem over further with Mr. Eden and with the High Commissioner for New Zealand during the course of the London conference. The New Zealand Government, which would have to introduce this proposal in the UN, was very much interested in the idea and was disposed to try to accomplish a neutralization of these offshore islands.

Secretary Dulles added that he had been proceeding since these discussions in London very actively in this matter, and had only yesterday talked with the President and also with the Vice President with respect to the desirability of discussions with members of Congress prior to moving the matter forward in the UN. Both the President and the Vice President, however, had thought discussions with members of Congress on this subject “impractical” prior to the November elections. The President did agree, however, that the United States should move as promptly in this matter as the New Zealanders desired. Accordingly, Secretary Dulles said that he was proposing to discuss further procedure on this problem at the State Department that afternoon. The main difficulty would be the attitude of the Chinese Nationalist Government, which will not like any proposal for neutralization of the islands because such a proposal would tend to reduce the chances of spreading the present conflict into a war with Communist China in which the United States would be involved. This, after all, is Chiang’s only hope of returning to the mainland.

It was equally clear, continued Secretary Dulles, that the Chinese Communists will not like the proposed UN neutralization of the Nationalist-held offshore islands. For this reason the Nationalists would actually be smart to let us play it this way while holding aloof themselves. The odds are overwhelmingly against acceptance by the Chinese Communists of any UN solution neutralizing the offshore islands. Refusal to accept the UN verdict would put the Chinese Communists in a very bad light before the rest of the world.

In any case, said Secretary Dulles, we must be prepared for whatever might happen, and he said that he had at hand a draft of a possible message for the President to send to the Generalissimo which he hoped that Mr. Cutler would take out to the President at Denver when he left later in the day. Secretary Dulles inquired whether the Council wished him to read this draft message, which the Council requested he do (copy filed in the minutes of the meeting).⁹

When Secretary Dulles had finished reading this message, Mr. Allen Dulles inquired about the timing, and Secretary Dulles replied that it would be sent, if the President approved, just before the matter was submitted in the UN. Secretary Humphrey inquired of Secretary Dulles whether he would be willing to read the contents of this proposed message on the front pages of the daily newspapers, because, said Secretary Humphrey, it would hit the first page very shortly after it got to the Chinese Nationalists.

Secretary Dulles said that he would be quite prepared to read the contents of this message on the front page, since he believed that the course of action that was outlined in the message (namely, the proposal for UN action to neutralize the offshore islands) would be firmly supported by the Congress and the people of the United States. There were, after all, only a handful of people in the United States who really wanted us to get into a full-scale war with Communist China over these islands.

Secretary Humphrey and Secretary Wilson expressed firm agreement with Secretary Dulles on this point, and Secretary Wilson added that the moment was certainly at hand for a complete new look at our policies in the Far East. They were in effect, he said, now nothing but “a lot of doubletalk”. Agreeing with this, Secretary Humphrey added that we are obviously heading for a genuine decision as to what we are going to do with respect to Communist China and the Far East. Thus far we had simply been temporizing, and if we continued to temporize we would most certainly get burned.

Mr. Allen Dulles expressed the opinion that, with regard to the Nationalist-held offshore islands, “our bluff might be called any time in the course of the next month.”

The Attorney General inquired whether, on the assumption that we did bring this issue before the United Nations Security Council, we could get a favorable vote for the neutralization of these islands. Secretary Dulles replied in the affirmative, and stated that the Soviets would probably veto the proposal, that Lebanon would abstain, but that the remaining members of the Security Council would vote in favor of the resolution to neutralize.

Governor Stassen expressed the view that the idea of a UN neutralization was a very good proposal, but he believed that the Soviet Union was quite likely to accept it rather than to veto it, and would thereafter exploit the possibilities offered by the long and involved series of negotiations. The Soviet objective would be to provide an entering wedge to move Communist China into the UN. Governor Stassen went on to state that in his opinion the best way to avoid a general war with Communist China was to have it understood clearly that there were certain issues that you are prepared to go to war about.

Secretary Humphrey said that what we ought to do is to clean up the soft spots in our policy with regard to Communist China and the Far East, and to get out of those areas in Asia which we don’t genuinely intend to stay in and fight for.

Secretary Wilson thought that the danger in getting the offshore island problem before the UN was that in this process Formosa and the Pescadores would also be injected into the UN process. Governor Stassen agreed, and said that more than Formosa might be involved. This might open the door to Communist China’s admission to the UN and “all the rest of it.”

