Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLI, Global Issues II

237. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Derwinski) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, January 22, 1985

SUBJECT

• Troubleshooting African Food & Disaster Relief

Activities. After you asked me to look at coordination of our response to the African food emergency, I examined these activities:

—Public Diplomacy

—Food for Progress

—Falasha

—Defending “constructive engagement”

—Private sector involvement

—FY 85 African Supplemental

—FY 86 Budget Request

—the Veep’s Africa trip

—The NSC proposal for a Bonn Summit agenda item on food aid

Factors. Coordination of these activities is complicated by political and PR headaches. Africa has been made a domestic political issue by the media and the Democrats, who are questioning our generosity with food, attacking “constructive engagement,” and calling for rescue of the remaining Falasha.²

We are responding with a vigorous PR campaign, an attempt to coordinate the private sector response, and requests to the Congress for more money. The central importance of deficit reduction limits our resources for food aid. Consequently, our PR efforts risk getting out in front of our performance. For example, the NSC included the long-term “Food for Progress” idea in the January 3 White House announcement on our food aid to Africa,³ but the NSC cannot get any additional resources for this scheme from OMB and has not prodded the Departments hard enough to reprogram existing resources for it.

The President sought Bill Verity’s advice on using private sector leadership to coordinate public donations. Verity endorsed the idea, but declined the job, suggesting Peter Ueberroth instead. However, Ueberroth left so many scars as Olympic czar that Deaver said no.⁴ The NSC wants State and AID to find someone else.

Chet Crocker is directing his PR efforts to defending “constructive engagement” and shielding Nimeiri from the exposure of the Falasha operation, whereas Peter McPherson is developing a “Public Diplomacy Strategy” to protect his programs: Food for Peace, emergency food aid, and disaster relief.

Also, in view of Peter’s concern over his role (as the “President’s Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance,” etc), Ken Dam agreed that I would be better described as a “troubleshooter” than a “coordinator.”

My Views. We have not yet had any disasters as a result of this less-than-perfect coordination. However, I would prefer to see Public Diplomacy coordinated out of Chet Crocker’s shop so that key political issues—constructive engagement, Falasha, and other refugee programs—are woven into AID’s PR blitz on food aid. We need clear NSC leadership on the Food for Progress scheme, if we are to overcome interagency footdragging and thus have a solid public position. Private sector coordination is taking on a life of its own and we can let that happen.

Looking ahead, I think we need to evaluate our support on the Hill before:

—we outline a leadership role for the President during our first Summit preparatory meeting with the Allies in Berlin February 15–17,⁵ and

—we launch the Veep on his trip to Cape Verde, Niger, Mali, and Sudan, now tentative for February 15–22.⁶

I will be working along these lines over the next few weeks and hope to have some progress to report.

1. Source: Department of State, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Subject Files, Edward Derwinski, 1984–1985, Lot 87D326, Famine Relief in Africa—1985. Confidential; Not for the System. A stamped notation on the document indicates that Shultz saw it.
2. Reference is to culturally Jewish communities in the Horn of Africa.
3. See footnote 2, Document 227.
4. Reference is to Ueberroth’s role as organizer of the 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles.
5. In telegram 53197 to Bonn, February 21, the Department provided a summary of the summit preparations. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D850120–0772)
6. In telegram 88850 to all African diplomatic posts and all OECD capitals, March 30, the Department provided a summary of Bush’s visit to Africa. The Department wrote that Bush “traveled outside Khartoum to eastern and western Sudan to get a first-hand look at the refugee camps and drought victims,” adding that “he emphasized not only U.S. assistance, but the private sector response as well; made clear that U.S. interests in feeding refugees and drought victims are overridingly humanitarian rather than political; and appealed to all parties, including the Ethiopian Government, to find some way of expanding relief to alleviate human suffering in areas not currently being reached.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D850201–0360)