Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLI, Global Issues II

326. Telegram From the Embassy in Iceland to the Departments of State and Commerce¹

Reykjavik, March 10, 1987, 1536Z

517. Subject: NOAA Administrator’s Visit to Iceland.

1. (Confidential—Entire text)

2. Summary: Dr. Anthony Calio, NOAA Administrator, made an official visit to Iceland March 4–6 at the invitation of Iceland’s Fisheries Minister Halldor Asgrimsson. Dr. Calio was accompanied by Assistant Director for Fisheries William Evans and NOAA General Counsel Daniel McGovern. Discussions centered around a US-proposed resolution concerning scientific permits to be introduced at the June meeting of the IWC.² Dr. Calio explained that, in his view, the ambiguity of the compromise on scientific whaling agreed to last year at Malmo was at the source of friction between the two countries and that the U.S. proposal was a way to address that problem.³ It was also aimed at establishing a link between scientific whaling and a comprehensive assessment which was to be gotten under way by 1990. Dr. Calio thought both sides could work together to get movement on a comprehensive assessment. The Icelandic side expressed their deep frustration at the workings of the IWC, an organization they thought unable to come to a consensus on such matters. But more importantly, the GOI was concerned about the appropriateness of submitting their scientific whaling program to a vote in the IWC. Much of the IWC membership operated from political motives, they thought, and thus the GOI was reluctant to submit their program to it for a vote. Throughout the visit, the Icelandic side expressed their belief that, in fact, the U.S. proposal was aimed at stopping Iceland from carrying out scientific whaling. While the results of the visit could be viewed as inconclusive, there is reason to believe that Dr. Calio’s delegation made progress in impressing upon Icelandic officials the need to go forward with the U.S. Resolution concerning scientific permits and that each in his own way was working toward the goal of getting agreement in the IWC on the start of a comprehensive assessment. Both sides agreed to stay in close touch as U.S. consultations with other IWC-member countries progressed. There was also agreement to coordinate efforts to prevent the Sea Shepherd Organization from attending the next meeting of the IWC.⁴ Dr. Calio and his colleagues stressed the need to accomplish this without unduly embarrassing the Chairman of the IWC. End summary.

3. Dr. Anthony Calio, NOAA Administrator, accompanied by Assistant Director for Fisheries William Evans and NOAA General Counsel Daniel McGovern, completed 3-day official visit to Iceland March 4–6 and returned to Washington on Saturday, March 7. Visitors, accompanied by Ambassador and Economic Officer James Ledesma, were taken to Thingvellir afternoon of March 4 where they were met by Fisheries Minister and Acting Prime Minister Halldor Asgrimsson and given a tour of the area. At Dr. Calio’s request, next day began with a trip to Hvalf Jordour (Whale Bay) where group toured Hvalur Whaling Company properties. Owner of Hvalur HF, Kristjan Loftsson, accompanied group on tour. Group then returned to Reykjavik where afternoon meeting had been set up, at suggestion of Foreign Ministry, with Foreign Minister Matthias Mathiesen. Meeting, which lasted about ten minutes, took place at Althing. Mathiesen underscored the importance of maintaining good relations with the U.S. and asked that everything be done to accomplish this. In a gesture toward Ambassador, Foreign Minister pointed to other recent obstacles having been surmounted commenting that amicable relations must be preserved. He looked to Ambassador to contribute again toward this end. Dr. Calio in turn responded that it was also his wish to maintain good relations. While Iceland and the U.S. did not see eye-to-eye on whaling matters, he thought some way must be found to resolve differences. McGovern stated that a positive element was that both sides involved in whaling matters now knew each other well and this would reduce any chance of misunderstanding.

