Attached is a paper prepared in response to an August 21 request by the
NSC staff for a paper on the
scientific whaling dispute between
[Page 946]
the US and Iceland, including a discussion of the
conservation and national security implications of the dispute and two
US policy options.2
The attached paper was provided to the Department of Commerce and Defense
for coordination. Rather than provide comments for this paper, Commerce
will either prepare a separate paper or present its points orally at the
September 1 meeting.3 The views of the Department of Defense
have been included.
It is our understanding that the Department of Commerce favors option A,
which is to maintain the position conveyed to Iceland at the July 21–22
talks—certification of Iceland under the Pelly Amendment if Iceland takes any further whales
before its program is revised and submitted to the IWC. The Departments of State and Defense
favor option B, which calls for agreement that Iceland’s decision
provides sufficient progress towards IWC criteria and US conservation objectives to make
certification unnecessary and not in the best interests of the USG. Option B keeps open the possibility
of further movement by Iceland on this issue.
The issue is hereby presented for consideration at the September 1
meeting to be chaired by Robert
Dean of the NSC
staff.
Attachment
Paper Prepared in the Department of
State5
Iceland and Scientific
Whaling:Options for Responding to the GOI Proposal
ISSUE FOR DECISION:
What is the appropriate US response to the Government of Iceland’s
proposed measures to bring its scientific whaling program into
conformity with IWC criteria and US
conservation goals.
ESSENTIAL FACTORS
A detailed review of the development of the scientific whaling
controversy was provided in a Levitsky-Carlucci memo, dated August 20 (Tab A).6 The following brief summary of the
most recent events is provided for background information.
Current Status:
At its 1987 annual meeting, the International Whaling Commission
(IWC) adopted a US-proposed
resolution for new, more stringent, criteria and review procedures
relating to the issuance of special permits for scientific
whaling.7 Pursuant to this
resolution, three resolutions were adopted recommending that
Iceland, South Korea, and Japan not issue (or in Iceland’s case,
revoke) scientific whaling permits until uncertainties identified by
the IWC Scientific Committee are
resolved.
The resolutions were strenuously opposed by the three countries
concerned, with support from Norway and the USSR. Iceland held that our
resolution gave the IWC powers not
justified under the IWC Convention
and thus was illegal.
Despite the IWC recommendation in
June that such activity stop, Iceland continued to take fin whales
under its 1987 scientific whaling program. In the view of the
Secretary of Commerce, Iceland’s continued taking of whales was
certifiable under the Pelly
Amendment.
[Page 948]
Iceland’s Actions in Response to US
Demarches
In response to a US suggestion that it cease taking whales while
bilateral talks were held, Iceland agreed to do so, but halted only
after taking all 80 fin whales called for in its 1987 program.
Discussions were held in Washington on July 21–22.8 Commerce informed the GOI delegation that Iceland’s continued taking of
whales, despite the IWC
recommendation, had established a basis for certification under the
Pelly Amendment.
However, the Secretary of Commerce agreed not to certify for the
time being so long as Iceland did not take additional whales,
redesigned its research program and submitted it to the IWC for approval in 1988.9 An interim understanding was reached.
Iceland agreed to maintain its pause in the taking of whales while
discussions continued between our two governments and to reply after
consultations in Reykjavik.
On August 27 we received a formal response to the July talks (Tab
B)10
containing measures the GOI is
prepared to take to bring its program into closer conformity with
the criteria outlined at the July discussions. The steps are: 1)
reduce the 1987 take of 40 sei whales to 20 (i.e. this would bring
the overall level from 120 to 100); 2) redesign its entire research
program with the aim that the number of whales taken be kept to the
minimum (it is our understanding from Ambassador Ingvarsson that
this is intended to signal further reductions in 1988—an
interpretation also conveyed to Ambassador Ruwe by Foreign Minister
Hermannsson); 3) continue
its cooperation with the IWC and to
take account of scientific views expressed there; and 4) consult
with us on the implementation of this offer and on its scientific
program as a whole. Due to the imminent arrival of the sei whales at
Iceland’s whaling grounds, the GOI
feels it must begin whaling operations without delay.
