Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLI, Global Issues II

318. Telegram From the Embassy in Norway to the Department of State¹

Oslo, April 28, 1986, 1414Z

2724. Subj: Appropriate U.S. Responses to Norwegian Whaling. Refs: (A) Oslo 2306 and previous; (B) State 113933 and previous; (C) Oslo A–10; (D) Oslo A–11.²

1. (C—Entire text.)

2. Summary, recommendation and action requested: The whaling issue looms as a major irritant in US-Norwegian relations, despite the minimal economic significance of the hunt and despite (or perhaps here because of) the uncertain scientific justification for the conservationists’ position. Whaling is an emotional issue, particularly in Norway, and will require careful diplomacy in order to avoid unnecessarily harming US–Norwegian relations.

3. The GON has opted to go ahead with a reduced 1986 harvest from the IWC-protected northeast Atlantic minke whale stock. The GON has reacted to political and economic pressures in north Norway in the belief that (A) such a minimal harvest is justified on biological grounds, and (B) that the United States will certify Norway under the Pelly Amendment, but will not apply sanctions against Norwegian fish exports to the United States.

4. The Embassy recommends that State and USDOC consider the USG’s options and agree now on what recommendation they will make to the President concerning certification and sanctions. If a recommendation in favor of sanctions is chosen, we believe this planned recommendation should be conveyed to the GON before the hunt starts in late May.³ Notification of our intention to recommend sanctions could provide a basis for bilateral negotiations aimed at a phased end to Norwegian whaling. Minimizing the damage to US-Norwegian relations requires that the USG pursue every avenue for a mutually satisfactory settlement with an important ally before imposing sanctions.⁴

5. We also request early, specific guidance on the consistency of Pelly Amendment sanctions with GATT obligations; vigorously rebutting GON assertions that any sanctions would violate the GATT is a way of underlining our will to impose sanctions, if that is to be the recommended response.⁵ End summary.

6. Now that the GON has announced a 1986 quota for the northeast Atlantic minke whale stock, contrary to the IWC ruling, the United States faces some difficult decisions. Since 1972, United States policy has aimed at ending commercial whaling. The Packwood Amendment to the Magnusen Fishery Conservation and Management Act and the Pelly Amendment to the Fishermen’s Protective Act clearly manifest the congressional intent to give teeth to our support for an end to commercial whaling. The US must now decide whether to certify Norway under the above amendments and then whether to apply some level of sanctions against Norwegian fish exports to the United States. The circumstances of the IWC protection ruling, the size of the proposed harvest, the stock assessment data, and the wording of the above amendments leave wide open the question of whether the proposed harvest will diminish the effectiveness of either the IWC itself, or its conservation program. The legislative reference to appropriateness of sanctions under the GATT may complicate the issue. Further, the importance of our bilateral relationship requires that the US refrain from a single dimensional analysis of Norway’s decision to go against the IWC.

7. We see three basic options available to the USG.

—(A) Do nothing

That is, withhold both certification under the Packwood and Pelly Amendments and any sanctions that might otherwise have resulted from such certification. In true biological and conservation terms, this option is justified by the low level of the proposed harvest, the lack of scientific data indicating that such a harvest would harm the stock, and the difficulty of establishing that such a low harvest would, in fact, diminish the effectiveness of either the IWC or its conservation program. This option would clearly be the option of choice in terms of US-Norway relations, socioeconomic considerations, and the strategic importance of north Norway, for the following reasons.

Refs A through C have tracked the process which culminated in the GON’s April 7 Cabinet decision to allow a harvest of 350 minke whales from the IWC-protected northeast Atlantic stock. Ref D provided a more community-oriented view of this small-scale coastal whaling, showing the importance of this activity to individual communities in north Norway—a strategically important area that shares a common border with the Soviet Union. Despite common references to whaling as a dying tradition, the refs show that whaling represents the critical marginal income that sustains coastal communities in an area characterized by long-term depopulation trends. Whaling is, in fact, a profitable enterprise—one that in years such as this, when cod harvests have hit record low levels, sustains entire communities.