4. Rest of afternoon taken up with meeting devoted, for the most part, to whaling issues including a detailed briefing on Iceland’s research program. On Icelandic side, meeting attended by Fisheries Minister, Secretary General of Fisheries Ministry Arni Kolbeinsson, Kjartan Juliusson, Whale Division Director at Ministry, Jakob Jakobsson, Director of Marine Research Institute, Johann Sigurjonsson, a Marine Biologist at the Institute, and Gudmundur Eiriksson, Foreign Ministry Legal Adviser accompanied by an assistant. Throughout almost entire visit Eiriksson and his assistant were sole representatives from Foreign Ministry.

5. Meeting began with Johann Sigurjonsson describing various elements of Iceland’s research program including efforts to obtain age and reproduction data (has greater availability of food resulted in speeding up of fin whale growth rate and therefore sexual maturity?), energetics, food and food-web (what is the relationship between Capelin and Humpback whale stocks?), June/July 1986 minke whale aerial survey (consultations with European and American scientists on interpretation of data not yet complete), and killer whale movement and population studies (what is their role in the ecosystem? Photo ID of over 120 completed so far).

6. With regard to Icelandic efforts to get North Atlantic sighting survey under way this year, Sigurjonsson and Jakobsson explained that progress had been made in obtaining resources (8 vessels and 4 aircraft) from Norway, Faroes, Denmark and the Nordic Council. Given the area to cover stretching from Norway to southern tip of Greenland, Iceland also sought participation of U.S., UK and Spanish scientists. Area to be surveyed could then possibly be extended to seas off the coasts of those countries. Management workshops had already taken place and two more were scheduled for late March. Planning sessions were organized for April/May with start of survey to take place in June. Throughout briefing, Icelandic side repeated that 1987 North Atlantic survey was intended as a major contribution to IWC comprehensive assessment. Indeed, the major thrust of their argument was that rhetoric surrounding discussion of the issue in the IWC was intended, in their view, as a delaying tactic and that their actions proved that a comprehensive assessment could be completed by 1990. In response, Dr. Calio expressed some surprise that he had not known extent of planning for this survey, to which Halldor Asgrimsson replied that developments had come slowly. Dr. Calio said he would look into possibility of encouraging participation by U.S. scientists including possible material resources. He agreed that international cooperation was essential to a comprehensive assessment.

7. Fisheries Minister then intervened to say with regard to U.S. proposed resolution concerning scientific permits, that question of utilization of whale meat had not been addressed. American interpretation of “primarily for local consumption” contained in June 1986 resolution on special permits had been difficult to accept, he said, especially given small Icelandic population.⁵ Nevertheless, this was history and he did not wish to return to the question again. Dr. Calio commented that it was his purpose to get a better understanding of how other IWC-member countries saw the US-proposed resolution on scientific permits and, on this score, it was essential that the USG get Iceland’s views early on. After consultations with the Minister last August, the U.S. had concluded that it was best not to return to the resolution agreed to in Malmo given its ambiguity. Thus, his purpose in coming to Iceland was to search for a resolution of differences and not to impose the will of the U.S. on Iceland. He sought to avoid volatility and an escalation of animosity, Dr. Calio said. At this point the U.S. side distributed two scientific papers (“The Role of Special Scientific Permits in Meeting the Research Objectives of the Comprehensive Assessment of Whale Stocks” by Howard Brabham, and “Problems in the Reanalysis of Past Data for the Comprehensive Assessment of Whale Stocks” by Douglas Chapman)⁶ which were intended to help establish a link between research and the comprehensive assessment. Dr. Calio also stressed that even the suggestion of a comprehensive assessment had been resisted by American environmentalist groups as little as twelve months ago, but that they had now come around to accepting such an exercise. He felt this was significant progress. His hope was that the IWC could adopt the four criteria contained in the U.S. resolution on scientific permits and thus have a way of judging whether the granting of special permits contributed to the comprehensive assessment. It was not the intent of the USG to push the IWC in any direction, Dr. Calio said. The problem, he stated, was that the IWC was “walking away” from difficult decisions and would not take a position. It was his objective to come up with a way for the U.S. to abide by its laws while obviating the need for unilateral imposition of sanctions.

