In preparation for your meetings next week with Soviet General Secretary
Gorbachev, to review
US START and Defense and Space
positions and identify what, if any, moves we might make in an attempt
to reach agreement by next summer.
The most important arms reductions issues facing us are whether (and if
so how) to modify our START and
Defense and Space position in order to move closer to an acceptable
START Treaty. I propose the NSPG
focus on this issue. In preparation for the meeting the Arms Control
Support Group has prepared a compartmented paper attached as Tab D. This paper is structured around a draft
summit joint statement as a vehicle for considering possible specific
moves. The paper has been distributed to your senior advisors and I
intend to use it as the focus of discussion.
In general, I expect at least some individuals to argue for the following
changes in existing U.S. positions:
—Establishing a counting rule of 6 air-launched cruise missiles per
bomber.
—Agreeing to negotiate on what is permitted and what is prohibited under
the ABM Treaty.
—Accepting a construction moratorium rather than dismantlement of
Krasnoyarsk.
Many of these will be controversial; some more so than others. In
addition to the substantive issues, we will have a brief discussion on
tactics.
White House photographer only.
Attachment
Paper Prepared by the Arms Control Support
Group5
Washington, December 4, 1987
GRIP 40D (U)
Purpose. To set forth the U.S. approach to the
arms control aspects of a joint statement to be issued following the
7–9 December summit meeting between the President and General
Secretary Gorbachev.
(S/G)
[Page 1031]
Background. A joint statement will be issued
at the end of the summit meeting. The Soviets intend that this joint
statement serve as “Instructions to Negotiators” on completing a
START and Defense and Space
Treaty. In contrast, the President has directed U.S. negotiators to
pursue separate START and Defense
and Space Treaties. At the summit, the United States seeks to
further our negotiating position while avoiding a so-called
framework agreement (i.e., a politically binding, quasi-legal
statement which could impose de facto
constraints on the United States while not
providing legally binding, effectively verifiable constraints on the
Soviet Union). (S)
Format. The following points are generally
agreed, although with some variations in approach:
—We want the summit to deal with the whole range of
issues (human rights, regional issues and bilateral issues as
well as arms control).
—The United States doesn’t want a framework
agreement.
—To avoid the perception we have created such an agreement, any
“Instructions to Negotiators” or any other arms control statement
should be part of a single summit joint statement, not a separate
stand-alone document.
—Such a joint statement should simply be issued, as in Geneva, not
initialled or signed.
—We don’t want to set up two different “agreed”
categories, those mentioned in a summit statement and those
not.
—We must not allow the Soviets to suggest that material previously
agreed and omitted from the summit statement is somehow no longer
agreed, or that failure to list an area of disagreement implies we
have acquiesced in the Soviet position.
—To this end, we should refer to existing joint START documents (especially the
START Joint Draft Treaty) to
reaffirm their status. In doing so, we should ensure all associated
documents (protocols, etc. are referenced).
—Since there is no draft Defense and Space Treaty, we should avoid
the implication that Defense and Space is subsumed in START and thereby acquiescing to
Soviet linkage. Thus our objective with respect to Defense and Space
should be instructions to negotiators to begin work on a draft
Defense and Space Treaty.
—In addition, the only details in such a statement should be general
endorsement of previous positions (“50 % reductions”) and/or those
new details on which agreement is reached at the
summit.
—The summit statement should make the negotiators’
job easier, not harder.
—We should avoid giving ourselves a negotiating deadline, and simply
refer to a “goal” for completion of agreements. To set an arbi
[Page 1032]
trary deadline for
completion of an agreement could lead to hasty decision making and
mistakes, and could lead to an unverifiable treaty. The internal
pressure on START, Defense and
Space, nuclear testing, and, possibly, chemical warfare, will be
great enough without our contributing to it.
—We should avoid statements of “general principles” of verification.
Verification is a matter of specific details, not sweeping
principles and the summit setting is inappropriate for discussion of
a complete verification scheme. But we should encourage the Soviets
to offer specific ideas on verification and
seek agreement on key details. In doing so, we should protect all
key elements of a START
inspection regime.
—Summit statements, while intended by the United States to be read as
broad policy documents, will be used in Geneva by the Soviets to
claim agreement with specific, detailed positions. Thus the Geneva
negotiators should be given the opportunity to review the arms
control portion of any statement to ensure language is technically
correct.
—In areas where we don’t narrow differences, the
summit statement should simply note the subject was reviewed,
not list each side’s position.
—Since we want the summit to deal with the whole range of issues, we
shouldn’t emphasize arms control more than necessary.
—Recording positions in detail risks the dangers noted above.