OPTIONS:
A. Inform the GOI that its proposal
does not meet IWC criteria or US
conservation objectives. If Iceland takes any
additional whales prior to resubmitting its program to the
IWC and receiving its
recommendation, the Secretary of Commerce intends to
certify.
B. Agree that although the GOI proposal is disappointing, it does represent
sufficient progress towards IWC
and US conservation objectives to provide a basis for a decision
not to certify this year.
[Page 949]
When informing the GOI of our
decision not to certify at this time, we would note that our
decision is intended to offer Iceland additional time to bring its
program into closer conformity with IWC criteria in 1988, including a further reduction in
the overall number of whales taken, and we interpret this as a
commitment to these ends.
IMPACT OF CERTIFICATION
International Conservation Implications
The most effective means of gaining whale conservation goals is
through voluntary compliance by the government(s) involved. The
threat of certification under the Pelly Amendment has thus far been the primary means
by which we influenced Iceland on the scientific whaling issue. It
is our view that the Icelandic response, while disappointing, moves
in the right direction and contains sufficient substance to allow us
to pursue our conservation objectives through means other than
certification.
Iceland has repeated on several occasions that certification will
result in its withdrawal from the IWC, possibly along with several other states. Thus one
result of certification could be to reduce the influence of the US,
and other states, on Iceland’s international whaling policy
decisions. Such a development could not be viewed as strengthening
the IWC’s conservation regime.
Certification will result in a serious bilateral confrontation and
put us in an adversarial position vis-a-vis Iceland. Under these
circumstances, the US ability to influence GOI whaling policy would be drastically reduced or
ended. The reduction or end of US leverage in Reykjavik will lessen
our ability to meet our conservation objectives.
As long as certification is kept as a threat, Iceland may be more
inclined to meet US and IWC
concerns over its program. Other than the loss of its whale meat
sales to Japan, and damage to its international reputation,
certification by itself would create no real economic imposition on
Iceland. (Since Iceland does not fish in the US EEZ, certification and loss of fishing
allocations under the Packwood Amendment is not relevant.) Once certified,
and absent any real intention to impose economic sanctions, the
Icelanders may have little or no reason to cooperate bilaterally or
in the IWC.
Political and Security Considerations
Certification, while the Independence Party (IP) leads the government
coalition, will play into the hands of Iceland’s leftist parties.
The conservative IP has been the most consistent and outspoken
advocate of close cooperation with the US, often in the face of
strong criticism. Certification can be expected to undermine the
IP’s electoral strength and reduce its willingness to defend our
interests.
[Page 950]
In an unexpected development, the IWC decision and subsequent discussions with the US
produced a reasoned public debate in Iceland over the merits of
continued research whaling given the threat it poses to Iceland’s
relations with the US and international reputation. Certification
will kill this promising debate and the discussion would then be
held in nationalistic terms, with Icelanders supporting the view
that they can not allow the US or IWC to “push them around.”
Certification will inevitably result in Iceland attempting to use the
presence of the Icelandic Defense Force (IDF) at Keflavik as a bargaining tool, as it has done
in the past under similar circumstances. Initially, the GOI is not likely to take drastic
steps, such as closing the base or asking for specific missions to
be ended. However, there are alternatives that could dramatically
reduce the operational effectiveness of the IDF and eventually threaten the status of the base.
These include:
1) Permitting dock handlers to boycott US goods, thereby forcing
an airlift of all required materiel and supplies to
Keflavik.
2) Placing restrictions on the flight operations, perhaps under
the guise of noise or safety regulations.
3) Terminating or slowing down all or part of the billion dollar
IDF upgrade program, which
includes the construction of hardened aircraft shelters and two
new northern-looking radar sites.
4) Asking that the number of IDF
personnel be reduced below the level where it would be possible
to carry out assigned functions.
