Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

328. Information Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, December 21, 1988

SUBJECT

• Transition

I am told that that portion of the White House staff which in the past has dealt with arms control has been told that none of them will have a job in the new Administration. As a result not much on that subject seems to be going on below the Scowcroft² level.

I am concerned that a situation will result in which it will be impossible to avoid giving Gorbachev a free run for some months to work on our allies in NATO and others with little organized U.S. response. In the meantime, divisions between the Washington agencies are likely to become more firmly locked into opposing views.

To mitigate this risk, I suggest you may wish to mention something along the following lines to Secretary-Designate Baker:³

1. It is important that the new Administration not delay too long in straightening out certain policy issues.

2. It is normal, and perhaps necessary, that the Secretary of State-Designate take a certain degree of responsibility and initiative in getting the process moving.

3. As to process, he might suggest creation of a new top administration arms control policy group, analogous to the current NSPG, chaired by the President and including the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the JCS, the Director of ACDA and the Director of the CIA. This group could be supported, as in this administration, by a senior group chaired by Scowcroft and including other members competent to analyze problems, to draft proposals, and to task specific groups for specific purposes.

4. One question which the top policy group should be able promptly to decide is whether it is necessary to review that language in the START Joint Draft Text which has already been agreed by the two sides. If not, it would be possible to concentrate immediately on developing recommendations to the President with respect to the more important portions of the Joint Draft Text which are not agreed between the sides. Resolution of these issues would facilitate allocation of time and staff to the most urgent and useful work.

5. Another task would be to establish appropriate groups to develop recommendations on certain issues involving important strategic questions and budgetary allocations which should logically be decided by the new Administration before decisions regarding the U.S. negotiating positions are arrived at. These groups could include not only Administration personnel, but also those outside the Executive Branch, including Members of Congress.

The most important of the issues to be addressed is resolution of what type of mobile (or movable) U.S. ICBM system or systems should be proposed to the Congress for authorization and funding. Ideally, we should resolve this question before determining our position on ICBMs for the next round of START. At a minimum, if that proves impossible, we should ensure that our START position does not foreclose any of our modernization options; i.e., by banning mobiles or movables. It appears that the garrison road-mobile mode of deployment supported by the Joint Chiefs and the Air Force staff would require launch from under attack if only tactical warning were available, and that such a deployment mode would be unacceptable to much of the Congress.

A related issue is whether the B–2 bomber will be worth the up-to-two hundred billion dollars it is estimated it will cost. There is merit in a redundant triad of SLBMs, ICBMs, and bombers to complicate Soviet attacks, leave no doubt in Soviet minds as to our ability to retaliate, and hedge against problems in any one system. [less than 5 lines not declassified] A high level special group could promptly address the issue of bomber modernization and its cost.

Finally, another special group could usefully re-examine the scope, timing, cost and relative strategic importance from an overall policy standpoint of various aspects of the SDI program.

The Krasnoyarsk radar and SLCM verification issues are important, but it is less likely that they will need to be resolved until the final stages of the negotiations.

If you believe these ideas have merit, you may wish to pass them on to the Secretary-Designate.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Shultz Papers, Memos—Transition. Secret; Sensitive.
2. On November 23, President-Elect Bush announced his intention to select Brent Scowcroft as the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs.
3. On November 9, President-Elect Bush announced his intention to nominate James Baker as Secretary of State.