Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

237. Memorandum From Linton Brooks, William Tobey, and Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell)¹

Washington, December 4, 1987.

SUBJECT

• NSPG Meeting on Arms Control Issues for the Summit—Friday, December 4, 1987—2:00 p.m.

Attached is the meeting memorandum² for Friday’s NSPG. We believe the focus should be on START and Defense and Space in order to identify moves we wish to make in an attempt to reach agreement by next summer.

The vehicle for arms control discussion is a compartmented paper (GRIP 40) (Tab D)³ based on Paul Nitze’s version of a summit joint statement. At present, it includes the following changes in existing U.S. positions favored by State:

—Dropping the 1650 ICBM sublimit.

—Establishing an ALCM counting rule of 6 per bomber.

—Accepting a SALT II approach on the BACKFIRE bomber by excluding Backfire from START in return for Soviet commitments not to increase numbers or provide for in-flight refueling (not in the initial position).

—Allowing heavy ICBM modernization.

—Allowing mobile ICBMs, subject to an agreed limit and agreed verification.

—Extending the period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty through 1996.

—Accepting reversion to the ABM Treaty rather than freedom to deploy after the non-withdrawal period.

—Agreeing to negotiate on what is permitted and what is prohibited under the ABM Treaty.

—Accepting a construction moratorium rather than dismantlement of Krasnoyarsk.

Most of of these will be controversial; some more so than others. The paper has some agreed points as well, including the outline of a verification approach for START. In addition to the substantive issues, we believe you need to discuss the tactics of how the statement would be tabled. This is not on the agenda, but is essential and we have alerted agencies to be prepared for it.

We believe the agency positions are reflected in the paper. We suspect Secretary Shultz will assume this has all been decided. We understand Secretary Carlucci may introduce the idea of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty through 1994 and non-deployment through 1996. The DCI may raise the issue of European concerns with a START treaty.

We are aware of no plans by any agency to raise any other arms control issues. If such issues are raised, we recommend discouraging discussion during the meeting; we need to focus on the questions directly related to START and Defense and Space.

The meeting memorandum for the President is at Tab I, it includes brief suggested talking points he might use to set the stage. Talking points for your use are at Tab II.

Recommendations

That you approve and forward the Presidential Meeting Memorandum (Tab I), along with Tabs A, B, C and D.⁴

That you use the talking points at Tab II in conducting the meeting.⁵

Fritz Ermarth, Steve Steiner, Don Mahley and Bill Heiser concur (all on previous drafts).

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁶

Washington, undated

GENERAL POWELL’S TALKING POINTS

I. INTRODUCTION

—We are here for a final review of some aspects of our arms reductions positions before the summit.

—Mr. President, would you care to make any initial remarks before we begin?

[President makes opening remarks.]

—Thank you sir. We have a compartmented paper you’ve all been provided to help structure the discussion. Lets first turn to START.

II. DISCUSSION OF ALTERNATIVE START POSITIONS

—I want to walk through the approach as I understand it. First we all need to be clear that this is intended as a package. I know it’s important to the JCS and others to view it that way; some moves are only acceptable in the context of things like counting rules.

NOTE: THIS POINT IS IMPORTANT TO THE CHIEFS.

—What we’ve done is set forth a paper that describes how we want the joint statement at the end of the summit to come out. Near the end of the meeting we’ll talk about how we get there.

—We have general agreement on several points. We all agree to begin with a chapeau that makes it clear the Joint Draft Treaty Text is agreed by both sides. In the chapeau we also would nail down:

—1600 Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (Bombers, ICBMs and SLBMs);

—6000 total “warheads”

—1540 warheads on Soviet heavy ICBMs (a 50% cut from current levels); and

—A 50% cut in total Soviet ballistic missile throwweight

—Then we’d have sections on:

—4800 ballistic missile sublimit and 3300 sublimit on ICBMs

NOTE: ADELMAN SAID ON THE RECORD YESTERDAY THAT 3300 WASN’T ESSENTIAL. SHOULD STAY IN NONETHELESS.

—ALCM counting rules (attribute 6 ALCMs to each ALCM-carrying heavy bomber)

—Ballistic missile warhead counting rules for existing missiles

—A verification package.

NOTE: PACKAGE INCLUDES:

1. Data exchange

2. Baseline inspections

3. On-site observance of elimination

4. Continuous monitoring of portals of productions facilities

5. Short-notice inspections of declared facilities

6. Short-notice inspections of suspect sites

7. No concealment or interference with NTM

8. Cooperative measures to enhance NTM

—None of this is inconsistent with our past position, although we had not previously agreed on ALCM counting rules or decided on numbers of Soviet RVs we could accept.

—Since there is general agreement on this part, I’d like to move on to the issues where we don’t have consensus unless someone objects.

—The first such area is mobile ICBMs. We’ve discussed this before. As I understand it, there are three views:

—Decide that we should alter our position and accept mobile ICBMs in a future treaty. State advocates agreeing to accept mobiles if effective verification is possible.

—OSD and Ed Rowny would not move in this area.

—ACDA would accept only road-mobile, single RV ICBMs.

—George [Shultz] why should the President change now? Why not wait?