(S/G)
Approach During the Summit. Negotiations will
be conducted by an appropriate working group as at previous high
level meetings. The positions set forth in the draft U.S. text
below, if and when approved by the President, will be considered a
single package to (be used as a going in position) which the
negotiating group will not exceed without further Presidential
guidance. (S/G)
The group drafting the joint statement should work from the draft
U.S. text, modified depending on what agreements are or are not
reached. They should be guided by the agreed general principles set
forth above. Before reaching final agreement, the drafting group
should check with: (a) the U.S. head of the U.S./USSR working group on arms control,
(b) U.S. negotiators, as appropriate, to ensure technical accuracy
of the language, and (c) SACG
principals, including senior representatives of those agencies not
directly involved in drafting. In all cases the object of such
checks will be to ensure that senior agency players are kept
informed and have a chance to offer substantive (as opposed to linguistic) comments. It is not
the intent to seek interagency agreement on the text of the
statement. (S/G)
Substance. Based on the foregoing, those arms
control areas other than START
and Defense and Space need be treated only briefly. A paragraph in
the joint statement along the following lines appears
appropriate:
[Page 1033]
“The two leaders also reviewed the progress of negotiations in
other areas, including nuclear testing, conventional arms
control, and chemical weapons. They agreed to continue their
current efforts in these important areas.” (S/G)
There should also be a separate paragraph on nuclear
non-proliferation, which is outside the scope of this paper.
Additional language on nuclear testing may also be required; this
subject is being dealt with separately. (C/G)
In addition, Ambassador Ledogar, U.S. negotiator to the conventional
force negotiations, prefers a longer, more explicit formulation.
Based on the rationale set forth above, and in view of the
multilateral nature of conventional negotiations all agencies agree
that discussion in this area should be kept short and that only a
brief mention is appropriate for the joint statement. (S/G)
The remainder of this paper discusses the areas of START and Defense and Space, where
agencies disagree on the substance (and to a
lesser degree the form, of what should be included. In many cases,
agency proposals represent significant changes in the current U.S.
position. (S/G)
START. With
respect to START, some would make
the following changes in existing U.S.
positions:
—Accepting “an agreement” on throwweight rather than including
throwweight in the START
Treaty itself.
—Dropping the 1650 ICBM
sublimit.
—Establishing an ALCM counting
rule of six per bomber.
—Allowing heavy ICBM
modernization.
—Allowing mobile ICBMs, subject
to an agreed limit and agreed verification.
In addition, depending on Soviet responses, some would consider:
—Reintroducing the concept of an exchange of declarations on
sea-launched cruise missiles.
—Excluding Backfire from START
in return for Soviet commitments not to increase numbers or
provide for in-flight refueling.
The START portion of the proposed
joint statement would read as follows:
“The President and the General Secretary discussed the
negotiations on reductions in strategic offensive nuclear arms.
They noted the considerable progress which has been made toward
conclusion of a treaty implementing the principle of 50%
reductions. They agreed to instruct their negotiators in Geneva
to work toward the completion of the Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty and all integral documents at the earliest possible date,
preferably in time for signature of the treaty and related
documents during the next meeting of heads of state the first
half of 1988. Recognizing that areas of agreement and
disagreement are recorded in detail in the Joint Draft Treaty
Text, they agreed to
[Page 1034]
instruct their negotiators to accelerate resolution of issues
within the Joint Draft Treaty Text including early agreement on
provisions for effective verification.
“In so doing, the negotiators should build upon the agreements on
50% reductions achieved at Reykjavik as subsequently developed
and now reflected in the agreed portions of the Joint Draft
START Treaty Text worked
out in Geneva, including agreement on ceilings of no more than
1600 nuclear offensive delivery systems, 6000 warheads, 1540
warheads on 154 heavy missiles; the agreed bomber counting rule;
and an agreement that the reductions will result in a 50%
reduction in Soviet ballistic missile throwweight which will
thereafter not be increased. As priority tasks, they should
focus on the following crucial issues:
(a) The additional steps necessary to ensure the reductions
enhance strategic stability. These are to include a ceiling of
4800 on the aggregate number of ICBM plus SLBM warheads within the 6000 total, and
a further sub-ceiling of 3300 on the number of ICBM warheads.
(b) The counting rules governing the number of warheads to be
attributed to each type of current and future ballistic missile,
and the number of long-range cruise missiles to be attributed to
each type of heavy bomber. With respect to B–1s, B–52s, Bear Hs
and Blackjacks carrying long-range ALCMs, this number shall be six per bomber. Heavy
bombers which do not carry cruise missiles, including Backfire,
shall be counted as one warhead as agreed at Reykjavik. There
shall be agreed rules governing how many warheads shall be
attributed to heavy bombers covered by START.6
(c) The counting rules with respect to existing ballistic
missiles, the number of warheads attributable to each type of
United States ballistic missile shall be:
PEACEKEEPER (MX) :10, Minuteman
III:3, Minuteman II:1, Trident I:8, Trident II:8, Poseidon:
10;
The Soviets will provide numbers of warheads attributed to each
Soviet missile; the United States could accept:
SS–11:1, SS–13:1, SS–17:4, SS–18:10, SS–19:6, SS–X–24:10,
SS–25:1, SS–N–6:1 SS–N–8:1, SS–N–17:1, SS–N–18:7, SS–N–20:10,
SS–N–23:10.