5) Requesting review of the 1951 Defense Agreement, possibly to
add periodic renegotiation of base rights or rental payments,
neither of which have ever been required.11
In 1976 DOD prepared a contingency
paper on the likely consequences and costs for the US resulting from
the loss of one or more of the missions carried out at Keflavik, as
well as a total base closure.12 In 1976, the one-time cost of providing similar
capabilities based elsewhere was estimated at $500 million plus a
33% increase in the annual operating costs for some missions. Even
then there would be a significant reduction in the effectiveness of
some of the missions due to the need to operate over greater
distances. These cost estimates have not been updated since they
were originally made. However, it is safe to assume that inflation
and today’s far higher prices to replace existing facilities would
multiply the 1976 figure several times.
Steps to Mitigate the Results of a
Certification Decision
Efforts to mitigate the results of a decision to certify fall into
three categories. The first are steps that could be taken regarding
whaling
[Page 951]
policy and
conservation. Since we do not know what the GOI whaling policy would become after certification, it
is difficult to concisely list possible steps we could take.
However, the US would continue to discuss scientific whaling with
Iceland as well as the implications of certification.
The second category are steps to mitigate reductions in the military
effectiveness of the IDF or a
change in the status of the base. In the 1976 paper referred to
above, there is a lengthy analysis of what actions (based on 1976
requirements) DOD could take to
replace the functions carried out at Keflavik. Although there are
technically feasible alternatives listed for each mission, some
relocation options might not be politically possible today and
others would be prohibitively expensive, especially in a period of
reduced budgets.
Finally, in the area of foreign policy and bilateral relations, a
decision by the President not to impose sanctions under the
Pelly Amendment would
avoid worsening the situation. We have been unable to identify any
other reasonable measures (such as in trade relations or NATO affairs) that could be offered
to the Icelanders to mitigate certification.
AGENCY POSITIONS: STATE
The Department of State supports Option B which is best calculated to
provide progress toward an improved whale conservation regime. We
are opposed to Option A and see it as likely to produce results
counterproductive to our whaling policy objectives and national
security interests.
We recognize the primary role of the Secretary of Commerce on this
issue and the important whaling policy questions at stake. We also
believe that the potential negative impact on bilateral relations
and national security are significant and must be considered within
the context of a decision to certify.
This dispute has now reached a juncture where it is clear that
Iceland is putting forward its final position in this year’s round
of whaling policy negotiations. We believe it is incumbent upon the
USG to assess an appropriate
course of action vis-a-vis Iceland that takes into account not only
whaling concerns, but also foreign policy and our security interests
in Iceland.
In considering our response to the Icelandic proposal, an important
consideration is whether the Secretary of Commerce can use means
other than certification to accomplish US conservation objectives.
We believe he can and that a decision not to certify is justified
under the present circumstances.
While recognizing the statutory responsibility of the Secretary of
Commerce under the Pelly
Amendment, we operate from the premise
[Page 952]
that the Secretary of Commerce, as affirmed by
the Supreme Court decision in the Japan Whaling Association case,
has discretion in making a decision whether or not to certify that a
nation is diminishing the effectiveness of the IWC’s conservation program.13 The Secretary of Commerce is not
bound to certify any and all departures from the recommendations of
the IWC Scientific Committee with
respect to scientific whaling, but can and should consider
certification on a case-by-case basis, in light of all relevant
factors, with a view to what enhances/diminishes the effectiveness
of the IWC. While we recognize the
risk of litigation and arguable distinctions between this and the
Japan case, we believe that a decision not to certify can be
justified legally.
We share the US goal of promoting the effective conservation of
whales and have contributed significantly to the Department of
Commerce’s efforts in this regard. We recognize that the GOI proposal does not conform to the
optimal objectives of the USG and
the IWC. However it does represent
progress toward the IWC
conservation regime on which we can expect to build further: it
reduces the number of whales taken this year, opens the way for
further reductions next year, keeps Iceland in the IWC and retains US influence. There is
no evidence that certification would produce equal results—and there
are strong indications to the contrary.
We do not consider certification to be the the most effective way of
furthering US whaling policy nor to bring Iceland into closer
conformity with the IWC
conservation regime. It will reduce, or end, our influence on
Iceland’s whaling decisions.
While it is impossible to predict how Iceland would respond to
certification, we strongly believe that it will be seen as an insult
to national pride and a potential threat to its largest money
earner—fisheries exports—resulting from the possibility (no matter
how remote) of sanctions being applied under Pelly. Certification will touch
off a downward spiral in our bilateral and security relationship
that will be difficult to arrest once begun.
