Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

252. Telegram From Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

226.

Rabat, January 9, 1986, 1347Z

For the Secretary and NEA/AS Murphy. Subject: January 8 Audience With King Hassan on Dealing With Libya.

1. Secret—Nodis

2. Summary: King Hassan asked me to come to Marrakech on January 8 to discuss the President’s January 7 announcement² and next steps to deal with terrorism. Emphasizing that the United States reaction was “fully legitimate,” he expressed the fear that, given the numerous expressions of solidarity with Libya and lack of support from European allies, the U.S. measures would appear ineffective, and Qadhafi would seem the victor in the confrontation. Hassan told me that, in fact, Qadhafi is deeply concerned and had called him earlier on January 8 to tell him so. Hassan said he was sending Royal Counselor Guedira to Tripoli to hear what Qadhafi intended to do to prove he is willing to respond positively to the U.S. position. I told Hassan that the President earnestly hoped that other countries would join with our initiative to drive home the point that terrorism is unacceptable. I said the U.S. hoped that Hassan, as head of the Arab League and the Islamic Conference, could make a statement in support of the President’s initiative. I emphasized to Hassan that words from Qadhafi were insufficient, that only actions, for example such as expulsion of Abu Nidal from Libya, were of interest. I told him that one of the main United States objectives and one of my main goals as Ambassador was to see Morocco’s union with Libya ended. He said he hoped to talk with President Reagan about that matter in coming months. End summary.

3. King Hassan asked me to come to Marrakech urgently on Wednesday afternoon, January 8. We spoke for an hour in his private quarters. The King was accompanied by Royal Counselor Reda Guedira and President of Parliament Ahmed Osman.

4. Hassan opened by telling me he had called me “as a friend” of President Reagan and of the United States. He said he had seen the measures against Libya announced by the President on January 7. The United States reaction, he noted carefully, was “fully legitimate” in his eyes. He said he understood the U.S. attitude toward terrorism and its desire to stop it.

5. He went on to note, however, that he was concerned about how effective the measures would turn out to be. They are economic measures, he said, not military ones. Qadhafi, he feared, would still be able to obtain the benefits of U.S. technology through other countries. He said he had analyzed the reaction over the past few days to talk of sanctions against Libya and had noted that the European allies were not at all supportive. The Arab and Islamic communities had both stated their solidarity with Libya. A number of non-aligned countries were doing the same. Hassan said that the United States position might have been better understood if its reaction had been more decisive. “You should have sent a commando unit, and talked about it later.” Hassan said he understood the reasons for the President’s decision, but in the current environment, he said he feared in the short term, the appearance would be that it is the United States, not Libya, that is isolated on the issue. Hassan said that he did not want to see that impression develop. The U.S. must appear as succeeding in this matter. He said it was important to look at the next steps.

6. Hassan observed that, for the moment, Qadhafi is “strutting about” acting victorious as a result of all the declarations of solidarity Libya is receiving. It is a false impression, Hassan stated. Qadhafi is deeply frightened by actions the U.S. might take. He said that the Libyan leader had called him earlier on January 8, and was clearly shaken by the President’s speech.³ Emphasizing that Qadhafi had in no way requested the visit, he said he had decided to send Royal Counselor Reda Guedira to Tripoli on January 9 to see what Qadhafi was willing to do in response to the President’s speech.

7. I then interjected to clarify the United States position. I explained at length the President’s January 7 statement, and the background which had led up to it. I emphasized the deep outrage in the United States towards terrorism, and in particular towards Libyan support of it. President Reagan felt strongly the need to act now to stop the terrorist threat, and his January 7 executive order was meant to do just that. I told Hassan that the United States seeks support from all countries in order to make its economic measures against Libya more effective. I urged him, as President of the Arab League and of the Islamic Conference, to join in that effort, condemning terrorism and Libyan support of it. I left him talking points on the President’s executive order and what we hoped friends of the United States would do to further its goals. (State 5472)⁴

8. I commented on Hassan’s intention to send Guedira to Tripoli, pointing out that the Libyan leader’s position was already well-known. I noted that Qadhafi had first praised the December 27 terrorist attacks in Rome and Vienna only later to “condemn them”.⁵ I emphasized that the United States was not interested in words or promises from Libya. The United States wanted to see a halt to unacceptable Libyan behavior, for example expelling Abu Nidal and ceasing all support for him.