Secretary Dulles replied to this argument by pointing out that the British Government was committed to backing up the U.S. position with respect to holding on to Formosa and the Pescadores. The British, however, felt very differently about the offshore islands. Moreover, continued Secretary Dulles, we still had a position on and an interest in the disposal of Formosa. He was confident, therefore, that there would be no successful effort to drive the United States out of Formosa in any UN negotiations, although he admitted that the Chinese Communists would certainly try to do so.

The Attorney General inquired of Secretary Dulles whether, if this proposed resolution was successfully passed in the UN and thereafter the Chinese Communists nevertheless attacked the offshore islands, the United States would be committed to defend these islands with its armed forces. Secretary Dulles replied that we would not be committed to use our forces to defend these islands, but if we should decide that we wished to resort to this expedient, we would at least do so with some degree of UN support, which we certainly did not have at the present time.

Secretary Humphrey called for a very methodical appraisal of all the implications of getting into trouble with Communist China over these small islands—for example, the effect on the Congress and on the people of the United States. If we can find a good alibi to get disengaged from these small islands, we should make use of this alibi and get out. Indeed, we should only stay in any area in the Far East where we decide in advance that it is in our interest to stay. Certainly, said Secretary Humphrey, we do not want to go to war with Communist China over Quemoy Island, even under the umbrella of a UN resolution. This is the real question.

Admiral Radford inquired of Secretary Humphrey whether he was willing to give up Formosa in order to avoid war with Communist China. Secretary Humphrey replied that he did not know the answer to Admiral Radford’s question. It might even be desirable to go to war for Quemoy. All he was asking was that the National Security Council be sure in advance precisely what it was prepared to fight for. Admiral Radford replied that all of this, of course, was part and parcel of the great global Communist offensive. You can’t decide what you are going to do with regard to individual cases like the offshore islands without having made a decision on the big show—in other words, what is to be our attitude toward the total Communist offensive. To this, Secretary Humphrey responded by stating that it was precisely this decision which he believed we ought to make up our minds about. Perhaps the best way to avoid war with China was to inform China clearly that we will defend Formosa, Quemoy, or whatever other places we felt were vital.

Dr. Flemming said that as he had understood the decision taken at the Denver meeting, the Secretary of State had been authorized to explore the possibilities of a UN solution. If the UN did act favorably and the Chinese Communists nevertheless attacked these islands, the United States would at least not be taking a unilateral action in defending them. It seemed to him, said Dr. Flemming, that this was still a pretty sensible course of action, and that we ought not to back away from it simply from fear that the Chinese Communists would attack the offshore islands despite a UN resolution calling for the maintenance of the status quo.

The National Security Council:¹⁰

a. Noted the oral progress report by the Secretary of State on the results of his activities pursuant to NSC Action No. 1224-b, and the possible difficulties which may arise in this connection.

b. Agreed with the recommendation of the Secretary of State to proceed with the action contemplated in NSC Action No. 1224-b.

c. Discussed a draft statement to the Chinese National Government advising them of the action in b above, as read at the meeting by the Secretary of State; and concurred in its appropriate use, with the understanding that at least certain parts thereof would be communicated only orally.

Note: The actions in b and c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State for implementation.

5. U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Formosa and the Chinese National Government (NSC 146/2, paragraph 10; memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated September 28 and October 5, 1954;¹¹ NSC Actions Nos. 1224 and 1228)

Mr. Cutler explained that he did not wish to interrupt the preceding discussion, but merely wanted to remind the Council that the next item, regarding Formosa, was very germane to the general problem of Communist China and to the specific problem of the proposed message from the President to the Generalissimo. Mr. Cutler then read paragraph 10 of the policy on Formosa (NSC 146/2), as follows: “Without committing U.S. forces, unless Formosa or the Pescadores are attacked, encourage and assist the Chinese National Government to defend the Nationalist-held offshore islands against Communist attack and to raid Chinese Communist territory and commerce.” Mr. Cutler then pointed out that the injunction in paragraph 10 with respect to raids on Chinese territory and commerce had been temporarily suspended by the President, and further noted the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of Secretary Wilson, which differed as to the wisdom of making such suspension permanent. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were opposed to permanent suspension of the raids, whereas Secretary Wilson favored it.