Further, the hunt is a cultural phenomenon. The coastal whale hunt is the last remaining vestige of a whaling tradition that stretches back to the pre-Christian era, while many of the whaling vessels are modern and whalers earn profits from the harvest, the cultural aspects of this hunt differ little from those of Alaskan Inuits whose subsistance depends on the harvest of other small whales. Direct financial support from the GON could alleviate the economic hardship resulting from a cessation of whaling, but such transfers are inadequate from a social/cultural point of view.

The GON has established a record of whale conservation by reducing over time, first its high seas whaling activities and now, its coastal whaling efforts. At each turn, the GON has reduced the harvest in compliance with the best scientific data available and in compliance with the IWC. As a result it has repeatedly reduced the number of whaling licenses and forced individuals to leave the fishery, thus inflicting economic harm on individuals existing in a marginal, albeit strategic environment. At this point, the whale harvest has been reduced to the minimum level that will allow its continuation. Elimination of whaling activities will cost jobs, and will run contrary to the USG’s longstanding policy of support for GON efforts to maintain population levels along NATO’s northern flank.

Finally, PM Willoch is personally involved in this issue. He is not persuaded that a moratorium on minke whale hunting is justified. He is by nature a man of principle, who firmly sticks by what he believes is right. During last September’s national election, Willoch’s non-socialist coalition lost votes in Norway’s rural areas, particularly the north. The loss of votes to the opposition labor party cost the governing coalition its majority in the Storting and has repeatedly made life politically difficult for the PM. Willoch has tried to emphasize his coalition’s support for the residents of rural Norway by increasing funding for infrastructure development and social programs. The GON decision to hold a hunt is an important attempt to show support for these isolated communities.

—(B) Certification, plus possibly token sanctions

Certify Norway but implement either no sanctions or extremely limited, token sanctions, reflecting the minimal and perhaps biologically insignificant impact that the 350-whale harvest will have on the protected northeast Atlantic minke stock. This is the option on which the GON is counting. GON officials have indicated that they anticipate certification under the Pelly Amendment, but are confident that actual sanctions will be withheld, because they are not in accord with the GATT, and because the President would exercise his discretion under the Pelly Amendment in any case. Unlike Option A, this option would satisfy to some extent anticipated domestic pressure for action against Norway by allowing the USG to clearly state through certification its opposition to Norway’s continued whaling. By stopping short of significant sanctions, it would also show the GON that we recognize the depth of its whaling problem and show our understanding for a strong ally. On the other hand, this would remove any external pressure to encourage Norway to cease whaling and withdraw its reservation to the IWC moratorium. In the absence of such pressure, Norwegian whaling can be expected to continue indefinitely.

—(C) Impose a proportionate sanction

Certify Norway and implement meaningful but proportionate sanctions against specified Norwegian fish exports to the US, such as salmon, in order to deny Norway any economic benefits from continued whaling. A proportionate sanction could involve Norwegian fish products up to but not exceeding the value of the whales being harvested. Such a proportionate sanction would reflect a strong US commitment to seek an end to Norwegian whaling. Collateral action to certify any other nation buying whale meat from Norway, would reinforce the message by impacting Norway in the marketplace.

The GON clearly does not anticipate that this option will be implemented. The GON will react strongly and challenge the US action under GATT. The public reaction will be strong, and will be exacerbated by the perception that a super power is picking on “Little Norway” and doing so without an adequate scientific justification. This strong reaction might be tempered by the realization that the sanction was proportionate to the whale catch—an argument that may prove essential to avoid this issue seriously poisoning bilateral relations.

The GON will also be watching closely how the USG will treat Iceland’s plans to hunt 200 whales for research purposes under these same amendments.⁶ Any perception that Norway is being treated less favorably than Iceland would only further aggravate the Norwegian reaction to US sanctions.

