Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLI, Global Issues II

108. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Schifter) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, May 24, 1988

SUBJECT

• A Breakthrough on Soviet Jewish Emigration?

SUMMARY. Responding to our urgings, the Soviets seem to have decided late in 1986 or early in 1987 to let most Refuseniks leave the country. Their emigration was spread out over about a year and, except for about 2,000 persons known to us who are still denied exit permits as well as any of whom we may never have heard, most of them (about 11,500) have now left. With regard to new applicants, the Soviets initially tried to discourage such filings, and succeeded. Less than 700 new applicants left in 1987. However, since the middle of February 1988 the Soviets have been processing new applications in larger numbers and with few restrictions, so that the months ahead may see further increases in Jewish emigration from the USSR. The Soviets can, of course, turn the valve off again at any time they desire. END SUMMARY.

Background

Sufficient time has now elapsed since the change in Soviet Jewish emigration policy in 1986 to be able to interpret the statistics, define the new policy on the basis of the statistical evidence, and analyze the possibilities as to future trends.

Clearly responding to U.S. urgings (it would not otherwise have been a high-priority issue) the Soviets adopted in 1986 a new emigration decree, to take effect on January 1, 1987. Early in 1987 emigration figures for Americans, Germans and Jews did, in fact, tilt sharply upward and have since then continued at a level substantially above that of the years 1982–1986.

Close examination of the Jewish emigration issue reveals that the Soviets adopted a two-track policy in early 1987: one governing Refuseniks and another governing new applicants.

The Refuseniks

The list of Refuseniks which you arranged to transmit to the Soviets in 1986 (furnished to us by the National Conference on Soviet Jewry)² contained the names of about 11,000 persons. The Soviets have told us since then that there were, in fact, about 17,500 Jewish Refuseniks. When approached by the Soviet authorities in 1987, about 4,000 indicated that they no longer wanted to depart. (This number presumably also includes those who had died in the interim.) Of the remaining 13,500, about 85% were granted exit permits while 15% were turned down once again.

Rather than allowing the newly approved ex-Refuseniks to leave promptly, their departure was spread out over a period of more than a year. That was accomplished by rationing the issuance of exit permits to about 800 per month. By now, except for a few stragglers, the approved ex-Refuseniks have left the Soviet Union.

About 2,000 persons known to us remain in Refusenik status, more than 80% of them on the ground that they (or their close relatives) are in possession of secret information, the remainder because a member of the family has been unable to obtain parental permission to emigrate. In addition to those known to us there may also be a number of “low-profile” Refuseniks of whose identity we are unaware.

Almost all of the security denials involve persons who quit their jobs so long ago that their information cannot reasonably be presumed to be secret. Furthermore, the requirement of parental concurrence in emigration (of adults!) simply does not make good sense. It would follow logically that both of these grounds for denying permission to emigrate seem to have been resorted to not just for the sake of the remaining Refuseniks, but to control and possibly suppress the emigration impulse of those who have not heretofore applied for emigration.

In recent months we have been told to expect new legislation on the subject of security denials and parental consent which will ameliorate the situation of the remaining Refuseniks. This, too, suggests that there is a relationship between this remaining Refusenik group and the Soviet Union’s concern about the rules under which future applicants will be processed.

We have urged our Soviet interlocutors not to wait for the approval of new rules, but to keep processing the remaining Refusenik cases. Specifically, we have urged them to subject them to thorough review in the chronological order in which they left their security-sensitive work, starting with those longest removed from such work. The Soviets have agreed to do that.

The New Applicants

The 1986 decision to let the bulk of the Refuseniks go was not accompanied by a decision to open up Jewish emigration generally. A new requirement, sponsorship by first-degree relatives living abroad, to be applied to first-time applicants but not to Refuseniks, was to disqualify the vast majority of potential exit permit applicants. Other requirements, such as the need to obtain the consent of all siblings remaining in the Soviet Union, were designed to add to the hurdles which new applicants would have to overcome. Moreover, after the new emigration decree took effect at the beginning of 1987, many new would-be applicants were told by Soviet emigration offices that these offices were too busy and that the applicants should come back a few months later.

