Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLI, Global Issues II

336. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, September 3, 1987

Iceland-US Whaling Dispute:“Will Iceland Play the NATO Card?”

SUMMARY

Iceland’s determination to continue whaling may yet lead to a confrontation with the United States, but we believe a slight shift in Reykjavik’s position on “scientific whaling” over the past year gives Iceland an opening to meet US concerns without appearing to give in to US pressure. Iceland’s traditional commitment to whaling has been challenged domestically by criticism from scientists, members of parliament, and newspaper editors across the political spectrum. Reykjavik is now moving away from treating scientific whaling as a cover for continuing business as usual to focusing on the truly scientific aspects of the program—giving the government leeway to win support for its scientific program from the International Whaling Commission and thereby avert a showdown with the United States without losing face. Reykjavik’s only other option for heading off possible US sanctions is to “play the Keflavik card”—imposing further restrictions on the US-manned NATO base or demanding economic benefits from the US for its use. We believe Iceland is unlikely to follow this course because a US ban on imports of Icelandic fish would hurt the economy severely, and Reykjavik is probably unsure that action against the base would forestall such sanctions. [portion marking not declassified]

The Icelandic Position

Icelandic support for whaling is deep. Although it does not make up a large part of the Icelandic economy (less than 0.5 percent of GNP), whaling is a traditional occupation in a country where tradition and culture are jealously guarded. Moreover, as a small fishing nation, Iceland is very sensitive to perceived threats to its sovereignty over territorial waters. Possible US sanctions aimed at forcing a change in Icelandic whaling practices are seen as such a threat. [portion marking not declassified]

Reykjavik originally viewed the International Whaling Commission’s (IWC) comprehensive assessment of whale stocks as an exercise that would define acceptable limits for future commercial whaling, rather than presage its abolition. Icelanders saw the IWC’s authorization of scientific whaling as an opportunity to gather information for the future management of whale stocks, while Iceland continued to reap economic benefits from the hunt. It was in this context that the Icelandic parliament voted in 1983 to support IWC limits on whaling. [portion marking not declassified]

Since Iceland’s scientific whaling began last summer, however, Icelandic attitudes toward whaling have shifted slightly. Scientists, members of parliament, and newspaper editors across the political spectrum have questioned the wisdom of continued whaling. Public discussion over the year has been much less defensive and emotional, and accusations of US “interference” in domestic affairs much less frequent. These changes in the tone of the debate over whaling may be due in part to frequent consultations between the US and Iceland, as well as to efforts by both sides to avoid public comments that could spark Icelandic resentment of the US. The sabotage of whaling facilities by radical environmentalists and the impounding of whale meat by West German authorities in Hamburg may also have contributed to the evolving change in attitude. Although such actions drew public condemnation, they made clear to Icelanders that whaling is an emotional issue for opponents as well as proponents. Moreover, expressions of environmental concern dramatically demonstrated that opposition to commercial whaling is not something arbitrarily created by the US government, but a view shared by private citizens of many countries. [portion marking not declassified]

Reykjavik’s position on the question of scientific whaling also appears to have moved slightly since last year; the government is putting greater emphasis on the quality and necessity of its scientific program, rather than simply continuing “business as usual” in whaling behind a facade of science. Iceland’s recent arguments in defense of the scientific whaling program highlight three important points. First, Reykjavik claims that the program is scientifically sound and that it generates needed information on whales and their environment. Second, the government points out that Iceland’s only whaling company, Hvalur H/F, does not earn a profit on its whaling operations. Third, officials declare willingness to cease killing whales, if the scientific program for studying whale stocks and migratory habits could be conducted effectively by other means. [portion marking not declassified]

This change in Iceland’s position on the specific issue of scientific whaling is due to several factors. International and domestic charges that scientific whaling is a transparent “cover” for commercial whaling wounded Icelandic pride. The shift in emphasis to the truly scientific aspects of the program probably also reflects a decision by Reykjavik to back down somewhat in order to avoid a major confrontation with the United States—which would expose Iceland to the prospect of certification and sanctions under the Pelly Amendment.² We believe this new focus on scientific goals would allow Iceland to meet US concerns—by bringing its whaling program into line with IWC specifications—yet claim victory for “winning” US support for a sound scientific whaling program, rather than admit to bowing to US and environmentalist pressure. [portion marking not declassified]

Reykjavik’s Options for “Playing the NATO Card”

Iceland has only one significant point of potential leverage on the US to block efforts to restrict whaling: the US-manned NATO base at Keflavik. If the US certifies Iceland under the Pelly Amendment—even if sanctions are not implemented—Reykjavik is likely to weigh possible actions against the base that would put pressure on the US. If Iceland decided to take action, it would probably move through a series of steps in an incremental escalation designed to force US concessions. In order of likely implementation, Iceland could:

—Impose even greater administrative restrictions on the activities of the base and its personnel—including limits on air operations.