After Mr. Cutler’s introductory remarks, Secretary Humphrey inquired whether all this did not really bring the Council down to the very serious question which was before it. If war with Communist China is really inevitable, should we now not determine to start a roll-back of Chinese Communist power in Asia? The longer we allow the Chinese Communists to roll us back, the worse will be our position when we face the inevitable showdown and war. If, on the other hand, a war with Communist China is not inevitable, should we not avoid all these minor quarrels and battles in which we are constantly involved by our present policy with respect to Communist China? This was the great question.

Secretary Wilson said that as he saw it, the United States was confronted in Asia by the collapse of colonialism and the end of white supremacy. We finally got an armistice in Korea, said Secretary Wilson, because this seemed the right course of action to U.S. and to world opinion. We then looked at the crisis in Indochina and we talked “very big” about it, but when the showdown came we decided not to go in. Now we’re talking big again about the offshore islands. The real thing we ought to do, however, is to clean up the past of World War II and make a new and fresh start with Asia. These offshore islands, which had always been a part of China, are likewise part of the aftermath of the Chinese Revolution. We are in danger of making a great mistake about this. “I think if I were top man in China I’d grab one of these Nationalist-occupied islands and sit there on it in order to see what the United States would do. If I were top man in Russia I would encourage Mao to do this very thing, because nothing would be so good for Russia as to get the U.S. involved in a war with Communist China. At Denver I had an idea of how to settle the problem of the offshore islands which I didn’t mention because of Secretary Dulles’ proposal. I would like to mention it now. It was the idea that if the United States is the real power in the Pacific and has the courage to say and do what it thinks right, we may be able to bring peace to Asia. What I propose, then, is that we tell the Gimo that we will not back him up in defending the off-shore islands, and that we try to get him to remove his troops from these islands. In return for this we tell him that we will sign a treaty with him to defend Formosa and the Pescadores. This kind of action would get much more U.S. and world support than would our getting involved in war with China. Chiang Kai-shek, of course, wants to regain mainland China, but he just isn’t capable of doing it. He is out. You cannot run China without some kind of dictatorship, and we ought not to get into a war with Communist China until we know how we will end the war and who will govern China after the war is finished.”

Secretary Wilson concluded with a repetition of his worry that solution of the offshore island problem along the lines sought by Secretary Dulles for UN action, would endanger our hold on Formosa.

Governor Stassen commented that we were not giving sufficient attention to the world-wide implications of the things we had been discussing. As he saw it, said Governor Stassen, approximately one-third of the world is standing on the sidelines trying to decide whether to join the free world or the Communist world. If we always seem to be afraid, we will lose this third of the world. The victories we have already achieved are significant, but let us not back away from danger now.

Secretary Wilson replied that he could see no gain in encouraging these Formosa Nationalists to act like a gang of pirates. We never once made use of the Chinese Nationalist troops in the two wars in Korea and Indochina. Maybe it was the wrong decision not to use the Chinese Nationalist forces, but the fact of the matter was we didn’t. “Accordingly, I can’t just see where we’re going now except into war with China.”

Dr. Flemming said that the real issue behind all this discussion was set forth in paragraph 1–a of NSC 5429/2. Did we really believe what was said in this paragraph? Dr. Flemming said that he, for one, did believe these words.

Secretary Humphrey agreed with Dr. Flemming that at least paragraph 1–a of NSC 5429/2 was the crux of the problem. Was it better for the United States to try to go back into mainland China and roll back the Communist power, or not? Suppose we elected to do just this and go to war with China; then what do we do? Or, on the contrary, would it be better to get altogether out of Asia? Just exactly how serious would it be for the vital interests of the United States if all of Asia went Communist—Japan, the Philippines, “the whole works”?

After a moment, Governor Stassen replied that the result would be an unfriendly Pacific up to our very shores. In the forward surge of a Communist victory in all Asia, the United States would shortly lose all of Latin America.

Dr. Flemming said that this was certainly the issue: Do we sit back and hand over all Asia to the Communists? He did not think that we could do this and survive, and it was for this reason that he preferred the policy in paragraph 1-a.