—Verification is key here. Judge [Webster] what are the CIA’s views?

—Ken [Adelman] why do you think we should only allow road-mobile.

—How do the JCS feel about Ken’s idea?

NOTE: JCS/OSD PROBABLY PLAN TO ABANDON MIDGETMAN WHICH IS ONLY MOBILE ICBM KEN’S PROPOSAL ALLOWS.

—Does OSD still want to hang tough on mobiles? Does anyone?

NOTE: ROWNY WILL WANT TO HANG TOUGH.

—The next area is allowing heavy missile modernization. As I understand it only State advocates this. George, why is this important?

—Are others opposed to doing this at all, or just opposed to doing it now?

NOTE: MOST WILL ACCEPT; ISSUE IS TIMING.

—We can be sure the Soviets will raise SLCMs and Backfire. As I understand it we all agree that we could respond to Soviet concerns by offering an exchange of unilateral declarations of nuclear SLCM forces. Does anyone disagree?

NOTE: THIS IS THE BEST WE CAN DO, BUT WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY NOT SATISFY THE SOVIETS.

—With respect to Backfire, if the Soviets accept our position, State would exclude Backfire from the treaty if there was no increase in numbers, it could not be refueled, and was not equipped to carry ALCMs.

—OSD, ACDA and Ed Rowny oppose this. Why?

CALL ON EACH IN TURN

—What do the JCS think?

III. DISCUSSION OF ALTERNATIVE DEFENSE AND SPACE POSITIONS

—Lets move to Defense and Space. Here we have agreement on a chapeau paragraph that is consistent with our current position.

—Our Defense and Space Negotiator, Hank Cooper, and Ed Rowny would make no move beyond that paragraph lengthening the non-withdrawal period, unless the Soviets concede to us a clear right to deploy after the period.

—Other agencies believe that we need to make some concessions. These are spelled out in the first two options.

—The first option would extend the non-withdrawal period through 1996, return us to the ABM Treaty after the period, and commit us to negotiate on the distinction between permitted testing and prohibited deployment.

—The second option would entail a non-deployment commitment through 1996, with a right to deploy thereafter, and an agreed understanding of what constitutes prohibited deployment, coupled with clear acknowledgement of our right to test under the broad interpretation.

—Finally, a third option weaves together elements of the first two. I think it would be best if we work from Option 3, as it captures the basic points at issue:

—Whether we commit not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, or simply not to deploy defenses not permitted by the Treaty.

—Whether we have a clear right to deploy after the period, or whether we would have to withdraw from the ABM Treaty.

—And, whether we should negotiate what constitutes prohibited testing versus permitted deployment.

—Option 3 also contains points of agreement among those who favor changing our position—that we should lengthen the period to 1996 and that we should undertake measures to improve predictability.

—As we we think about these options, some of which involve major concessions to the Soviets, we need to think about the tactics involved.

—George [Shultz] why do we need to move on SDI now, and are there any requirements that the Soviets would have to meet before we table the option favored by State?

[AFTER DISCUSSION]

—Frank [Carlucci] does Defense want to see anything from the Soviets before we would move in Defense & Space?

NOTE: CARLUCCI MAY SUPPORT NON-WITHDRAWAL THROUGH 1994 AND NON-DEPLOYMENT THROUGH 1996 AS A COMPROMISE

[AFTER DISCUSSION]

—Other opinions?

[AFTER DISCUSSION]

—As we are about to go toe to toe with the Soviets, I think we must be absolutely clear about where we stand. Mr. President, your key advisors differ over lengthening the non-withdrawal period (absent key Soviet concessions in Defense and Space), what should happen during the period, and perhaps most importantly what happens to the ABM Treaty after the period.

—We will be preparing papers for your decisions on these issues.

IV. SUMMARY

—We have two more areas to cover.

NOTE: IF TIME SHORT, SKIP KRASNOYARSK AND GO TO TACTICS WHICH IS MORE IMPORTANT.

—Agencies differ on what to do about Krasnoyarsk.

—Two formulations have been suggested:

—Halt construction and agree that the radar will be dismantled in a verifiable manner. This is the choice of OSD, Ed Rowny and Ambassador Cooper.

—Agree that construction will not be resumed, that the transmitter power supply will be removed and that we’ll have a right to periodic on-site inspection. State and ACDA favor this.

—We’re running short of time; are there any essential points on this to make to the President?

[AFTER BRIEF DISCUSSION]

—I’d like to talk about tactics for a moment. I see three basic possibilities for introducing this material:

—Provide it as a paper to Soviet Marshal Ahkromeyev on Monday December 7.

—Have the President introduce it in his initial meeting and explain it in detail.

—Have the President introduce it and suggest that it be discussed by experts.

—What are your thoughts?

[DISCUSSION]

—This has been useful. Thank you for coming.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat: National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Records, NSPG 171. Secret. Sent for action.
2. Printed as Document 238.
3. See Tab D, Document 238.
4. Powell indicated his approval. On Tabs A, B, and C, see footnotes 2 and 3 and Tab C, Document 238.
5. Powell indicated his approval.
6. Secret. All brackets are in the original text.