Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 1

793.00/10–654

No. 323
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Bond)

top secret

[Washington,] October 6, 1954.

Subject:

• China Item: Consultations with United Kingdom and New Zealand

Participants:

• The Secretary
• Mr. Phleger, Legal Adviser
• Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
• Mr. Key, Assistant Secretary, UNA
• Mr. MacArthur, Counselor
• Mr. Bond, UNP
• Mr. Wainhouse, IO (later)
• Sir Robert Scott, Minister, British Embassy
• Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, UK Delegation to General Assembly
• Miss Barbara Salt, British Embassy
• Mr. Foss Shanahan, New Zealand Delegation to UN
• Mr. Hunter Wade, First Secretary, New Zealand Embassy
• Mr. M. J. C. Templeton, New Zealand Delegation to UN

The Secretary opened the meeting by saying there were several aspects of the China item which he wished to discuss. He said first that we should make every effort to limit the scope of the item to the Quemoy situation, and to avoid opening up the whole range of problems outstanding between the Republic of China and the Communist Chinese, since any such broad discussion would be bound to reveal embarrassing differences between the United States and the United Kingdom. He anticipated that if the Communist Chinese should accept an invitation to participate in the discussion of this problem in the Security Council, they would make every effort to broaden the question to such an extent that such differences would be apparent. He went on to say that he felt it of the utmost importance to decide among ourselves, before proceeding further with this item, that we would steadfastly resist any such effort to go beyond the immediate subject of our proposed item, adding that, in his approach to this matter, he had from the outset assumed that we would be in accord as to the necessity of such a limitation.

Turning to the specific question of the draft resolution¹ which was before the meeting, he said he felt the operative paragraph of that draft, and in particular the section of that paragraph referring to a “peaceful solution”, was too broad since it would open up the entire question of relations between Formosa and Communist China.

He had stated that he had originally been attracted to Chapter VII of the Charter because of the language in Article 40 about “prevent (ing) an aggravation of the situation” through “provisional measures”, since he had felt this is what we were trying to do in this case. He raised the question whether this could not be done also under Article 36, and said that if so, he believed we should use this approach.

The Secretary then raised the question of whether the item should be dealt with under Chapter VI as a “situation” or a “dispute”. He pointed out that the use of “situation” served to narrow the issue, but that treating the item as a “dispute” would serve the useful purpose of preventing a Chinese veto.

Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice at this point interjected that the UK would prefer to treat the item as a “situation”. He pointed out that the Soviets might use the veto in any case and that his Government was therefore not unduly impressed by that particular argument in favor of the “dispute” concept. The latter concept, he added, would raise considerable difficulties for the UK, particularly with respect to the question of who were the disputants. He said that in the view of his Government any “dispute” must be between entities entitled to bring matters before the Security Council, i.e., States, and that to allow a non-entity to bring a dispute before the Council would establish a precedent which would have serious implications for the UK in dealing with colonial problems, for example, Malaya.

Mr. Shanahan stated that although Ambassador Munro was still undecided on this point, he himself was impressed by the arguments in favor of the “situation” concept. He added that he felt it particularly important to limit the scope of the problem in order to resist efforts on the part of the Soviets and neutralist Delegations to raise the broader problems of China policy. The Secretary, after consultation with Mr. Phleger, expressed agreement with the point of view that the item should be treated as a “situation”, and said he assumed that subject to New Zealand concurrence, we were agreed on this point. Mr. Shanahan said he would refer this matter to his Government.

The Secretary then asked if all those present were in agreement that the scope of the item should be strictly limited to the problem of the fighting in and around Quemoy. After a general indication of assent on the part of those present, Sir Gerald said that although he was without instructions on this point, he regarded such a limitation as essential.

Sir Robert Scott stated that he was not particularly concerned about the introduction of extraneous issues into the debate with the exception of the question of Chinese attacks on shipping in the Formosa straits, which the Soviets have already raised in the General Assembly. There ensued a brief discussion of this problem, at the conclusion of which it appeared to be agreed that although we could not prevent the Soviets from raising this question, we should not allow ourselves to be drawn into debate on this subject in the Security Council.

