239. Telegram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State1
741. Subject: Summary of the Current Emergency Relief Situation in Ethiopia.
1. (C—Entire text)
2. Following is a summary of the current situation in Ethiopia, as I see it. While most of what follows has been reported in septels over the past several weeks, you may not have seen or read all of our traffic.2 The Charge has cleared this message, and supports my comments on various aspects of the situation.
3. The basic numbers with which you are familiar remain unchanged: 7.7 million people are at risk of dying of starvation. (Chairman Mengistu used the figure of 9 million in a pep rally for rehabilitation Camp Cadre two weeks ago.3 But the donor community and the PMGSE itself continue to operate in terms of 7.7 million.
4. At least 1.3 million MT of food (1.2 million MT cereals, and 100,000 MT supplementary foods) are required over the 13-month period December 1984 through December 1985; that’s an average of 100,000 MT a month. It now appears likely that the donor community will provide the required 1.3 million MT of food. UN Coordinator Kurt Jansson4 figures about a third of the total will come from U.S., another third from the EEC, and the remaining third from the other donors. Assuming Washinton approval of my proposal for an overall USG program level of 500,000 MT plus (including cross-border aid from Sudan), then we shall more than fulfill Jansson’s expectations, as far as the USG share is concerned.
[Page 640]5. Massive donor food shipments are now arriving here—175,000 MT in January. The current estimate is for a total of 440,000 MT in the first three months of calendar 1985. This compares to 220,000 MT in the last three months of calendar 1984, and brings the monthly average for the six-month period to 110,000 MT.
[6. text missing from bottom of page] course, greatly taxing the capacity of the three available ports (Assab, Massawa, and Djibouti). Their maximum offtake is estimated to be 135,000 MT per month. The donor community (ably led by Jansson and his growing staff) is seized with the problem of unloading the ships and moving the food out of the ports. Various extra bagging equipment is being brought in, and by mid-March, Dutch-financed port improvements will have increased Assab’s capacity. Unfortunately, the priority given by the PMGSE over the past week to the unloading of two Soviet ships bringing in arms has been a serious setback as far as the unloading of foodstuffs is concerned. We don’t have final figures on the total amount of food and other relief goods unloaded in January. But it will certainly be less than we had hoped.
7. Of even more immediate concern than congestion in the ports, is the problem of finding enough trucks to move the food inland. An estimated 3955 heavy and medium trucks are needed to handle the expected inland transportation load over the near term. The government has 4005 trucks in its (civilian) inventory, but as many as 40 percent are normally down for repair and maintenance. New trucks are being provided in substantial numbers by various donors, particularly the West Germans and Italians. Many PVO’s (e.g. CRS) are also bringing in new trucks. Jansson has discussed the truck situation with the number three man in the government—Fisseha Desta—who quote guarantees unquote that the government will provide enough vehicles to move the food inland, including trucks from the military. We shall see.
8. Also of grave concern to us all is the final step in the transportation/distribution process, i.e. actually getting the incoming food to those who need it in all parts of the country. This problem has two particularly difficult aspects:
A) Getting food to those people in government-controlled areas who are too far away from—or two weak to travel to—the hundreds of established feeding sites; and
B) Getting food into those northern areas not under government control. Various cross-border operations from Sudan are, of course, by no means sufficient to deal with the millions of drought-affected people in Eritrea and Tigray. The ICRC estimates that no more than 500,000 can be helped in this way.
9. Re the problem of people who can’t make it to the feeding centers: Jansson is very pleased with his first experimental air drop [Page 641] (January 27), involving RAF and West German planes, and Ethiopian Air Force helicopters. He hopes to soon organize regular air drops (only in government-controlled areas, however) involving RAF and FRG planes, and Polish repeat Polish helicopters, which are just arriving.
10. Re the second problem: You are, I believe, fully aware of: A) All the obstacles which the PMGSE is throwing in the way of our efforts to get food to the north; B) The lack of other donor support for a strong and united front against the PMGSE on this issue; and C) Jansson’s recent failure to obtain approval for unarmed UN or ICRC food convoys into the north. It appears woefully clear that the only viable option at the present time is increased cross-border aid from Sudan.
