279. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State1

6562.

Pass NSC for Colin Powell; OVP for Don Gregg; OSD for Secretary Carlucci and ASD Armitage; State for Deputy Secretary Whitehead and AS Murphy. From Ambassador. Subject: F–16s for Morocco: Hassan’s Emissary to the President.2

[Page 578]
1.
Secret, Entire text.
2.
General Achabar, Secretary General of the National Defense Administration, summoned me urgently July 6 to inform me that the King was sending him to Washington as a personal emissary with a message for the President regarding the long-standing issue of Moroccan acquisition of F–16s. Achabar said that the Moroccan Embassy in Washington would be making a formal request for a meeting with the President,3 but that he wanted to give me the precise reason for the King’s request for such a meeting. He gave no hint of the content of the King’s message on the F–16s. Achabar said he would be arriving in Washington July 14, via London. He would be available in Washington for a meeting with the President at any time through the following week.
3.
Comment: Hassan’s interest in the F–16 has a long history. In choosing to highlight it at this moment, he may be trying to make a last minute appeal to an administration with which he has had excellent relations. I suspect the appeal may turn out to be some form of linkage between acquisition of F–16s and the U.S. proposals for expanded military training activities in Morocco, which have been under discussion for some time. I was recently contacted by Royal Counselor Guedira with regard to the U.S. plans. Guedira’s message was that the King wanted to discuss them with me personally prior to my departure from Morocco, now set for July 14, and that in the meantime I should not discuss them with anyone else, including Foreign Minister Filali who has been our designated interlocutor up to this point. If my estimate is correct, the King may use my farewell interview to express his general views on expanded U.S. military activities, but will reserve ultimate decisions until he has in hand the U.S. reaction to his as yet undisclosed message to the President on the F–16s. That, I recognize, might take us into the next administration. But the King has indicated several times that he has a long perspective.4
4.
Comment continued: Recognizing pressures on President’s schedule, I nevertheless strongly urge that every effort be made to find time for him to receive King Hassan’s personal emissary on the issue of the F–16s. Keeping a dialogue open with King Hassan is particularly important at this time not only in view of our own plans for military activities but also because of the rapid pace of events in North Africa. Notably between Morocco and Algeria and our own upcoming Presidential election. I will be in Washington on consultation week of July 18 and would be available to participate in such a meeting if deemed appropriate.
Nassif
  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–90–0080, 1988 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 11, Morocco. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. A stamped notation at the top of the telegram reads: “SEC DEF HAS SEEN JUL 7 1988.” In the right-hand corner of the telegram, Carlucci wrote: “I don’t understand the issue here. We do not oppose the sale. Is he looking for more FMS to finance them? FC.”
  2. Carlucci underlined the subject line.
  3. Carlucci placed an asterisk in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.
  4. Carlucci drew a vertical line in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph.