Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 1

611.94A/9–2654

No. 303
Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Cutler) to the Secretary of State¹

top secret

Washington, September 26, 1954.

Subject:

• Par. 10, NSC 146/2, US Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Formosa and the Chinese Nationalist Government.

1. The subject paragraph reads as follows:

“Without committing U.S. forces, unless Formosa or the Pescadores are attacked, encourage and assist the Chinese Nationalist Government to defend the Nationalist-held off-shore islands against Communist attack and to raid Chinese Communist territory and commerce”, (underlining supplied)²

2. Yesterday, in Denver, I briefed the President on the National Security Council Meeting held in Washington on Friday, September 24, 1954, including the report of the Secretary of State relative to the off-shore islands held by the Chinese Nationalists. At the conclusion of my briefing, at the suggestion of the Secretary of Defense, I took up with the President the views of the Secretary of Defense with reference to the underlined portion of par. 10, quoted above. Mr. Wilson suggested striking from our policy the underlined language, for these reasons: (a) the present situation differs from that which existed (Korean War) when this policy was adopted and when we first began supplying military assistance to the Chinese Nationalist Government forces on the off-shore islands other than Formosa and the Pescadores; (b) to “cool off” the Chinese Nationalists from, intentionally or accidentally, provoking increased hostilities with the Chinese Communists; (c) as a result of seeking to diminish the chance of increased hostilities, to ease the tasks of the Secretary of State in other parts of the world. If the underlined language were eliminated from our policy, the US would be in a position to inform the Chinese Nationalists that it would no longer supply military assistance to help them to raid Chinese Communist territory and commerce or replace items lost in such raids.

3. The President requested me to advise the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense that, subject to their concurrence, he was directing that the U.S. for the time being should suspend “encouraging and assisting the Chinese Nationalist Government to raid Chinese Communist territory and commerce”; thereby modifying to that extent for the time being his prior approval of par. 10, NSC 146/2. He pointed out that this action did not modify or affect the rest of the policy in par. 10, quoted above, and that the United States would “without committing U.S. forces, unless Formosa or the Pescadores are attacked, encourage and assist the Chinese Nationalist Government to defend the Nationalist-held off-shore islands against Communist attack”. Nor did it affect Council actions taken at the Denver Meeting on September 12, 1954, and approved by him (NSC Action No. 1224³). The action directed was a step to help maintain, for the time being, the status quo.

4. This Memorandum requests the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to advise me at once in writing whether they concur in the action indicated in par. 3 above.⁴ Upon receipt of such concurrence, a formal notice of modification of policy will be issued by the Executive Secretary⁵ and measures to implement the change may then be promptly taken by the appropriate departments and agencies.

5. The President wished me to emphasize that the action referred to was a suspension for the time being, pending further clarification of the situation. It is, therefore, understood that the Secretary of Defense will submit a paper on this subject, which can be appropriately staffed and, together with comments, considered at the National Security Council Meeting directed by the President to be held in Washington on Wednesday, October 6, 1954, at the same time as, and in relation to, the report then to be made by the Secretary of State with reference to Section I, NSC 5429/1 (China portion of Review of Far East Policy).

Robert Cutler

1. Also sent to Secretary of Defense Wilson.
2. Printed here as italics.
3. See footnote 9, Document 293.
4. Department of State concurrence was conveyed in a letter of Sept. 28 from Robertson to Cutler. (611.94A/9–2854)
5. A memorandum of Sept. 28 from Lay to the National Security Council reported that the President had temporarily suspended the language in question. (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 146 Series)