Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

253. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

10312.

Washington, January 11, 1986, 2135Z

For the Ambassador. Subject: Response to King Hassan. Ref: Rabat 226.²

1. Secret—Nodis.

2. We want to reinforce the excellent representations you made to King Hassan in your 1/8 meeting. You should seek another audience at earliest possible time and draw on the following points:

— We appreciate your recognition that the measures announced by President Reagan are “fully legitimate” and your understanding of the United States Government’s attitude toward terrorism and our desire to stop it. We reemphasize the important point that Ambassador Nassif made in his meeting with you on January 8. Our goal is an end to unacceptable Libyan behavior. We have no confidence in words or promises of Colonel Qadhafi.

— The USG regrets however, that the Government of Morocco is associated with the OIC consensus declarations.³ These include egregious and hostile mischaracterizations of the measures now taken by the United States.

— The USG is resolved to make Qadhafi pay a price for his persistent support of terrorism. In coming weeks, we will seek other governments’ support in a series of measures to reduce the threat of terrorism and isolate Libya. We are encouraged by indications that European and other governments are considering measures consistent with these objectives.

— Morocco’s leadership role in securing approval of Arab League condemnations of terrorism is appreciated; such a position, however, is seriously weakened by the strong support given Libya in Arab League and OIC fora.

— We are confident that our condemnations of Qadhafi are well founded. His protestations of innocence cannot be believed, nor can his word be trusted. For example, in addition to the many terrorist actions which can be traced to the Libyan Government, you should know that Libyan officials now are telling Western European governments that Abu Nidal is not in Libya, but operating from Morocco.

— We appreciate his Majesty’s thoughtfulness in raising the possibility of a visit to the US by the Crown Prince to consider further the possibility of moderating Qadhafi’s behavior. As Ambassador Nassif has stated, however, we have no interest in engaging in any dialogue, even indirectly, with Qadhafi. We do not trust his word. If he is interested in moving toward international acceptability, let him demonstrate that through such actions as that suggested by Ambassador Nassif.

— We welcome His Majesty’s thoughts about Qadhafi, but remain firm in our belief that Libya’s support for terrorism has remained undiminished as has its threat to international order.

Shultz

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Rabat 1986 Nodis. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Roger Merrick (NEA/AFN); cleared by Murphy, Quinn, Oakley, Zweifel, Simeon Moats (S/S–O), and Pamela Rockwell (L/EBC); approved by Armacost.
2. See Document 252.
3. On January 7, the OIC released a statement that in part proclaimed “its solidarity with the Libyan Arab people and its active support of the defense of its sovereignty and the integrity of its territory and territorial waters.” The full text of the statement is in telegram 233 from Rabat, January 9. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860020–0879) On January 9 the OIC adopted a second, consensus resolution “expressing solidarity with Libya” which “toughens the earlier language adopted” by specifically condemning “the measures taken by the United States against (Libya).” The Embassy’s informal translation of the resolution is in telegram 281 from Rabat, January 10. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860023–0285)