8. Asgrimsson responded to Dr. Calio’s remarks with a declaration that a comprehensive assessment was also important to Iceland, but that it was also important to let scientists decide for themselves how best to get results and not subject their proposals to a vote. It was essential that Iceland be allowed to carry out research as it saw fit. The Minister said he had no faith in the judgment of the IWC’s Scientific Subcommittee and that members were too susceptible to political pressures. In short, he was concerned about what would come out of the Scientific Subcommittee and was not willing to be bound by its views. Further, the view of the full committee inevitably contained three or four opinions anyway. While scientific merit was not something one could vote on, he said, it was another thing to seek the views of others. In response to Dr. Calio’s comments that his purpose was to get movement toward a comprehensive assessment by focussing attention on criteria and that it was possible to set limits and still respect a divergence of views, Asgrimsson asked why the U.S. could not simply go forward with a comprehensive assessment based on Iceland’s research so far. He did not understand what danger to stocks there could be by virtue of scientific whaling. Catches were not excessive, he said. Dr. Calio in turn responded that if moratorium on commercial whaling was ever to be lifted, members would need to have the results of a comprehensive assessment and that currently there was no criteria in place. The result of inaction in the IWC would be that the organization would drift for perhaps another five years. If this were to happen, he could foresee a repetition of the US/Iceland bilateral confrontation in 1987, and each year after that.

9. McGovern intervened at this point saying that in fact much of the opposition to a comprehensive assessment was based on the fear of some that it would produce wrong answers, that is, results which could justify lifting the ban on commercial whaling. The USG, however, had succeeded in convincing opponents that the only way to apply discipline to scientific programs was to move forward on a comprehensive assessment and agree on criteria by which scientific proposals could be tested. The objective, he said, was to bring skeptics to the conclusion that the purpose of the IWC was to manage stocks, not simply to preserve them. McGovern repeated Dr. Calio’s earlier statement that at this point a repetition of last year’s bilateral confrontation was inevitable and therefore both sides must manage the problem. The error last year, he thought, was in trying to get at scientific legitimacy by focussing on consumption and use. Therefore, this year the U.S. was aiming at getting agreement on scientific criteria. The way to decide whether a scientific program undercut an internationally agreed upon conservation regime was for the IWC to say so. McGovern concluded his remarks by saying that in his view the ambiguity of the resolution on special permits agreed to in Malmo had allowed varying interpretations and that this had led to feelings of bad faith. Therefore, the ambiguity needed to be cleared up.

10. The remainder of March 5 afternoon meeting was devoted to a brief discussion of four criteria contained in U.S. proposal. On this score, Fisheries Minister thought Iceland’s scientific program could probably stand up under all four. What concerned him, he stated, was the notion of voting, devising procedures and getting the IWC to come to grips with issues. In response to expressions of frustration by Icelandic side at apparent inability of IWC Scientific Subcommittee to come to a consensus, Evans agreed that at present it was in effect a debating society, but that if confronted with the need to make a decision, it could be sufficiently disciplined to produce one. Fisheries Minister then stated that if the U.S. sought solutions, his suggestion would be to change American law. “You can’t save the world,” he commented. Dr. Calio responded that if the USG attempted to change the law, the result was likely to be a much stiffer one.

11. Next day began with Evans, McGovern and EconOff traveling with Arni Kolbeinsson and MFA Representative to Westman Islands to observe fishing operations. Dr. Calio was unable to take part in this part of visit. With the agreement of both sides, the afternoon was spent meeting again to resume discussion of whaling matters. Evans began with a brief description of scientific papers distributed the day before emphasizing that Iceland was the first country to see them, that intent was to discuss them fully at June 1–13 Scientific Subcommittee meeting, and that they were intended to tighten theories and provoke action, not rhetoric. Johann Sigurjonsson’s reactions were almost uniformly negative saying that they were general and without detail and that in his view result would be discussion of comprehensive assessment in terms of paper work with no action. Dr. Calio responded that papers were intended to stimulate thinking and did not necessarily reflect the views of the USG. He agreed that we needed to get started toward agreement on launching of comprehensive assessment by 1990 but did not understand how the GOI intended to get there.

