Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLI, Global Issues II

97. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rodman) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci)¹

Washington, September 25, 1987

SUBJECT

• A Moscow Conference on Human Rights?

Since 1973, the human rights focus of the Helsinki process has been a powerful political force putting the Soviets on the defensive and, more important, reminding the world that the root cause of tension is the fundamental difference between the democracy of the West and the Leninist dictatorship of the East. Under Gorbachev’s predecessors, the Soviets were always on the defensive, shied away from discussions, and sought to deny the legitimacy of the subject. Under the new leadership, the Soviets have cleverly gone on the offensive—embracing the issue, alleging “political prisoners” and social deprivations in the West, thus seeking to neutralize the issue by turning it in directions irrelevant or opposite to its original meaning.

A centerpiece of the new approach is the Soviet proposal of November 1986² to host a conference on “humanitarian cooperation” in Moscow, as part of the CSCE follow-up process.

State’s initial reaction last year was that we really didn’t like the idea, but we “shouldn’t close the door;” it was bad tactics to “just say no,” and in any case we should see what concessions we might extract from them in the process. More recently, the United States has begun to spell out in CSCE what concessions we want. Whether we realize it or not, it looks to me like we are now in the opening phases of a negotiation over this question.

Our terms seem quite stiff, and even in the exile and dissident community there is some sentiment that such concessions by the Soviets might be significant enough to warrant giving them their conference:

—First, the conditions of the conference itself in Moscow must be totally free. Exiles must be granted visas to come back and attend; dissidents must be allowed access; Western reporters must be allowed to roam free, etc.

—Longer-term Soviet commitments must include, first and foremost, release of political prisoners.

—Emigration must be freed up.

—Radio jamming must cease.

This list is meant to be “not exhaustive,” but the items we have specified to the Soviets are essentially those above.

My concern is that these terms are not as difficult for Gorbachev to meet as they may seem:

—It’s no big deal for him to let troublemakers run around for two weeks during the conference. The Soviet system will still be intact when they all go home.

—Gorbachev is already letting many political prisoners out, as part of his policy of coopting the intelligentsia and lightening the hand of the KGB somewhat on the populace. He can do more of this, in accordance with his own strategy. The Soviets are already talking of repealing one (though not all) of the statutes used to prosecute dissidents.

—Emigration he can do also, whenever he decides the payoff is worth it, in terms of either U.S.–Soviet relations, entree into the Middle East, or now this.

—Radio jamming, even of RFE/RL,³ does not seem like the most vital thing in the world for them.

Most likely, the Soviets will eventually agree to do some of these things, perhaps amounting to substantially if not completely meeting our demands. In a predictable negotiating environment, the West then will predictably find it hard—even impossible—to say no.

My main problem is that the Soviets will indeed pay a high price for such a conference—because it’s worth it to them. I can’t emphasize this enough. The payoff will be intangible, but real enough for them to value it highly. It confers an extraordinary legitimacy on the Soviet system. As some of Shcharanskiy’s friends expressed it to him, it’s like everyone inviting the Nazis to host an international conference on race relations in Berlin in 1937. And in return for a few concessions that (a) are inherently reversible and (b) do not go to the basic structure of their system in the first place. The Soviet system will remain what it has been; no one pretends otherwise. Yet the West will now be treating the land of the Gulag as an equal partner and worthy host for an international dialogue on political liberty! Nothing could more completely symbolize the collapse of 15 years of Western human rights policy.

To me, the very idea of endorsing such a conference on such a subject in such a place is obscene. And it would, as I say, represent a watershed Soviet success in neutralizing Western human rights policy once and for all, or throwing it into utter intellectual confusion.

Shcharanskiy, too, dislikes the idea, but when he was here, he told Fritz and me that he and his fellow dissidents were torn. They saw the Soviet propaganda gain, but they also valued the concrete concessions that might be extracted. For those in the trenches, it’s a real dilemma. Shcharanskiy’s uncharacteristic diffidence on the issue, however, may also reflect his assessment that more and more governments seemed to be moving in the direction of letting it take place (for a price), in contrast to last year when he had the sense that governments had no interest in actually having a conference. I told him that nothing was decided in the USG and that the views of people like himself would carry great weight.

I talked to Warren Zimmermann about it. He insists he will maintain total firmness on the terms we have laid down. He says he too is sensitive to the moral dilemma. I urged him not to do something that we’ll all be ashamed of five years from now.

I am alerting you to this issue nonetheless, because I see us heading into something that could prove explosively controversial. Indeed we are beginning to lose control of the issue. We are heading down a path with an all-too-predictable end point—and the cost to the West will be measurable by the degree of pleasure and triumph that the Soviet leadership will feel even at the cost to them of some concessions that they are (by hypothesis) willing to pay.⁴

1. Source: Reagan Library, Lisa R. Jameson Files, USSR: Human Rights/General 05/22/1985–10/31/1987. Confidential. Sent for information. Ermarth, Bemis, and Rostow concurred. A stamped notation on the document reads: “Natl Sec Advisor has seen.”
2. See footnote 5, Document 87.
3. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
4. In telegram 307674 to CSCE Vienna, October 2, the Department transmitted the conditions for a Moscow human rights summit and asked the Embassy to transmit those instructions to the Soviets in the form of a démarche. (Reagan Library, Lisa R. Jameson Files, USSR: Human Rights/General 05/22/1985–10/31/1987)