Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLI, Global Issues II

243. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Crocker) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, March 2, 1985

SUBJECT

• Next Steps In Our Ethiopia Policy

Issue for Decision

In becoming the largest relief donor and perhaps the most active in pushing for food distribution in insecure areas, the U.S. has entered into a most extraordinary involvement with Ethiopia, one that, if well managed, could produce far-reaching political consequences. However, there should be no expectation of dramatic “conversions” of Ethiopia’s Marxist leadership. Rather we will need to maximize the opportunities presented by the present situation for reducing Mengistu’s support among the military and the population at large. Your approval is requested for several actions along this line.

Background

U.S. relations with Ethiopia have deteriorated steadily since 1974 when a Marxist-oriented military overthrew the Emperor. The situation became more worrisome in 1981 when Ethiopia signed the Tripartite Pact with Libya and North Yemen and began supporting and training insurgents against both Sudan and Somalia. While animosities within the region are deep and complex, with long historical roots, these actions of the Mengistu regime, backed by USSR and Libyan arms, pose threats to U.S. interests in the region and the stability of two of our friends. Efforts to open a serious dialogue with the Mengistu leadership have produced reluctant statements of agreement in principle, but there has been no concrete action. Mengistu is dependent upon Soviet support for his survival and his policies.

The recent drought and famine in Ethiopia have meanwhile changed our involvement there dramatically. Our emergency aid began to increase sharply during 1983–84 as reports of massive starvation came to us. At first, given the difficulty of working with the PMGSE, and its own refusal to acknowledge the problem to its own population, we channeled our aid through private voluntary organizations. By the fall of 1984, however, the problem was overwhelming the PVOs, and the PMGSE was ready to acknowledge what the world was rapidly finding out—that tens of thousands of people were dying and millions were in danger of death. In September 1984, Ambassador Walters and I met in New York with the Ethiopian Foreign Minister and made two discrete offers:² (1) We renewed and defined in detail our readiness for a thorough and far-reaching political dialogue; (2) we offered, without condition regarding political differences or a dialogue, a massive relief effort including government-to-government assistance. The PMGSE accepted both offers in principle, but has only proceeded with the second. In November, their Relief Commissioner came to Washington to negotiate and sign an emergency program, including 50,000 MT of food on a government-to-government basis. Days later, American planes were flying food, an AID team was set up in-country and PVO programs further expanded. In FY85, our emergency aid to Ethiopia will be close to $330 million.

Political Consequences

Several things have happened on the political plane as a result of our action:

—Our massive, lead involvement in the relief effort is widely known at all levels in Ethiopia, in spite of the refusal of the Ethiopian Government to publicize it. Our Embassy personnel, as well as other seasoned Ethiopia watchers, report warm, effusive expressions of appreciation from government officials and ordinary people alike, in Addis Ababa and in the countryside. Embassy working relations with the PMGSE have eased considerably, and there has been no objection to introduction of AID staff, monitors, etc. There has been a virtual cessation of attacks on the U.S. in the government-controlled press.

—The top levels of the PMGSE, however, have become defensive and at times antagonistic toward our role, making no political concessions at all. They cannot admit what everyone in Ethiopia knows, that the West—not the USSR—is saving Ethiopia at the time of disaster. The true magnitude of our aid is thus never publicized in the Ethiopian media. Moreover, they fear, rightly, that as the relief effort goes on, more people at home and abroad are questioning whether the PMGSE’s policies are not in fact partly to blame for the disaster: internal agricultural policies that emphasized state farms and collectivization and a foreign policy dependence on the USSR that brought military but no economic aid. There is also the memory that failure to address quickly the drought of 1973/74 was the galvanizing cause behind the fall of the Emperor. Thus the PMGSE takes pains to blame the donors, not the PMGSE, for responding too late.

—The drought has meanwhile produced new issues between us. One is the PMGSE’s proposal to relocate 1.5 million people from the drought-wracked north to other parts of the country. We have refused to participate in the scheme charging that it is poorly prepared, partly coercive and politically motivated (i.e., to deprive rebel forces of their popular base). The PMGSE has reacted sharply and trumpeted Soviet support for it.