Mr. Shanahan then raised the question of how we could best prevent the Soviets from gaining a propaganda advantage from our initiative, stating that this appeared to be largely a matter of timing. He suggested in this regard that we might consider stating our public case in the letter to the President of the Security Council, with the thought of releasing it immediately following its submission. The Secretary asked whether we could not accomplish the same result through a press conference, and suggested that the details be worked out in New York.

With regard to the question of timing, the Secretary expressed the view that once the item has been filed, a considerable part of the potential gain will have been achieved, including its deterrent effect upon the Chinese Communists, who might feel that any aggressive action taken at a time when the problem had been placed before the UN would redound to their disadvantage. He added that consequently he had no strong feeling of urgency concerning the calling of the first meeting of the Security Council.

The Secretary then stated that it had been his understanding in London that the UK proposed to give the Chinese Communists only two or three hours’ advance notice of our action in the Security Council, but that he had since understood that the British Embassy was now thinking in terms of two or three days. He expressed the opinion that this would be very dangerous and requested clarification of the British attitude. Miss Salt said that this subsequent suggestion, which she emphasized was not an official position of her Government, represented an attempt to coordinate notice to the Chinese Communists with our proposed notice to the Chinese Nationalists, which she understood we proposed to give two or three days in advance.

The Secretary said this represented a very difficult problem for us. He said that while we could give no water-tight assurances concerning the way in which the Chinese Nationalists would react to knowledge of our intentions in this matter, he regarded it as of the utmost importance that we handle this delicate question in such a way as to discourage them from “flying off the handle”, an objective which he said was of particular importance in terms of US public opinion. He went on to point out that the reaction of Chiang Kai-shek and his Government to our proposal might depend in large measure on the manner in which we were to take them into our confidence, and that he therefore would not want to commit the United States Government to giving as little advance notice to the Chinese Nationalists as the British apparently were willing to give to the Chinese Communists. He pointed out that our relations with the Formosa regime were very different from the relations of the UK with the Peking regime, since the US and the Republic of China were close working allies whose relationship involved a degree of intimacy which would preclude our acting without prior consultation with them. The Secretary went on to say that before the US could finally commit itself in this matter, it would have to explore the attitude of its Chinese ally, adding that this would take considerably more than a matter of a few hours to accomplish.

Mr. Shanahan said he was in general agreement with the Secretary’s position, in the sense that he felt the US must be given every opportunity to obtain the agreement of the Chinese Nationalists to our proposal, but that Ambassador Munro was particularly concerned with the possibility of leaks arising out of such advance consultation. The Secretary expressed the opinion that it would be possible to handle this problem without a substantial risk of leaks by taking it up personally with the Generalissimo. He concluded by saying that we must request an opportunity for advance consultations with Chiang Kai-shek and his Government before embarking finally upon the projected course of action in the Security Council.

At this point the Secretary expressed his regrets and took leave of the meeting, which adjourned to reconvene elsewhere. (See additional memorandum of this date.)²

1. Not attached to the source text. According to a memorandum of Oct. 6 from MacArthur to Dulles, the draft resolution and a draft letter to the President of the Security Council had been prepared by a tripartite working group. (110.11 DU/10654)
2. A memorandum of Oct. 6 from Key to Dulles reported that, after Dulles’ departure, the other participants had tentatively agreed on a timetable calling for submission of the letter to the President of the Security Council on Oct. 14 (provided that the United States could complete its consultations with the Chinese Nationalists by Oct. 12) and had agreed that a draft minute should be prepared in order to prevent future misunderstandings regarding the scope of the item. A revised draft resolution and letter, also tentatively agreed upon, were attached to the memorandum; the operational paragraph of the resolution called upon the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China to terminate hostilities in the Quemoy area “and to seek by peaceful methods to prevent their recurrence.” (793.00/10–654)