9. I told the King this was one issue on which every American was in complete agreement. When he told me he wanted to try to lower regional tension, I responded that we want to see an end to terrorism. The King showed a renewed awareness on the depth of U.S. feelings on the question. He told me that he was considering the pros and cons of sending Crown Prince Sidi Mohamed to Washington later in the week to deliver a letter from him to the President and speak to the President, “if only for a few minutes,” on the terrorism question. Later in the conversation, however, he said he would only send the Crown Prince if he received an appropriate response from Qadhafi. Hassan went on to say he felt a personal friendship for President Reagan, and emphasized he had no such feelings toward Qadhafi. “I might have a treaty with Libya,” he observed, “but we have been friends of the United States for hundreds of years.”

10. Toward the end of the conversation, I confided privately to the King that he had to understand the United States’ position. I said that it is a USG objective and one of my top priorities as Ambassador to Morocco to see an end to the treaty of Oujda. I explained that anything Morocco did or said with regard to Libya would be viewed by the U.S. in the context of the Oujda Accord. The U.S. overriding interest was in terminating that relationship. Hassan agreed that it was a matter he would have to discuss personally in Washington. I then added that any discussion with the President could usefully include an exchange of views on possible contacts between Hassan and Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres (State 367280).⁶ Hassan said that he would like to make a brief working visit to Washington in the early spring to pursue those questions.

11. Comment: During the meeting, Hassan was relaxed and seemingly far removed from the pressures of an Islamic Conference ministerial meeting in Fes. I do not believe that I was convoked to carry out any particular Arab League or Islamic Conference commitment. Hassan, as the Department is aware, has long sought to insert himself as a middle-man between the U.S. and Qadhafi. He also continues to attach great importance to a meeting this year with the President and may have regarded the ill-conceived idea of sending Crown Prince Sidi Mohammed with a message as a first step in that process. Without impugning the Crown Prince’s abilities, I did my best to discourage the proposal emphasizing that the USG position on Libya would be determined by specific actions only, not words. In fact, there is a bizarre discontinuity between Hassan’s aspirations to play a mediator’s role and Interior Minister Basri’s report, shared with me on the same day, about possible Libyan terrorists transiting Casablanca for the U.S. (Rabat 205).⁷

12. These contradictions and Hassan’s self-serving interest in mediation and a meeting with the President should not, however, obscure what I believe is a genuine attempt to be helpful on his part. The executive order and current U.S. crisis with Libya occur at a time of maximum friction in Morocco’s union with Libya. Hassan, in my view, is not ready to risk resumed Libyan support to the Polisario by an outright rupture and is worried that the crisis could impact adversely on his relations with the U.S. His concern that the U.S. not become isolated in the Arab and Islamic groups by a groundswell of support for the “underdog” Libya appears genuine. I am under no illusions, however, that the King, if he chooses to even raise the issue, is likely to prevail with Qadhafi in seeking expulsion from Libya of Abu Nidal or other specific indications of change in Libyan behavior.

13. On the other hand, why not respond to Hassan that if he is interested in lowering the temperature, he can take a first step by telling Colonel Qadhafi to publicly admit his support for Abu Nidal, announce his imminent expulsion from Libyan territory and an immediate cessation of further financial and political support for him. Regardless of the potential for success, such a role would shift the burden of lessening tension to Hassan and call his hand on the issue of whether the union can live up to its advertised moderating potential. It would also put more pressure on Hassan to abrogate the treaty if he fails to pass the “test” and is consistent with our démarches world-wide.

Nassif

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Rabat 1986 Nodis. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2. Reference is to Reagan’s January 7 statement at a press conference that he had issued Executive Order 12543 prohibiting trade and certain transactions involving Libya. Documentation on this decision is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad. For the text of the Executive Order, see Public Papers: Reagan 1982, Book II, pp. 14–15.
3. Reference is likely to Reagan’s January 7 press conference, during which he accused Qadhafi of providing “sanctuary and support” for the perpetrators of the December 27, 1985, terrorist attacks in the Rome and Vienna airports. See Public Papers: Reagan 1982, Book II, pp. 17–24.
4. Telegram 5472 to all diplomatic posts, January 8, contains the text of the executive order. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860015–1078)
5. Reference is to the December 27, 1985, terrorist attacks. See footnote 2, Document 156.
6. In telegram 367280 to Rabat and Tel Aviv, December 3, 1985, the Department agreed “that likelihood of an early Hassan-Peres meeting is doubtful at present,” but indicated that “it is possible that quiet communication will continue between the two leaders.” The Department also urged the Embassy in Morocco to “encourage Hassan and his advisors to continue to play a constructive role” in any future discussions. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850862–0824)
7. In telegram 205 from Rabat, January 8, the Embassy reported that Basri shared with Nassif the text of a telegram from “Casablanca security services reporting alleged plan by Libyan terrorists to infiltrate the United States via Casablanca.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860018–0624)