—A more serious political issue arising out of the drought is in the north. Approximately 2.3 million of the 7 million persons at risk in Ethiopia are in areas contested by rebels and thus outside PMGSE control. Both the PMGSE and the rebels have resisted most of the cease-fire, safe passage, or other proposals to separate food distribution from the war and enable relief agencies to reach these people. As a result tens of thousands are fleeing to Sudan, creating an emergency there, and many more may just die. The U.S., like other donors, has responded by sending some food, through PVOs and the ICRC, across the Sudan border to rebel relief organizations. The PMGSE has strongly protested these programs,³ threatening to make it a major political issue with the U.S. and recently seizing Australian and German supplies⁴ bound for the same type of program. The U.S. meanwhile is becoming one of the most vocal in calling attention to this “northern problem” and urging the UN, the PMGSE, and the other donors to do more about it.

—The “northern problem” blurs the distinction between emergency aid and our political agenda with the PMGSE. The PMGSE’s rabid reaction to aid across the Sudan border relates to its preoccupation with the Eritrean and Tigrean insurgencies for which it has sought and received massive Soviet arms but been unable to quell. The PMGSE is convinced that if only “enemy countries”—Sudan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, but these seen as encouraged by the U.S.—would stop supporting the rebels, the insurgencies could be crushed. This is the PMGSE’s stated justification for backing southern Sudan rebels against Nimeiri. Moderates within the PMGSE will also cite this problem, along with Somali irrendentism, as the basis for Ethiopia’s closeness to the Soviets, i.e., a need for arms.

—Thus the northern famine issue goes beyond humanitarian concerns to fundamental political issues of the Horn. Nevertheless, the PMGSE continues to stall on a political dialogue with us in which such issues could be discussed.

In summary, the PMGSE is trying to ride the tiger of the famine, including the sudden and dramatic dependence on the West for help, without having to change political direction or admit its failures.

U.S. Policy and Opportunities

We should not expect any major change in the political outlook of Mengistu and his top cohorts. They are deeply committed to their present ideological and foreign policy positions, and deeply suspicious of the U.S. Our involvement in aiding Ethiopia will not therefore, unlike our early food aid to Mozambique, help bring about revisions in Mengistu’s views.

The regime, however, is not shaky. Mengistu is too clever and too brutal to be easily overthrown. Soviet and Cuban presence also protects him. If change is to come, short of chance assassination, it will have to come about from major disaffection among the military and perhaps the internal security establishment, forcing either a change in leadership or a change in Mengistu’s positions.

This will happen, we believe, only when these groups, risking Soviet and Cuban reaction, become convinced, (a) that Mengistu risks not only major famine but dismemberment of the country, and (b) that the West can offer not only economic help but some help or at least assurances on preserving national unity. It is the fear of chaos leading to dismemberment (as well as fear of retribution) that keeps the military elite loyal to Mengistu; without Eritrea, Ethiopia becomes a landlocked country and perhaps unravels altogether. Mengistu has played on this fear, using it along with ideology to justify the Soviet role, and it has been the rationale for elimination of each of his rivals since 1975.

[1 paragraph (10 lines) not declassified]

We are however, favorably positioned by the drought and our extraordinary involvement in aid to intensify public pressure on the PMGSE, increase disaffection, and discredit the PMGSE’s policies. To do so, we must preserve a steady course, and not give in to pressures for sudden and ill-conceived reactions. For example, we are being pressed by some elements in Congress to negotiate rapidly solutions to Hickenlooper and Brooke Amendment problems⁵ which prohibit regular development assistance so that we can move beyond emergency aid to longer term assistance. This would give up one of the most important “plums” in our political dialogue. On the other side, some advocate punishing Ethiopia by a reduction in our emergency aid—this would only subject us to massive criticism at home and abroad, with renewed media pictures of starving babies, etc., and deprive us of the unique position we have gained for spotlighting the PMGSE’s gross policy failures.

There are also some who would advocate our lending support to the rebel groups, but this would only strengthen Mengistu’s hand internally with his military which is the one group that can bring about political change. Furthermore, any aid we could give to separatists’ organizations, for political or military purposes, would be marginal. They receive arms from Ethiopian defeats, refuge from Sudan and aid from Arab states—all sufficient to bleed the PMGSE. Military victory, however, is beyond their grasp.