Secretary Dulles said that we were now back where we were in Denver. At that time the President made it clear that he was not ready to use the armed forces of the United States for the defense of these islands. Accordingly, we had the option of either abandoning these islands altogether or of trying to save them by resort to the UN expedient. You can talk all you want of the bad effect on Asia if the United States does not fight to defend these offshore islands, but you say nothing about the bad effect on Europe if we do undertake to fight to hold these islands. Secretary Dulles warned that we would be in this fight in Asia completely alone. Europe could be written off in such a contingency. Accordingly, all this was not a one-way street. Recourse to the UN for a solution offers a chance to save these offshore islands without becoming involved in an isolated war with Communist China.

Dr. Flemming said that that was precisely why he had personally favored the UN solution proposed by Secretary Dulles.

Secretary Humphrey agreed that the United States must continue to temporize on the issue of the islands, but he insisted that we must meanwhile settle the larger problem, of which these islands were a part. If our real objective is to recapture China and remove the Communist regime, that was one thing. If not, it was quite another.

Mr. Cutler pointed out that we had not set for ourselves in our policies the objective of a reconquest of China and the destruction of the Communist regime.

Dr. Flemming said that if the President decided to send this draft message to the Generalissimo, he would not regard such an action as temporizing, but rather would regard it as a course of action designed to reduce the power of Communist China along the lines of paragraph 1-a.

The Attorney General expressed the opinion that the Executive should go to Congress before submitting this proposal to the UN, because the follow-up of the neutralization of these offshore islands might involve the United States in a UN-sponsored war with Communist China.

Secretary Dulles explained that the action anticipated in the UN would be a UN recommendation that the fighting between the Chinese Communists and Nationalists stop and that the status quo ante be restored in the offshore islands. This action would either presumably be accepted by the Chinese Communists or else it would be vetoed by the Soviets in the Security Council. This latter action would certainly mobilize a strong public opinion against the Communist world which would be highly advantageous to the United States. If thereafter we finally decided to fight to defend these offshore islands, we should at least be in a better world position to prosecute the war. To his mind, continued Secretary Dulles, such a course of action was at least the best in this sense—namely, as regarded the probable attitude of the Generalissimo. If he falls from power this would be a disastrous course of action for him and would end all his hopes of returning to the mainland. Perhaps under these circumstances Formosa would be lost to the Communists. Secretary Dulles said that of course such a result would be very bad indeed. On the other hand, the Generalissimo’s chances of getting back on the mainland were growing dimmer every day. It was his view that if the people of Formosa had complete freedom of choice they would vote to be an independent state. In any event, Secretary Dulles suggested that the Council should authorize him to present this draft message to the President and let the President decide whether we should seek Chiang’s approval of the proposal to go to the UN, or merely confine ourselves to discussing this move with him.

Governor Stassen suggested that it might be a good idea to have New Zealand make its move in the UN and thereafter discuss the proposal with the Generalissimo. This proposal, said Mr. Allen Dulles, would at least save some face.

The National Security Council:¹²

a. Noted and discussed the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the Secretary of Defense contained in the reference memorandum of October 5, 1954.

b. Deferred further consideration of the suspended portion of paragraph 10 of NSC 146/2, pending consideration of a report by the Secretary of State on Part I of NSC 5429/2 in accordance with Action No. 1233–c above.

. . . . . . .

S. Everett Gleason

1. Drafted by Gleason on Oct. 7.
2. This portion of the memorandum summarized an intelligence briefing by Allen Dulles; only those paragraphs pertaining to China are printed here.
3. The first portion of the summary of discussion under this agenda item concerned a proposal for an economic grouping of free Asian nations; for text, see vol. xii, Part 1, p. 927.
4. For NSC Action No. 1148, see Document 208; for NSC Action No. 1206, see footnote 15, Document 256.
5. Not printed.
6. Reference is to NSC Action No. 1233-a; see footnote 7 below.
7. The lettered subparagraphs constitute NSC Action No. 1233. (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95, “Record of Actions by the National Security Council, 1954”)
8. For NSC Action No. 1224, see footnote 9, Document 293; for NSC Action No. 1228, see footnote 4, Document 302.
9. Not attached to the source text, but see footnote 1, Document 334.
10. The lettered subparagraphs constitute NSC Action No. 1234. (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95, “Record of Actions by the National Security Council, 1954”)
11. Regarding Lay’s Sept. 28 memorandum, see footnote 5, Document 303; concerning his Oct. 5 memorandum, see footnote 1, supra.
12. The lettered subparagraphs constitute NSC Action No. 1235. (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95, “Record of Actions by the National Security Council, 1954”)