—Charge rent or demand other economic benefits.

—Request that the US withdraw some personnel, or even the entire base. [portion marking not declassified]

We believe it is unlikely, however, that Iceland will eventually resort to any of these measures. Although Foreign Minister Hermannsson indicated to US officials in early August that Iceland would pursue a tough line by resuming whaling and “reevaluating the entire bilateral relationship” if Washington certified Iceland under the Pelly Amendment, his comments to the press the next day were much less combative. Moreover, the US Ambassador reports that, based on a conversation with Hermannsson in late August, Iceland will probably reduce by one half its take of sei whales for 1987 and agree to further revisions in its scientific whaling program for 1988. Lastly, as noted above, Iceland’s position on whaling has changed slightly over the last year, creating maneuvering room for Iceland to meet US concerns on scientific whaling without losing face. [portion marking not declassified]

Reykjavik is surely considering that the costs of a US ban on Icelandic fish exports would be enormous—Iceland could immediately lose up to 10 percent of GNP. Even sanctions imposed for a short period of time would cause significant disruption in the Icelandic economy. Iceland probably believes the United States is willing to certify and impose sanctions if no concessions are made, and Reykjavik will be reluctant to trigger US punitive measures. Iceland would be quick to exploit any signs of differences between Washington agencies, of course, in order to push a tougher line on whaling. [portion marking not declassified]

In our view, there are two circumstance that could persuade Iceland to retaliate against the Keflavik base:

—If the Icelandic public were angered by perceived US interventionism.

—If Reykjavik became convinced that actions against the base would prevent the United States from taking punitive measure. [portion marking not declassified]

At present, however, the public seems as concerned with environmentalist charges that “science” is being used deceitfully to justify hunting whales as it is with the prospect of US sanctions. Icelandic officials, moreover, appear unsure that action on Iceland’s part would result in US concessions. If the dispute continued to the point of US certification of Iceland under the Pelly Amendment, Iceland might threaten retaliation against the base, but only if it believed this would raise the issue to a political level where it may launch a final “appeal” for a concession. [portion marking not declassified]

Appendix: Echoes of the Cod Wars?

The current dispute over whaling is superficially reminiscent of the famous “Cod Wars” of past years. The Cod Wars were disputes in 1958, 1972, and 1975 between Iceland and the UK over the extent of Iceland’s exclusive fishing zone. These disputes led to exchanges of fire and ramming incidents between Icelandic gunboats and UK frigates. In an effort to obtain US pressure on London, Iceland threatened to expel the US base at Keflavik and withdraw from NATO. In 1975 Reykjavik broke diplomatic relations before London finally recognized Iceland’s unilateral claim to a 200-mile fishing limit. [portion marking not declassified]

There is little in common, however, between the current whaling dispute and the UK-Icelandic Cod Wars. In the Cod Wars, Reykjavik acted to protect vital economic interests; in the whaling issue, it is Iceland’s actions that expose it to the loss of important economic interests through US sanctions. Whereas Iceland took unilateral action in the Cod Wars, action in the whaling case was initiated by IWC efforts—with Icelandic support—to regulate whaling. In the Cod Wars, Iceland was acting out of an environmentally based concern to preserve fish stocks. In the scientific whaling dispute, Iceland’s current position is opposed by environmentalists who believe that fewer or no whales need be killed to conduct necessary research. [portion marking not declassified]

The main similarity, however, may be the most dangerous. As they did in the Cod Wars, Icelanders may grow to see themselves as defending their national sovereignty against a hostile Great Power. This view cemented the Icelandic position in the Cod Wars, and—if public outrage grew—could also do so in the scientific whaling dispute. [portion marking not declassified]

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 90T00114R: Intelligence Publications Files (1986–1987), Box 4, Folder 366: Iceland-U.S. Whaling Dispute: “Will Iceland Play the NATO card?” Confidential; Noforn. [text not declassified] This memorandum was prepared by [name not declassified], Office of European Analysis. Questions and comments may be directed to [name not declassified], Deputy Chief, West European Division, [text not declassified].
2. The Pelly Amendment requires that the Secretary of Commerce inform the President if any nation is undertaking actions which diminish the effectiveness of an international fisheries agreement. Violation of IWC rules for scientific whaling would be grounds for such certification. Once a country has been certified, the President is authorized to impose sanctions on its fish exports to the US. The President must also report to Congress on the action taken, at which point Congress could decide to legislate its own sanctions if it wanted stronger measures than those taken by the President. [Footnote is in the original.]