These numbers shall be subject to verification by on-site
inspection. There shall be agreed rules governing how many
warheads shall be attributed to future weapons systems covered
by START.”7
(d) Building upon the provisions of the INF Treaty, the measures by which the provisions of
the START Treaty can be
verified will, at a minimum, include:8
[Page 1035]
1. Data exchanges, to include declarations by each side of the
number and location of weapon systems limited by the Treaty and
of facilities at which such systems are located. These
facilities will include locations and facilities for production
and final assembly, storage, testing, and deployment of systems
covered by this Treaty. Such declarations will be exchanged
between the sides before the Treaty is signed and updated
periodically after entry into force.
2. Baseline inspection to verify the accuracy of these
declarations promptly after entry into force of the Treaty.
3. On-site observation of the elimination of strategic systems
necessary to conform to the agreed limits.
4. Continuous on-site monitoring of the perimeter and portals of
critical production and support facilities to confirm the output
of these facilities.
5. Short-notice on-site inspection of (a) declared locations
during the process of reducing to agreed limits, (b) locations
where systems covered by this Treaty remain after conforming to
the agreed limits, and (c) locations where such systems have
been located (formerly declared facilities).
6. The right to short notice, on-site inspections at locations
where either side considers covert production, storage or repair
of START systems could be
occurring.
7. Provisions prohibiting the use of concealment or other
activities which impede verification by national technical
means. Such provisions would include a ban on telemetry
encryption and would allow for full access to all telemetric
information broadcast during missile flight.
8. Measures designed to enhance observation of START-related activities by
national technical means. These would include open displays of
treaty-limited items at missile bases, bomber bases, and
submarine ports at locations and times chosen by the inspecting
party.
NOTE: Text thus far is agreed by all agencies. (C/G)
(e) Additional provisions specifically for verification of
mobile ICBMs, including
restrictions on their deployment areas and provisions for
assuring the distinguishability of mobile missiles. With
agreement on methods of verifying the number of mobile ICBMs, an agreed number of such
land-mobile ICBMs can be
permitted within limits provided by the agreement.9
NOTE: Ambassadors Lehman and Rowny and the Office of the Secretary of Defense would not include this
provision. ACDA would include this provision only if the
Soviets agree to the rest of the package, and then would allow only
the single-RV, road-mobile SS–25.
(S/G)
[Page 1036]
(f) Based on agreement to all the foregoing, the President
noted that the United States is prepared to permit the continued
testing and modernization of heavy ICBMs.
NOTE: Ambassadors Lehman and Rowny, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and ACDA would not
include this provision. (S/G)
No provisions are included for sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM).
There are no known methods by which the numbers of nuclear armed
long-range SLCMs may be verifiably
counted. [7 lines not declassified]
If the Soviets raise the issue of SLCM limits, all agencies agree the United States
should reintroduce the concept of an exchange of notifications on
planned SLCM deployments outside
of and in addition to the 6000 warhead and 1600 delivery system
limits provided for in the current Joint Draft START Treaty text. (S/G)
The language above preserves the existing U.S. position that Backfire
should be limited by a START
Treaty. If the Soviets accept the rest of our package, but object to
Backfire, State would agree to exclude
Backfire from START if, in
return, the Soviets give assurances that the number of Backfire
bombers will not be increased above the current levels, that such
bombers will not be given the capability to carry long range
air-launched cruise missiles, that such bombers are not and will not
be equipped for in-flight refueling, and their crews are not and
will not be trained for in-flight refueling. ACDA, OSD and Ambassador Rowny oppose such a provision.
(S/G)
Defense and Space. All agree that the
following language should provide the basis for a U.S. position on a
joint statement:
“The President and the General Secretary also discussed the
status of negotiations relating to Defense and Space issues.
They agreed to instruct their negotiators in Geneva to expedite
work on a Joint Draft Treaty Text incorporating a commitment on
non-withdrawal from the ABM
Treaty in a new separate treaty which would enter into force at
the same time as the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms. They
also agreed to instruct their negotiators in Geneva to first
identify areas of agreement and disagreement in the Joint Draft
Treaty Text and then to accelerate work toward resolution of the
areas of disagreement.” (S/G)
This language requires no change in existing
U.S. positions.