12. Halldor Asgrimsson commented that in his view the question was, does the U.S. proposal promote the carrying out of a comprehensive assessment. He could conclude, he thought, that in fact its intent was to stop scientific whaling. It was essential that the first step be to address the question of how to accomplish a world-wide comprehensive assessment, like the one Iceland had already begun. Following that, the IWC could take up criteria on special permits. Dr. Calio responded that it was not his intent to propose criteria for special permits, but merely to get at the question of whether scientific whaling contributed toward a comprehensive assessment. Thus it was essential that the IWC focus on the definition of a comprehensive assessment. McGovern asked whether the price for Icelandic support of the U.S. resolution on scientific permits was a call for action on a comprehensive assessment and that in turn the price for support of a comprehensive assessment was IWC review of special permits to assure no abuse. Gudmundur Eiriksson responded that in fact the price for Iceland supporting the U.S. proposal was giving up its right to conduct scientific whaling. McGovern in turn thought that the issue arousing most interest this year was special permits. This being the case, the U.S. objective was to channel that enthusiasm toward the goal of accomplishing a comprehensive assessment.

13. Discussion then turned to questions of tactics and how each, in his own way, was contributing toward acceptance of the need for the startup of a comprehensive assessment. In response to Asgrimsson’s comment that the U.S. wanted Iceland to stop scientific whaling, Dr. Calio said this was not necessarily the case and that in fact continuation of scientific whaling was building pressure for acceptance of a comprehensive assessment. It occured to him, however, that the June meeting of the IWC might be too early to get acceptance of the U.S. resolution and that it might be wiser to aim for completion of deliberations in the IWC by early 1988. These were questions he would be taking up soon during consultations with other IWC members including Nordic Group and Europeans. Asgrimsson then said that it was clear that GOI could not support U.S. resolution but that both sides must continue discussing matters and keep up pressure for a comprehensive assessment. Picking up on earlier comments, his view was that Iceland’s scientific program was helping to bring this about. Dr. Calio agreed but said this was a sensitive matter which needed to be handled discreetly. It was essential to stay in close communication, Asgrimsson said. Discussion concluded with Fisheries Minister’s offer to assist Dr. Calio in arranging meetings with Nordics, if need be. Dr. Calio thought it important to keep in mind that movement in the IWC toward a comprehensive assessment could result in consensus that work on the survey would not involve the taking of whales. In this event, it would be important to come up with wording to the effect that IWC members continued to enjoy the sovereign right to determine their own actions. McGovern commented that US/Icelandic cooperation in this year’s North Atlantic Survey could also contribute toward getting agreement for a comprehensive assessment.

14. March 6 meeting then concluded with a brief discussion of Iceland’s plans to prevent the Sea Shepherd Organization from attending the next IWC meeting as an observer. The USG was aware of Iceland’s interest in denying Sea Shepherd an opportunity to be present as a non-governmental organization, McGovern said, and the U.S. was prepared to offer its support if it could be accomplished without undue embarrassment to the Chairman of the IWC. Further, it was important to deny Sea Shepherd the publicity that it sought. Therefore, U.S. suggested early consultations with the Chair and other IWC members. Icelandic side said they had written to a number of delegations in order to seek their views. Although the GOI’s current thinking was to bring the matter up at the first IWC meeting, the U.S. suggested approach and concerns would be taken into account. Iceland’s aim was also to deny Paul Watson any opportunity for publicity.