This policy of discouragement was indeed successful. The number of new applicants during the first half of 1987 was quite low. Of the about 3,000 Jews who were allowed to leave the Soviet Union in the first half of 1987, about 50, less the two percent, were new applicants. As our complaints about Soviet policy continued to be voiced, the Soviets relaxed their restrictions on new applicants slightly during the middle of 1987. Though no official announcement was made to that effect, the first-degree relative requirement was no longer applied rigidly. New applications then began to rise, with the result that during the second half of 1987, out of 5,000 Jewish emigrants, about 600 or, 12%, were first-time applicants.

Then came January 1, 1988 and a new clamp-down on first-time applicants.³ While the remaining Refusenik cases continued to be processed without reference to the provisions of the 1986 emigration decree, the restrictions provided for in that decree were once again fully applied to anyone filing a new application. Some new applicants whose papers had been accepted toward the end of 1987 had them returned.

As soon as we were convinced that the Soviets had once again resorted to a harsh policy of restrictions and were applying it in all cities from which we had news, we protested strongly. Two weeks after we had delivered our protest, around the middle of February, the Soviets once again relaxed their restrictions, assuring us that the restrictive policy had been reimposed “through bureaucratic oversight.” They also told us, for the first time, that the first-degree relative requirement would be waived for all applicants for exit permits to Israel and that this waiver would remain in effect for all of 1988. We promptly passed this information to the interested organizations and soon thereafter the number of applications began to rise significantly.

Chances are that the reimposition of the restrictive policy on January 1, 1988, which remained in effect for about seven weeks, was more than a bureaucratic error. It is likely that when Jewish emigration was again authorized in 1986, it was decided to open the gates for most Refuseniks, but to prevent an avalanche of new applications. When few new applications were filed, the Soviets may have decided to loosen the restrictions somewhat. Then, when the number of applications began to climb, the Interior Ministry decided to clamp down again. After we had protested, the Foreign Ministry must have interceded and the leadership, as a further accommodation to us, may have decided to reverse the Interior Ministry.

Thus, for the last 90 days prospective Jewish emigrants have come forward with the knowledge that the first-degree relative requirement does not stand in their way. The only legal restrictions in effect are, as in the case of Refuseniks, knowledge of secrets and the parental consent requirement. We need to note that a clearcut, open and known policy as to the treatment of new applicants has thus been in effect only since about February 17, 1988.

Even with this policy in effect, there is one other potential control on the number of exit permits issued: processing delay. We have already had reports that long lines are now forming in front of local offices handling emigration applications. (One such office, I was told, accepts applications for exit permits only on Wednesdays. A line of applicants begins to form Monday night.)

Thus, since last February the principal question has been at what pace the Soviets will be prepared to process new applications. At first it appeared that monthly Jewish emigration totals had moved up to 1,000. We have now been told that in April 1,400 exit permits were issued. Moreover, in that month about 2,800 new applications were accepted for processing. The months immediately ahead may thus reflect a further turn-up in monthly departures. Just how far the monthly figures will go depends on how many applications are accepted each month and how fast they are processed. The rate of emigration thus reflects a policy decision taken probably at a high level in the Soviet hierarchy. The question before us is whether the Soviets have decided to allow a breakthrough to a substantially higher level of emigration than the 800–1,000 per month figure allowed so far, whether they will stick close to the present emigration level, or whether they will, as is also possible, cause the emigration totals to go down again.

Just how many likely applicants there are we do not really know. The estimate which is often used is 400,000, which would be about 20 percent of the Soviet Jewish population. The Soviets say this estimate is far too high. Whatever the number may be, it is clear that the rate at which the Soviets will allow applications to be processed will continue to depend on the interest the United States takes in this issue.

Note: A problem still on the horizon, which may lead to complications in the future, is the continuing effort of the Israeli government to see to it that all recipients of Israeli emigration invitations do in fact travel to Israel. The waiver by the Soviets of the first-degree relative requirement applies only to Jews who receive invitations from Israel. You will receive a full memorandum from RP on this issue.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Correspondence File—Ambassador Richard Schifter CHRON and Subject Files, 1984–1991, Lot 94D411, R. Schifter’s Monthly Chron—May 1988. Confidential. Copied to Simmon, Abramowitz, Moore, and Murphy. There is no indication Shultz saw the memorandum.
2. Not found.
3. See Document 103.
4. Possible reference to Document 110.