Ambassadors Cooper and Rowny oppose moving beyond this
to extend the non-withdrawal periods unless the Soviets agree to a
clear right to deploy defenses at the end of the period. Ambassador
Rowny considers the remainder of this material fundamentally flawed
and unsuitable for submission to the NSPG or the President. Other
agencies would make concessions beyond the current U.S. position in
the context of Soviet agreement to our basic START requirements. Three options
for such additions exist. (S/G)
[Page 1037]
Option 1. Add to the above as follows:
—Extend the non-withdrawal period through October 11, 1996, i.e. the
tenth anniversary of Reykjavik.
—After 1996, the sides resume their full rights to withdraw from the
ABM Treaty.
—Agreement on the distinction between testing (which is permitted)
and deployment (which is not).
—Confidence building measures enhancing openness and
predictability.
NOTE: Option 1 requires the following changes to U.S. positions:
—Extending the period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty through 1996.
—Accepting reversion to the ABM
Treaty rather than freedom to deploy after the non-withdrawal
period.
—Agreeing to negotiate on what is permitted and what is prohibited
under the ABM Treaty.
Option 1 is favored by State. (S/G)
Option 2. Instead of the previous option, add
to the basic language the following:
—Commitment not to deploy strategic defenses beyond those permitted
by the ABM Treaty through 1996,
with a right to deploy thereafter.
—An agreed understanding on what constitutes prohibited
deployment.
—A clear understanding, entailing a strong U.S. statement that
testing permitted by the ABM
Treaty, i.e., under the broad interpretation, would be
conducted.
—Predictability measures to ensure confidence that prohibited
deployments were not being undertaken.
NOTE: Option 2 requires a change to the current U.S. position by
extending the period of non-deployment through 1996.
Option 2 is favored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Option 3 would merge various suggested options
so that the joint draft statement would include the following:
—A 10 year period of [A: non-withdrawal] [B: non-deployment] through the tenth
anniversary of the Reykjavik meeting (October 11, 1996).
—After that time (October 11, 1996), the sides are free to [A: exercise their right to withdraw from the
ABM Treaty] [B: deploy defenses not currently permitted by the
Treaty] after having given 6 months notice.
—It would be clearly understood that during the 10 year period, both
sides have the right to conduct research, development and testing,
[Page 1038]
including testing in
space, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and that the United States intends to fully
exercise those rights.
—With respect to conduct during the 10 year period, the sides will
negotiate an agreed understanding as to [A: the
distinction between testing (which is permitted) and deployment
(which is not)] [B: what constitutes
prohibited deployment]. [C: Do not
negotiate anything in this area, simply agree to
disagree.]
—To enhance strategic stability, provide predictability, and ensure
confidence that prohibited deployments were not being undertaken
during the 10 year period, the sides meet regularly to exchange
briefings on each side’s strategic defense programs and to
facilitate mutual observation of strategic defense tests and visits
to strategic defense research facilities.
—[If at any time after the eighth anniversary of the Reykjavik
meeting (i.e. October 11, 1994), should a side wish to deploy
strategic defenses not permitted by the ABM Treaty, it shall initiate a two year period of
discussions to ensure a stable transition. At the end of this two
year discussion period, unless agreed otherwise, either side will be
free to [A: exercise their right to withdraw from
the ABM Treaty] [B: deploy defenses not currently permitted by the
Treaty] after having given 6 months notice.]
Krasnoyarsk. Agencies disagree concerning how
Krasnoyarsk should be handled. Two formulations have been
suggested:
Formulation 1: “To support their efforts to
negotiate new agreements, the sides agree that construction of the
Krasnoyarsk radar, which has been halted by the Soviet side, will
not be resumed and that the radar will be dismantled in a verifiable
manner.” (S/G)
This approach is favored by Ambassadors Rowny and
Cooper and
by OSD.
(C/G)
Formulation 2: “To support their efforts to
negotiate new agreements, the sides agree that construction of the
Krasnoyarsk radar, which has been halted by the Soviet side, will
not be resumed. The power supply for the transmitter will be
removed. Procedures for periodic on-site inspection will be agreed
to assure confidence that construction has ceased and does not
resume.” (S/G)
This approach is favored by State and ACDA.
(C/G)
Tactics. Three approaches have been suggested
for introducing this material:
—Provide it as a paper to Soviet Marshal Ahkromeyev on Monday
December 7. The President would subsequently refer to it briefly in
his initial meeting with the General Secretary.
—Have the President introduce it in his initial meeting and explain
it in detail.
[Page 1039]
—Have the President provide the paper to the General Secretary at his
initial meeting and suggest that it be discussed by experts.
(S/G)
Regardless of which approach is selected, Ambassadors Cooper and Rowny feel
strongly we should initially table only the
main portion of the START
material and the chapeau for Defense and Space. The START portions on mobile missiles
and the Defense and Space material modifying U.S. positions would be
reserved until there is evidence of Soviet seriousness. (S/G)
