172. Memorandum From William P. Barr, Office of Policy Development, Executive Office of the President to the Counsellor to the President (Meese) and the Assistant to the President for Policy Development, Executive Office of the President (Harper)1
SUBJECT
- Law of the Sea Strategy
The State Department is now recommending that we take a low profile/business-as-usual approach in our diplomatic efforts to wean our allies away from the LOS Treaty and into an alternative regime.2 This recommendation directly conflicts with the views of all other interested agencies; arises from intensive maneuvering by pro-Treaty bureaucrats at State Department; and, if adopted, would result in utter failure.
Aggressive, High-Level Diplomatic Action Is Essential
It was the consensus of the Interagency LOS Group that, though it would be difficult, we stood a fair chance of achieving an alternative regime if we made it a high priority and pursued it forcefully and at high level. Political appointees in the State Department’s bureau directly involved in LOS negotiations agreed with this assessment. The IG recommended that (1) the President directly contact allied leaders and (2) send a special Presidential envoy (such as Donald Rumsfeld) to start discussions about an alternative regime with the allies.
This approach is considered essential for three reasons:
1. It will make it unambiguously clear to our allies that this is a high priority and of special importance to the President.
2. It will elevate the issue to the political level and out from the clutches of diplomatic bureaucracies that are hostile to the President’s position. The professionals in allied Foreign Ministries (and, to an extent, in our own State Department) either support the Treaty or want to remain in the Treaty process. As long as we continue dealing at the agency-to-agency level, our allies will continue to drift toward the Treaty. The head of the British delegation told his U.S. counterpart that as long as the Foreign Ministry controlled the issue, Britain would accept the Treaty, but that, if President Reagan intervened directly with Thatcher, he [Page 500] expected that Britain would stay out.3 Businessmen in allied countries likewise tell us that their Foreign Ministries are trying to guide their government’s policy inexorably toward the Treaty. We must act decisively and cut through this process.
3. It is the best way to engage the allies in discussions leading to an alternative regime. For weeks, State Department officials have been dealing with their counterparts and are getting nowhere. We must get the allies engaged in a planning process that leads to an alternative regime. We must get the hook in their mouth. A Presidential call and a visit by a special envoy are the best ways to get this started.
The State Department’s Recommendation Is Without Merit
The State Department’s recommendation to avoid high-level activity is based on three arguments: (1) that “too many other things are on the plate”; (2) that we should wait until we have fully developed an alternative; and (3) that “it won’t work and it’s not worth the cost”. None of these arguments have merit.
1. The foreign policy plate is always full. This does not mean that we can stop forcefully pursuing important strategic interests. If we treat LOS as a low priority, as suggested by State, the President would become isolated from the rest of the world on this issue. This would not be politically good for the President nor strategically good for the nation. It is clear to me from direct observation that the bureaucrats who have been making the “full plate” argument within the State Department would like the U.S. to become isolated so that a future Administration will join the Treaty. We cannot let this happen. Constructing an alternative regime must become a high priority.
2. The argument that we should wait until we have every jot-and-tittle of the alternative worked out is totally off-the-mark. The fact is that we already have a good idea what kind of alternative regime we want. There is no need at this stage to fill all the gaps and set it into concrete. Just the opposite. The whole idea is to approach the allies with a flexible position so that they will become engaged in the development process itself. Once we get our allies in on the planning, we’re half way there.
3. The assertion that “it won’t work” is nonsense. It will be a challenge, but there is no evidence to support the contention that it would be futile. There is strong opposition to the Treaty in the private [Page 501] sector in allied countries. Our arguments are good, and there is every reason to believe they will be listened to by the responsible political leaders of allied countries.
One of our nation’s greatest statesmen, Elihu Root, once said: “Every business is best managed by its friends; every undertaking is best prosecuted by those who have faith in it.” The fact that the State Department is ready to concede defeat before the fight has been joined clearly demonstrates why the President and a special envoy must be involved in prosecuting this effort.
- Source: Reagan Library, Meese Files, Law of the Sea. No classification marking.↩
- See Document 171.↩
- In telegram 12826 from London, June 10, the Embassy reported: “Head of UK Del indicated that Thatcher might decide not to sign the treaty upon urging by Reagan. The UK has made no decision even at staff level to sign or not sign LOS Treaty and clearly wants to keep its options open although all Ministries but Industry are likely to recommend signature.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820303–0548)↩