11. To add to the overall misery, there appears to be a [text missing from bottom of page] fully defined. Recent outbreaks of cholera and measles in several parts of the country, and greater evidence of malnutrition among the affected famine groups, are matters of very serious concern. Thus far the government has refused to acknowledge the existence of cholera but many NGO’s in the field are convinced of its presence.
12. The government’s resettlement policy—which it seems determined to implement, whatever the cost—is an issue which divides the donor community. The Embassy and AID continue strongly to believe that the USG policy of not assisting the Ethiopian Government’s hastily organized, and politically motivated, resettlement program is correct. But other donors, particularly some Europeans and the Australians, are inclined to support resettlement, as quote the only long-term answer unquote.
13. In this connection we noted the stress placed on the search for long-term solutions at the recent SFRC hearings on Africa. The USG, of course, is constrained from any long-term development activities in Ethiopia by the Hickenlooper amendment.5 Many people passing through here (including Codels and representatives of the media)6 seem to believe that if only the Hickenlooper issue were settled, the U.S. would: A) Move right in with a massive development assistance program; and B) Suddenly have a dramatic and positive impact on Ethiopia’s economic condition. We have sought discreetly to disabuse those who have voiced such high expectations.
[Page 642]14. Even sans Hickenlooper, and even if the USG would want to reopen a regular USAID Mission in this Soviet-supported, Marxist-oriented, military dictatorship, there is no reason to suppose that the PMGSE would want to establish a long-term aid relationship with the USG at this point. Some elements in the PMGSE would like to settle claims, but Mengistu has been reluctant to move, possibly because he doesn’t want to face the issue of possible long-term aid from the U.S. Moreover, as you correctly pointed out in the SFRC hearings, we consider the PMGSE’s current economic policies (particularly in the agriculture sector) to be completely contrary to the kind of long-term development strategy which we would espouse.
15. In sum, the overall situation here appears more positive than it was just two months ago, particularly in terms of food commitments and arrivals. But, given the food distribution problems—and the apparently growing health problems—none of us here is very upbeat. Moreover, we are being frustrated at almost every turn by the very government whose people we are trying to help. Not only is the PMGSE opposed to food shipments to the north, but it is consistently constraining us in various little ways from providing relief in the government-controlled areas as well. And then the PMGSE rubs it in by refusing to give public credit for the U.S. aid which it receives.
16. For example, for 10 days the PMGSE withheld permission for two of our AID people (TDYers from Washington) to visit the ports of Assab and Massawa, even though their purpose is to deal with the logistics problems associated with the arrival this month of the first 40,000 MT of our government to government program. I myself am having serious problems in securing permission to travel outside of Addis. The January 24th Ethiopian Herald (the official English-language newspaper) had an article praising quote friendly countries unquote for providing cargo planes and helicopters for the internal airlift. All the countries that are providing aircraft are mentioned, except the U.S.
17. These kinds of actions by the PMGSE—which certainly seem calculated—are maddening to those of us stationed in Addis. But there doesn’t seem much that we can do about them, short of threatening to withhold our aid. And that’s a step we are strongly opposed to taking at the present time.
- Source: Department of State, Subject Files, Other Agency and Channel Messages and Substantive Material—United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO), United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), 1985–1988, Lot 92D308, UNDRO 32, AF/Drought/Ethiopia. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Nairobi. Sent to Rome, USUN Geneva, USUN New York, and Khartoum. In the right-hand margin, an unknown hand wrote: “Eureka! a readable cable.”↩
- In telegram 59 from Addis Ababa, January 4, the Embassy reported on a visit by U.S. officials to a feeding and medical station where 6,000 victims of the famine resided. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D850007–0672) In telegram 349 from Addis Ababa, January 18, the Embassy reported on the PMGSE seizure of a food shipment. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D850039–0113)↩
- Not further identified.↩
- Reference is to Kurt Jansson, Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations for Emergency Relief Operations in Ethiopia.↩
- Reference is to the Hickenlooper amendment of 1962, which prohibited foreign aid to countries that seized U.S. assets or levied discriminatory taxes against the United States.↩
- See Blaine Harden, “U.S. Law Bars Aid That Could Develop Ethiopian Agriculture,” Washington Post, December 1, 1984, p. A1.↩