8. Recommendation:

The Embassy believes that option B would be the most appropriate course, both in the interest of maintaining strong bilateral relations, and as an appropriate signal of US opposition to GON whaling. However, if it is decided that significant sanctions are necessary, we recommend that this be conveyed to the GON in forceful terms as early as possible and that this be coupled with an effort to engage the GON in a negotiated end to Norwegian whaling.

Specifically, we recommend that such a decision be conveyed to the GON in Washington and Oslo (by the Ambassador) before the hunt starts in late May. This timing would help forestall any Norwegian accusations that USG statements concerning sanctions were vague and imprecise.

9. The USG statement should contain a clear justification of the US action under the GATT. GON officials have already said that they consider such action contrary to the GATT and will likely lodge an objection in that forum if sanctions are undertaken. In deciding what sanctions to impose, we must also weigh the options which Norway has available under the GATT or otherwise to respond to or retaliate against US sanctions. The GON’s emphasis on the GATT aspects suggests that they will be carefully assessing their options, though we have not yet heard any indications of possible retaliation. A strong, and early justification will help convince the GON that we are indeed serious in explaining our intention to recommend sanctions.

10. So far, the Norwegians have given no indication that they are willing to consider negotiating an end to whaling. Their reasons are clear. They believe whaling will be scientifically justified for the foreseeable future and, equally important, they simply do not believe that the USG will implement meaningful sanctions. That belief may change, however, if the GON is faced with a solid State-USDOC recommendation to the President to impose meaningful sanctions against Norwegian fish. Nor do they yet believe that the environmentalists will be able to organize an effective boycott.

11. After the GON has time to absorb the seriousness of our intent to recommend sanctions, the USG should offer negotiations similar to those conducted with the Japanese to phase out whaling activities by a set date. Our opening position could be an offer to withhold sanctions this year in return for a total ban on Norwegian whaling next year. The ongoing negotiations could justify a slight delay in implementing sanctions and give the GON time to back away from a difficult political problem. Should the negotiations fail, the USG would always retain the option of increasing the sanction pressure at a later date. While notification of the State-USDOC recommendation should be made before the hunt, other opportunities to convey the message at appropriately high levels will arise. The early June visit to Washington by Nils Morton Udgaard, National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister, would be a prime opportunity to present the US position and propose negotiations.⁷ The IWC meetings in June could provide an opportunity to carry the negotiations forward and assess the prospects for success before deciding whether to proceed with a recommendation for sanctions.⁸

Brown

1. Source: Department of State, Dumping; Arctic; Whaling; Antarctic; Scientific Research, 1976–1987, Lot 94D419, Whaling—Norway 1985–86. Confidential. Sent for information to the Department of Commerce. In the upper left-hand margin, an unknown hand wrote, “Norway 350 minke not scientific.”
2. In telegram 2306 from Oslo, April 11, the Embassy described a meeting regarding Norway’s plans for the nation’s 1986 hunt. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860283–0102) In telegram 113933 to Oslo, April 12, the Department provided press guidance regarding the Norwegian decision to hunt whales. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860281–0354) Airgram A–10 from Oslo was not found. In airgram A–11 from Oslo, April 16, the Embassy provided a report on whaling in northern Norway. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P860046–1854)
3. In telegram 3195 from Oslo, May 16, the Embassy reported that Stuart had requested that Norwegian officials delay their upcoming hunt. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860384–0081)
4. In the margin next to this sentence, an unknown hand wrote, “Can’t do this before Supreme Ct. ruling—?”
5. Not found.
6. See Documents 315 and 316.
7. In telegram 181308 to Oslo, June 9, the Department summarized Udgaard’s visit, during which whaling was not mentioned. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860445–0200)
8. In telegram 181127 to Oslo, June 9, the Department reported that Baldrige had certified Norway. The IWC meeting was in session at the time. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860444–0937)