We believe that the GOI proposal
represents the most constructive position we are likely to receive
from Iceland and it should be accepted. It is our understanding that
it was agreed only with great difficulty by the three-party
government coalition and, should we press now for additional
concessions, new formulations could be worse from our
perspective.
We would make clear in that we do not endorse Iceland’s decision and
that we intend to continue to press for more flexibility; Iceland
[Page 953]
indicated in its
response that it is prepared to continue discussions. Additional
GOI concessions are far more
likely if the GOI can portray them
as voluntary, rather than having them seen as a result of US
“coercion.” As an example, non-certification would leave open the
possibility of further cooperative non-lethal research that could
reduce Iceland’s rationale for conducting scientific whaling.
Iceland has stated several times its willingness to use non-lethal
methods to accomplish its research aims.
Should the US certify Iceland, Japan would almost certainly cease its
purchases of whale meat taken under the special permits in order to
avoid being certified. Iceland would view the Japanese decision as a
result of US coercion and interference in the trade relations
between two of America’s allies. Although not a major factor in
Iceland’s exports, the added loss of a trading partner would further
strain our relations with Reykjavik.
The crucial base at Keflavik remains Iceland’s most important “card”
in any dispute with the US, and it is one that the GOI has not hesitated to use in the
past. In recent years security cooperation with Iceland has improved
markedly in a broad range of areas, despite problems that occur in
relations between close friends and allies. However, Iceland defines
this issue as touching on its national sovereignty and of
fundamental importance to its special relationship with the US.
Should the US certify, there will be an immediate public reaction
against the US and our military presence. The reduction or loss of
one or more of the missions currently carried out at Keflavik would
have an immediate and highly negative effect on our national
security and closure of the base could be devastating. If our 35
year old security relationship is seriously damaged by this issue,
the political will and consensus necessary in Iceland to maintain
our presence might prove impossible to reconstruct.
Outside of security and bilateral areas, there are other steps the
GOI could take that will work
against our interests. If certified, the GOI could initiate steps to withdraw from the IWC, effective in 1988. Iceland, and
other whaling nations, have raised the possibility of founding a new
international organization to regulate whaling. It is not clear
whether this is a serious threat at this time.
Acceptance of the GOI proposal can
be presented to Congress and conservation groups as providing more
progress towards the IWC
conservation regime than would have been possible through
certification. We will be able to cite that fewer whales will be
taken this year, and there is a good (but informally conveyed)
likelihood that Iceland’s program will be further reduced in future
years. Iceland will remain in the IWC and continue to take account of the scientific
views expressed there, all of which will strengthen the IWC’s conservation regime.
[Page 954]
AGENCY POSITIONS: DEFENSE
The US base at Keflavik, Iceland is of vital importance to US and
NATO security. Its location
makes it the linchpin of US efforts to defend North Atlantic sea
lines of communication between North America and Europe, as well as
an invaluable forward position for the defense of the US. Without
unhampered ability to operate US air and naval forces from Keflavik,
we would be very hard pressed to reinforce Western Europe in crisis
or war, and to defend the US from Soviet nuclear missile attack
submarines in the Atlantic Ocean. Even in peacetime, Keflavik is an
unrivalled location for daily surveillance of Soviet air and naval
activity in the Atlantic. It would be extremely difficult to conduct
these operations from any other location. At present, we use
Keflavik on favorable terms and without paying base rent. Icelandic
cooperation has permitted great progress on modernization and
improvement of the US defense posture there.
DOD is concerned that the US
position in Keflavik, our freedom of operations there, and perhaps
even our presence itself, may be jeopardized by the expected
Icelandic reaction to a certification decision. The history of the
very difficult US-Icelandic “Rainbow” shipping controversy between
1984 and 198714
leads us to expect that if certified, Iceland will harden its
position rather than sacrifice its national dignity, at considerable
expense to friendly bilateral relations. At risk is the US base at
Keflavik, as that would be the only lever that Iceland could use to
apply pressure upon the US. The result would be serious damage to US
defense, and the loss of an important ally.
