Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLI, Global Issues II

304. Memorandum From the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs to All State Department Participants in the International Whaling Commission Policy Formation¹

Washington, May 17, 1984

SUBJECT

• Whaling Foreign Policy and U.S. Policy in the IWC, Potential Conflicts and Confrontations

U.S. whaling policy now concentrates upon securing effective implementation of the IWC commercial whaling moratorium decision which comes into effect for the 1985/86 whaling seasons.² We have indicated to both Norway and Japan the likelihood of application of the two forms of fisheries related sanctions³ which must be considered for nations which engage in activities which undermine the IWC conservation regime (whaling in contravention of an IWC regulation, not an objection by itself) if they maintain their objections to the moratorium and engage in actual whaling activities contrary to the moratorium after it takes effect. Although we have an indication from the Japanese that they are interested in avoiding fisheries sanctions and from the Norwegians that they want to avoid a bilateral confrontation, we have no indication that a complete termination of whaling activities would be acceptable. All the other whaling countries, except the U.S.S.R., have now indicated a willingness to abide by the moratorium decision, to differing degrees in response to U.S. pressure. In addition, within the IWC, the countries supporting the moratorium look to the U.S. as the only enforcer of the IWC action (through the sanctions available in the Pelly and Packwood Amendments).

In these circumstances there is a significant prospect of confrontation between the U.S. and Norway and the U.S. and Japan, respectively, when the moratorium enters into effect. Confrontation over this issue with Japan and/or Norway could have a significant negative impact upon our respective bilateral relationships. Recognition of the consequences of confrontation over whaling issues has led to the consultations between the U.S. and Norway, and the U.S. and Japan, to explore some form of compromise. The consultations have concentrated upon the possibility of developing a formula to permit continuation of limited whaling of a subsistence character which could be construed as not being subject to the IWC’s ban on commercial whaling.

In recent bilateral consultations we have accepted as a framework for discussion confidential discussion papers⁴ from both Japan and Norway suggesting a possible IWC accommodation which would allow coastal whaling to continue at current levels with no import or export of whale products. Although Japan has also insisted that some pelagic whaling remain, to be justified as a research project without import restrictions (allowing Soviet whaling to continue), they have shown some flexibility already on numbers of whales taken in these operations which may be an indication of further flexibility.

The efforts to explore possible compromises can be expected to become more difficult in light of the lack of proposals from Norway or Japan that differ significantly from the status quo; the recent negative reactions from other IWC Commissioners consulted concerning a possible exception for Norway; and recent U.S. indications for a phase-out of whaling as a potential requirement for a compromise. In addition, any compromise is likely to be viewed as a betrayal by the environmental community which would attempt to muster support on the Hill and from the American public in calling for the State Department to stop activities which are undermining the moratorium.

Any such compromise in order to have any chance of IWC acceptance and avoid the U.S. setting whaling regulations bilaterally should avoid opening up the whaling moratorium decision with an exception that would allow all the whaling operations in other countries to continue. The Icelanders have already served notice that they would demand the same authorization to any special arrangement for continued Norwegian whaling,⁵ and we can also expect that the other whaling countries that did not object will apply pressure on the U.S. and within the IWC to also be given special consideration to allow continued whaling. Other IWC members who have taken a similar view to the U.S. concerning the importance of the IWC moratorium decision can also be expected to object to U.S. activities in support of a compromise which could undermine the IWC decision.

In order to continue consultations with the Japanese and Norway, all the U.S. participants recognize the necessity to try to determine some elements of a U.S. position soon if we are to have a position which allows any limited whaling to continue. All of the participants in the interagency discussions have seen the information memo that we prepared for the Secretary⁶ and are expecting the State Department to take a position.

It appears that requiring a phase-out in order for a compromise to be acceptable to the U.S. is not likely to give us the opportunity to discover if Japan and/or Norway will accept a major reduction in the level of their whaling and other controls, and is very likely to end the discussions. The Japanese and Norwegians have told us they cannot accept a phase-out provision. The moratorium was also called a phase-out and was rejected by the public and the Governments of both countries.

A more constructive approach might be to guide the discussions toward a major reduction in the level of coastal whaling and toward a structure which the IWC can oversee. This approach would have many of the advantages of a phase-out: disincentives and restrictions to limit applicability to other whaling countries and easier differentiation from the Commercial Whaling Moratorium decision yet would be easier for Japan and Norway to sell at home. This should not include a continuation of pelagic or research whaling because this does not offer any of these benefits, unless it’s acceptable to the IWC. Such a position would offer us the time that we all agree is on our side and substantially reduced whaling which will result in the eventual acceptance of the end to whaling in these countries.

At this time it would not be helpful for the U.S. to take the initiative within the IWC, but our position should allow us to keep our options open. Informal discussions with other Commissioners concerning possible structure of a proposal would be useful. There is no assurance that the IWC would accept any compromise but certainly U.S. support would be critical. On the other hand the impression that the U.S. and Japan and Norway respectively have cut a deal without IWC involvement could easily result in a backlash. In order to take into account U.S. foreign policy concerns and the U.S. commitment to the IWC as well as the implementation of the commercial whaling moratorium decision, the State Department should advocate this approach in our discussions with the Department of Commerce.⁷

1. Source: Department of State, Chronological Files, 1984–1985, Lot 86D362, May 1984 #2 OES Completed Items. Confidential. Drafted By Kendrew on May 16 and cleared by Scully, Michalak, McKee, Wolfe, Flournoy, Lexit, and Malone.
2. See Document 301.
3. An April 20 information memorandum from Wolfowitz, Malone, and Kelly to Shultz covering all aspects of the moratorium decision is in Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P840093–2272.
4. Not found. A Norwegian discussion paper is mentioned. (Ibid.) A Japanese discussion paper is described in a February 15 memorandum from Scully to Malone. (Department of State, Chronological Files, 1984–1985, Lot 86D362, February 1984 #1 Completed Items)
5. Telegram 1074 from Reykjavik, May 10. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840308–0730)
6. See footnote 3, above.
7. Not further identified.