Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLI, Global Issues II

68. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Stockholm, January 18, 1984

HUMAN RIGHTS extracts from Secretary’s Stockholm Meeting with Gromyko, January 18, 1984.

Gromyko said that he had not consented to all the specific issues mentioned by the Secretary, but, as he had said, the two broad areas for discussion would be the international situation and bilateral relations. He thought that, as he had told Dobrynin, this was the direction in which the discussions should go. He noted that the Secretary had named a number of other items, among them, for example, human rights. Since the Secretary had named this matter, he would tell him at the very outset of their discussion that he did not intend to discuss any such topic. Of course, the Secretary could talk about it if he insisted, but Gromyko would not enter into discussion of this item.

The Secretary said that of course it would be up to Gromyko whether he would wish to respond to something the Secretary would say. That was Gromyko’s privilege. But the Secretary said that he must make some comments.

Gromyko repeated that he would tell the Secretary at the very outset that he would not enter into discussion of this topic. The two of them already had some experience when one side does not wish to discuss some specific issue. He would only say again that he would not discuss this item because the Soviet Union would not allow anyone to interfere in its internal affairs. To raise this issue would therefore be an evident waste of time. Surely it would be too much of a luxury for foreign ministers to lose time on that sort of item. As for himself he had no wish to lose time. As for the Secretary, he could of course do so, but without Gromyko’s participation. He would suggest that the Secretary feel free to speak on the two items named, i.e. the international situation and bilateral issues. Or, if the Secretary preferred, Gromyko would lead off and talk on our bilateral relations. He thought that neither of them would feel constrained and they would have enough room to exchange views, particularly about the Stockholm Conference. At the Conference the Secretary had expressed the views of the U.S. Administration and today Gromyko had expressed the views of the Soviet Government and the Soviet leadership. He thought it would not be superfluous if he said something in addition to what he had stated publicly.²

These were some of the comments the Secretary wanted to make with reference to the various forums in which the topics Gromyko had properly identified as matters of concern in our country and in the world would be discussed.

Gromyko said that first of all, he wanted to reply to one of the questions the Secretary had touched on at the beginning of their talk today. The Secretary had raised the question of human rights, blowing it out of all proportion. He would say that the Secretary was probably well aware of the Soviet appraisal of his entire position on this question. Gromyko was convinced that the U.S. position on this subject was entirely pervaded by falsehood, and that the U.S. was exploiting this matter for propaganda purposes. In essence, the Soviet position was more or less generally shared in the world, and it was that nowhere else were human rights violated so much as in some of the places in the Western hemisphere that were so dear to U.S. hearts, not to mention in the U.S. itself.

Gromyko said he would ask the Secretary not to ask him to be more precise; he could of course be more precise, but he did not believe he should waste time on this matter. If he were to talk on this subject he would only restate his assessment of the human rights situation as it existed in the United States. The Secretary had spoken of the importance of people moving across borders, the importance of reunifying families, etc., but he would simply point out that he did not know of a single instance where these matters had caused wars to break out. The Soviet Union was unshakeable in that position. He would not want to devote any time to the details of these matters.

The Secretary said he was surprised that it was Gromyko who had raised the subject of human rights. He was ready to discuss this topic and there were a few comments he wanted to make:

—First, the Secretary wanted to express his admiration for the Soviet Union for taking a decision on the Pentecostal families.³ The decision had been up to the Soviet Union, and it had been made. It showed that progress was possible.

—Second, he wanted to say that with reference to individual issues, President Reagan preferred a process of quiet diplomacy in this area.

—Third, he wanted to mention the cases of Shcharanskiy, Sakharov and Begun,⁴ as people of great interest to the United States.

—Further, he would also mention a subject we had discussed with the Soviets many times: the question of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union and its radical decline in recent years.

—He also wanted to note that Edgar Bronfman, President of the World Jewish Congress, had made an arrangement to come to Moscow to discuss issues concerning Jews in the Soviet Union. The Secretary hoped that Gromyko would receive him and work with him.

—On a more traditional note, the Secretary recalled that at their earlier meeting in New York he, in the usual practice, had given the Soviet side a list of people who claimed U.S. citizenship under our laws, but had been refused permission to leave the Soviet Union. He would like Ambassador Hartman to provide Minister Korniyenko with an updated list of such cases, and also lists of persons seeking to join members of their families in the U.S. and of binational divided spouses. (Ambassador Hartman passed these lists to Korniyenko following the meeting.)⁵

1. Source: Department of State, Soviet Union, 1958–1984, Lot 90D438, Shultz-Gromyko Stockholm Jan 18, 1984. Secret; Sensitive.
2. In telegram 1013 from Shultz’s delegation in Stockholm, January 17, the delegation transmitted Shultz’s January 16 arrival statement. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840032–0332)
3. The Soviet Government permitted the emigration of 15 additional Pentecostals in June 1983. See John F. Burns, “15 Pentecostals to Leave Soviet: 5 Spent 5 Years in U.S. Embassy,” New York Times, June 27, 1983, p. A1.
4. Reference is to Soviet dissident Iosef Begun.
5. Not found.