Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLI, Global Issues II

72. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Hill) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, August 22, 1984

SUBJECT

• Genocide Convention

In recent months a variety of groups and individuals have written to the President or to senior staff members of the White House to urge Administration support for Senate ratification of the Genocide Convention. These have included a letter (dated April 12, 1984) to the President from Mr. Gerald Kraft, the President of B’nai B’rith,² and most recently a letter to you (dated August 2, 1984) from Professor John Norton Moore on behalf of the American Bar Association.³ Attached is a draft presidential statement supporting ratification of the Genocide Convention.⁴

The Genocide Convention has been pending before the Senate for 35 years, and ratification has been supported by Presidents Truman, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Carter. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee last reported the treaty out in 1976 with three understandings and one declaration.⁵ Due to opposition from various groups, the treaty was never brought to a vote on the floor.

Over the years, opposition to the Genocide Convention has diminished. The American Bar Association, which until the 1970s was opposed to the treaty, is now a very strong supporter. Moreover, conservative opposition has diminished, and senators such as Lugar and Armstrong have privately said they would support ratification under appropriate circumstances. The core opposition now appears to be limited to Senators Thurmond, East, and Helms, and the Liberty Lobby. Jewish groups have long urged ratification.

We consider that our technical questions about the treaty can be cured by the three understandings and one declaration that the Committee approved in 1976. The Committee’s position, which we endorse, was even more restrictive than that taken by the Nixon Administration.

The key argument against presidential support for ratification at this time is political. The Administration might be accused of a cynical electoral ploy, in submitting the treaty too late for action during the President’s entire term after sitting on it for three and a half years; as noted, a few conservatives would oppose ratification on substantive grounds. The key argument in favor of an announcement of presidential support for ratification at this time is in essence defensive. It is not urged that the Administration would gain a great deal by announcing support, but rather that a failure to support the treaty might well be denounced as an extreme position at variance with those of most preceding presidents including President Nixon. Moreover, the treaty is substantively acceptable and there is increasing pressure for the Administration to take a position on it.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff have made it clear to us that the treaty cannot be considered this year, and we could seek to defer the holding of a hearing on the treaty if we felt such a hearing would be controversial. The Department recommends that the President announce support for ratification, as part of his overall human rights policy, at whatever time the President may consider appropriate.⁶

Charles Hill

1. Source: Department of State, Assistant Secretary Files—Elliott Abrams Subject and CHRON Files, 1981–1987, Lot 89D184, Correspondence: August 1984. Confidential. Drafted by Abrams on August 21 and cleared in L and H. Bova signed for Hill.
2. Not found.
3. Attached but not printed.
4. Attached but not printed.
5. See footnote 3, Document 67.
6. The U.S. Senate consented to ratification of the Genocide Treaty on February 19, 1986. Reagan signed the treaty’s implementing legislation on November 4, 1986.