58. Papers Prepared in the Department of State1
Washington, June 25, 1982
PAPERS FOR SHULTZ BRIEFING BOOK
1. Human Rights in the Administration’s Foreign Policy.
2. Human Rights and the Communist Countries.
3. Human Rights and Latin America.
4. Human Rights and the Congress.
5. State Department Role in Granting Political Asylum.
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Attachment
Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State2
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ADMINISTRATION’S
FOREIGN POLICY
This Administration took office with a
determination to make foreign policy reflect the American
concern for freedom throughout the world; at the same time
there was a widespread feeling that Carter’s human
rights policy had actually hurt the interests of freedom.
The evolution of a detailed Administration human rights policy
embodying these perceptions took some time, and emerged in the
Clark/Kennedy memo of November [October] 1981.3
The Reagan Administration has
made it clear that human rights is at the core of
US foreign policy, for the goal of our foreign policy is to
preserve our liberty and the forces of liberty in the world. Freedom is the issue that separates us from the
Soviet bloc and that embodies America’s claim on the imagination
of people all over the world.
Our human rights policy has two “tracks”, the negative and the
positive. The negative track is embodied in
legislation which prohibits aid to governments which are “gross
and consistent” abusers of human rights, and in the way we
oppose (through act or word) human rights violations. The positive track is a significant Reagan Administration
innovation, in which we seek actively to help democracy.
The President’s speech to Parliament4
noted our intention to study an “Institute for
Democracy” modeled on the German Parties’ foundations, and
announced an international conference on free
elections to be held here in the Fall. This positive track
also includes use of ICA, working with Armenian foundations, and
other initiatives.
Our human rights policy has two goals. First, we
seek to improve human rights practices in numerous
countries—to eliminate torture or brutality, to secure
religious freedom, to promote free elections, and the like. A foreign policy indifferent to these issues—if US
influence could ameliorate conditions—would not appeal to the
idealism of Americans, would appear amoral, and would lack
public support. Moreover, these are pragmatic, not utopian, actions for the US. Our most
stable, reliable allies
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are democracies. Our reputation among the populace in important
countries that are dictatorships will suffer if we come to be
associated with repression rather than progress. Often the people
whose rights we are defending are the national leaders of future
years.
The Reagan Administration
differs from the previous administration over the most effective
tactics to achieve these pragmatic goals. Our
litmus test is effectiveness. With friendly countries, we use
diplomacy, not public pronouncements. We seek not to
isolate them for their sins and thereby render ourselves
ineffective, but to use our influence to effect desirable change.
Our goal is to achieve results, not to make
self-satisfying but ineffective gestures.
But the second goal of our human rights policy sometimes conflicts
with this search for effectiveness: we seek also a
public association of the US with the cause of liberty. This is
a pragmatic, not just idealistic goal: our ability to win
European cooperation and defeat Soviet propaganda will be harmed
if we seem indifferent to the fate of liberty. Friendly
governments are often susceptible to quiet diplomacy, and we
therefore use it rather than public denunciations. But if we never appear seriously concerned about human rights
in friendly countries, our policy will seem one-sided and
cynical. Thus, while the Soviet bloc presents the most
serious human rights problems, we cannot let it falsely appear that
this is our only human rights concern. So a human
rights policy does inescapably mean trouble—for example, from
friendly governments if we pressure them, or from Congress if we
appear not to be doing so. Yet a human rights policy
embodies our deepest convictions about political life, and our
interests: the defense and expansion of
liberty.
Attachment
Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State5
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE COMMUNIST
COUNTRIES
The greatest human rights problem in today’s world
is not Guatemala, Chile or South Africa but the repressive
communist system and the international influence
of the Soviet Union and its allies. It follows that the
human rights problem in the Soviet bloc must be a major focus of
U.S.
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human rights efforts.
It is important to avoid the temptation of
pushing for human rights improvements only where our influence
is greatest, and not where the biggest problem lies—with the
Soviet bloc. Moreover, it follows that human rights policy
must not systematically diminish U.S. strength or undermine the
incentives of other countries to be a friend of the United
States.
Domestic Aspects—Since a
policy that appears to be based on pure power-politics will
never win the sympathy of the American public, serious attention
to human rights abuses in the Soviet bloc is a necessary part of
any policy that intends to resist the expansion of Soviet
power. Human rights abuses in Soviet-bloc countries are
also the subject of particular concern by a number of important
constituencies, particularly ethnic groups, such as Polish-Americans
and Jews.
Methods—We have to combine private and public
diplomacy in dealing with human rights abuses in Communist states.
Because our diplomatic influence is limited, public pressure (USG
statements, CSCE, UN, etc.) is more important for
communist states than elsewhere.
Linkage—The President has stated that human rights
will be on the agenda of every high level meeting with the
Soviets. Linking human rights with improvements of
bilateral relations with Communist states, particularly in the area
of trade, has shown itself to be an effective tool for gaining
improvements in countries like Romania and Hungary. In Poland, human
rights linkage has undoubtedly acted as a brake against even more
severe repression of Solidarity. Linkage can only be effective if it
is used and timed carefully.
Prominent Issues
—Freedom of emigration. No communist state
allows free emigration. Their citizens are allowed to leave only for
“family reunification”. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment ties
most-favored nation status to emigration. We have extended this
status to Poland, Hungary, the PRC
and Romania. We have the greatest problems with emigration from the
USSR and Romania. Jewish
emigration from the USSR is
running at the lowest levels [since
1970?].
—Civil and political rights. The most
prominent abuses are the imprisonment of virtually the entire
Helsinki Monitoring Group,6 and the internal exile of Andrei Sakharov in the Soviet
Union; the stifling of Solidarity in Poland; the repressive actions
against Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia;7 systematic and pervasive oppression in Cuba and
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Vietnam; and a variety
of individual cases of repression in Romania, Bulgaria and
Yugoslavia.
—Freedom of religion. All religious
denominations in communist countries are either tightly controlled
or coopted by the regimes or suppressed outright. In Poland and
Hungary religion has been allowed freer rein. Unregistered Baptists
in the Soviet Union and Romania are creating growing problems for
those regimes and are attracting greater attention in the West,
while the Lithuanian Catholic Church continues to be repressed by
the Soviet authorities.
Poland—The repression in Poland that began in
December 1981 was the most significant human
rights event in this Administration’s term, because it
affected a whole nation that was gaining a significant measure of
freedom, and not just a few people. Because Poland (together with
CBW and Afghanistan) is one of
the few issues that lend themselves to major use against the USSR in the contest for European and
world opinion, it is important to keep alive
international awareness that a massive violation of human
rights is going on in Poland. The U.S.
sanctions against the Polish government and the Soviet
Union have kept the issue alive and given
meaning to our statements of concern for human rights.
Afghanistan—Massive human rights violations
continue in Afghanistan as a result of the Soviet occupation. We do
not have friendly influence with the Babrak Karmal government or the
Soviet occupiers. So these responses are
available to us: 1) Actions that bring the Afghan
struggle to the attention of the world; 2) Humanitarian aid to the Afghan refugees; 3) Military and humanitarian aid to the Afghan
resistance. In this category the concrete policy issue that
confronts us is whether the level of our military and humanitarian
aid is optional.
The Afghan human rights problem has created significant international
sympathy for our side, particularly in Europe. But the conflict in Afghanistan has thus far created far less
concern than similar conflicts such as the Spanish Civil
War or the Vietnam war. Afghanistan may have the
potential to become a major cause into which international
protest is channeled. The policy issue facing us is whether
the USG has any way of using its
capacity to organize and draw attention to create greater world
concern about Afghanistan.
