Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 1

793.00/10–754

No. 326
Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)¹

top secret

[Washington,] October 7, 1954.

I have just spoken to the President with reference to various matters, including the China matter.²

1. With respect to the “talking paper”,³ he thought we should introduce it by a statement that we know that certain nations are disposed to take United Nations action.

2. He expressed the view that if Chiang was prepared to assume a defensive posture on Formosa and the Pescadores, we could and should make a security treaty with him. Obviously, this would not exclude operations which we jointly agreed on as in the common interest.

3. He agreed that it would probably be useful to talk to Senator Knowland.

JFD

1. Also sent to MacArthur and Merchant.

2. This conversation was also recorded in a memorandum prepared in the White House and in a memorandum prepared by Phyllis Bernau. The portion of the White House memorandum relating to China reads as follows:

   “China question. (Apparently, something Cutler talked over with President.) Pres. said he thinks it was a good approach that Doug (MacArthur) ought to take. Dulles said Roy Roberts [Walter Robertson] will go instead of Doug; Roy has much more personal influence. Just this morning, Dulles got disquieting news that Eden may be running out on this. He at first agrees; 2 or 3 days later, ‘doesn’t know.’

   President expressed surprise—said it must be nailed down to ‘We agree to so & so …’ Dulles already told them we have to have an agreed Minute before we start on the thing. If Chiang is willing to go along with this kind of program, we ought to be prepared to consider making some kind of a treaty with him. President agreed.” (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file)

   The analogous portion of the Bernau memorandum reads as follows:

   “Re China—the Pres. agreed with the approach MacA. should take. The Sec. said Robertson may be going. The Pres. said he thought the lead should be—we have learned that nations friendly to us are about to bring this before the SC and so we come to talk about it. The Sec. said he heard some disquieting news that indicates Eden may be running out. However this is not certain. The Pres. said to nail it down. The Sec. said he wants an agreed minute before we start. If China is willing to go along, we should be prepared to consider making some kind of treaty. The Pres. agreed. The Sec. said there is a growing feeling here that perhaps we ought to give Knowland more advance information—the thought is for Robertson to talk to him on the way out. The Pres. agreed.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, “Telephone Conversations”)

3. The “talking paper” was intended for use by Robertson or MacArthur in direct discussion with Chiang Kai-shek in Taipei; this was apparently the draft message originally intended to be sent from Eisenhower to Chiang. See footnote 1, Document 334.