190. Memorandum From the Special Presidential Envoy on the Law of the Sea Treaty (Rumsfeld) to President Reagan1
SUBJECT
- Law of the Sea Talks with Key Allies
Law of the Sea (LOS). A French official told us that “a poor outcome was inevitable once the LOS process was launched in the UN.” Unfortunately, subjects seem to become more difficult to handle in multilateral processes like the UN, and the results are more likely to clash with US interests and common sense. The seabed mining provisions in the LOS treaty may be one of the most extreme examples.
The mission as your special emissary was to raise LOS from the level of experts, who had helped create the problem over the past 10 years, to the top political level—the only level where we had a chance of averting a damaging outcome at this late date. The specific objective was to dissuade key allies from signing the treaty when it opened for signature. To this end, we traveled to five countries and discussed LOS with President Mitterrand, Chancellor Kohl, Prime Ministers Thatcher, Lubbers and Nakasone, and the President of the European Commission.2
The reception accorded the mission shows the importance of the US to these countries and the respect extended to you personally. As expected, the reactions of these leaders varied. Thatcher was most impressive and correctly labeled LOS “an international nationalization of the seabeds.” Conversely, Mitterrand expressed no concern about the offensive aspects of the treaty and was unhelpful. (France had announced its decision to sign the treaty before the mission began.)3
When the treaty was opened for signature on December 10 in Jamaica, of the countries we targeted only France and the Netherlands signed it. The UK, FRG, Japan, Belgium and Italy did not sign. Notably, only one major western country with a capability for deep seabed mining (France) signed.
A favorable outcome for US policy in this area will require proper follow-up. The treaty is open for signature for two years and the Prepa [Page 537] ratory Commission will begin working on the rules and regulations in a few months. The major industrialized countries will continue to be under pressure to sign from their own LOS experts and from Third World countries. Over 110 countries signed the treaty.
Your involvement, Mr. President, will be needed to counter such pressure, especially during your January 18 meeting with Nakasone4 as the pressures to sign in Japan are strong. Continuing involvement by the Secretaries of State, Defense and the Treasury will be necessary as well. Finally, the US must develop and present a more definite and detailed alternative to LOS for major seabed mining countries. Without that, the risk of their signing the treaty late next year will be greater.
Allied Relations. Four of the seven key allies you asked me to visit underwent a change of government since the mission was launched about two months ago. This symbolizes the political problems of countries that are most important to the US. That extraordinary pace of political change is generally not a healthy sign for stability in free world approaches, but the leaders in the FRG and Japan seem closer to your philosophy and approach than those they replaced.
The mission’s outcome suggests again that the US can have a positive influence on other countries’ perceptions, plans and, at times, policies when the US adopts a policy that is sound, lends Presidential prestige to it and takes the issues to the top leaders in these countries on a timely basis. The US effort and mission on LOS gave heart to those in and out of government in these countries who agreed with your position but had concluded that the battle was already lost.
Personal. I appreciate the confidence you expressed in me by naming me your special emissary. Also, the support given the mission by your NSC staff, particularly Michael Guhin, and the Department of State, particularly your Deputy Ambassador to the UN Kenneth Adelman, was superb.
- Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Subject File, Law of the Sea (12/3–12/12/82). Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the document reads: “The President has seen.” Reagan initialed the memorandum in the upper right-hand margin.↩
- See Documents 180, 186, and 187.↩
- See footnote 4, Document 179.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 187.↩