15. In order to prevent the possibility of any misunderstanding, both sides agreed that it would be useful to meet again for an hour prior to Dr. Calio’s departure for Washington. Therefore, on March 7 Dr. Calio, McGovern, Evans, Ambassador and EconOff met at Keflavik Airport with Gudmundur Eiriksson, Arni Kolbeinsson and Kjartan Juliusson. Eiriksson, who appeared to have a mandate to speak for the GOI, stated that as a result of discussion over the last two days it was the impression of the Icelandic participants that the U.S. side had put into abeyance the U.S. 4-point resolution on scientific permits and that it would go forward with efforts to bring about agreement on a comprehensive assessment. This in fact would satisfy the GOI, Eiriksson said, since it was the opinion of his colleagues that the U.S. should “relax” and that the compromise agreed to in August 1986 was sufficient to prevent further friction until at least 1990. In short, the U.S. proposed resolution was unnecessary, Eiriksson thought. Dr. Calio stated that the need for this last meeting was to clarify what appeared to be the GOI’s incorrect understanding of the U.S. course of action with regard to putting forward the 4-point resolution in upcoming consultations and at Bournemouth. He explained that he had put the resolution on the table and that it contained criteria which would establish a link between special permits and a comprehensive assessment. He reiterated comments the day before to the effect that he did not think it possible to get the IWC to focus on a comprehensive assessment until the issue of special permits had been resolved. At the same time, he agreed that Iceland’s activities also stimulated movement toward a comprehensive assessment. He thought it a mistake, therefore, to conclude that the U.S. had agreed to shelve its proposal. In fact this option had been rejected some while back and he had no choice but to push forward with the proposal. The conversation then turned to Eiriksson’s concern about the intent of the U.S. resolution. Was it not, in fact, aimed at Iceland, he asked. The imminent departure of Dr. Calio’s flight prevented any further discussion.

16. Prior to Dr. Calio’s arrival at the airport and the March 7 last minute meeting, he attended a briefing by IDF personnel on U.S. NATO Base Operations. Finally, we provide below text of Ministry of Fisheries March 7 press release, text of which had been agreed upon by both sides the day before.

Qte

Dr. Anthony J. Calio, Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere, concluded on March 6 an official visit to Iceland, the purpose of which was to gather information on marine research and fisheries management as carried out by the Government of Iceland. He was here at the invitation of Minister of Fisheries Halldor Asgrimsson. Dr. Calio was accompanied by Assistant Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration for Fisheries William Evans and General Counsel Daniel McGovern.

During their stay in Iceland NOAA officials exchanged information with scientists from the Marine Research Institute as well as experts from the Ministry of Fisheries relative to Iceland’s recent experience in Fisheries Management and Stock Assessment. Consultations included a visit to the Westman Islands where they observed, among other things, the processing of capelin roe for export. NOAA officials were also interested in estimates of cod production in 1987. The shrimp fishery and future prospects for clam production in Iceland.

Given the central role that NOAA plays in carrying out the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, legislation requiring the U.S. Government to prevent overfishing and conserve resources, the delegation sought to profit by Iceland’s experience in fisheries management. Officials also discussed ways in which the United States and Iceland can promote and increase their cooperation in the field of fisheries and fisheries research.

Both sides also consulted on whaling matters as they pertain to their mutual membership in the International Whaling Commission. They discussed the possibility of increased cooperation in comprehensively assessing whale stocks, including those of special interest to Iceland.

End qte

17. This message was prepared after Dr. Calio’s departure for Washington.

Ruwe

1. Source: Department of State, Dumping; Arctic; Whaling; Antarctic; Scientific Research, 1976–1987, Lot 94D419, Whaling: Iceland July 1987. Confidential; Immediate.
2. In telegram 72204 to multiple diplomatic posts, March 12, the Department transmitted the text of the U.S. proposal. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870190–0536)
3. In telegram 4210 from Copenhagen, June 13, the Embassy transmitted a report on the 38th meeting of the IWC in Malmo that included an extended discussion on scientific whaling. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860459–0341)
4. The Sea Shepherd Conservation Society is an American environmental group that uses direct action to stop whalers.
5. See Document 322.
6. Neither found.