The elements of a steadier course are:

1. Maintain the high ground we now have with our food and other emergency programs. Our involvement in the drought emergency has provided us a unique credibility with other donors, African states and the more pro-Ethiopian elements in Congress in criticizing PMGSE shortcomings.

2. Intensify popular and elites’ knowledge in Ethiopia of the U.S. role in the current emergency and contrast it to the PMGSE’s limited acknowledgement of it. One way will be to maximize visible U.S. assistance, e.g., we have offered the use of U.S. military medics for giving vaccinations and supplying emergency care to drought victims. Another would be a more concerted effort by VOA, USIS, private Americans and direct Embassy contacts to make known the importance and magnitude of the U.S. response. Third would be to be sure to provide U.S. emergency aid to the several regions of Ethiopia affected by drought.

3. Broaden knowledge among PMGSE elites, especially in the military, of our offer of dialogue, including issues relevant to Ethiopian unity. Make clear to important Ethiopians that the U.S. is prepared to develop more normal relations, including an aid relationship, with an Ethiopian government that is prepared to reconsider positons inimical to U.S. interests. Do not become a demandeur, but use occasions to remind PMGSE officials already knowledgeable that Mengistu has never taken up this offer. At a later date, we may wish to publicize our offer of dialogue, if we feel that there is no chance of responsiveness to quiet diplomacy.

4. While continuing emergency aid, and leaving the offer of dialogue on the table, do not negotiate any resumption of regular foreign assistance or other economic benefits outside the context of improved political relations. We are obligated, legally and under Congressional pressure, to respond to PMGSE offers to negotiate specific compensation cases. But we should not set aside our more fundamental objections to resuming a regular aid relationship.

5. Continue feeding programs to rebel relief groups across the Sudan border, in spite of PMGSE protests, but avoid supporting separatist aims of rebel organizations.

6. Stand firm on our public and private insistence on expanded feeding programs in the north, and on refusing assistance to resettlement. Make clear that PMGSE positions on these issues are divisive and cruel to elements of the Ethiopian population. Continue, as we are doing now, to internationalize pressures on the PMGSE on this issue, calling on the UNSYG and other donors to speak out. Broadening our base in this way avoids charges of U.S. bullying and gives us the high ground as well as the standing to speak out.

7. Make clear to the PMGSE leadership that without dialogue we feel free to (a) make public our criticisms of PMGSE shortcomings, (b) refuse regular development assistance, and (c) make no moves to dissuade Sudan or others from aiding Ethiopian rebel organizations.

These actions will have several effects. They will deepen our penetration into and contacts with Ethiopian society. They will contrast sharply Western aid with Soviet indifference and PMGSE policy failures. They will send a signal to alternative leadership that there are clear and tangible benefits to Ethiopia in an improved relationship with the West. And they will intensify Mengistu’s defensiveness while continuing to tarnish his image. If there is prospect for political change in Ethiopia, these are the ways we can best promote it.

S/P Comment: We concur in this memo’s objective—to “intensify public pressure . . . increase dissatisfaction and discredit the PMGSE’s policies.” But we do not think making the magnitude of U.S. relief assistance more visible throughout Ethiopia will be enough to accomplish this goal. We believe that in addition to a general appeal to the elites including an offer of dialogue, a more specifically tailored approach is needed to influence the security establishment.

We suggest that a small State/CIA group reassess on an urgent basis whether more can be done covertly or overtly to strengthen the memo’s proposed next steps. Since any recommendations from this group would be supplemental, we recommend the Secretary’s approval of the course of action in this memo.

Recommendation

That you approve the above course of action.⁶

1. Source: Reagan Library, Papers of George P. Shultz, 1985 Ethiopia. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Lyman and cleared in S/P. Sent through Armacost. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Shultz saw it.
2. In telegram 4576 from Addis Ababa, October 8, 1984, the Embassy mentioned an “informal readout” on the meeting among Walters, Crocker, and Goshu. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840639–0679)
3. See Document 229.
4. See footnote 2, Document 239.
5. The Brooke amendment placed restrictions on aid to nations behind in debt payments to the United States. Regarding the Hickenlooper amendment see footnote 5, Document 239.
6. Shultz initialed the approve option.