Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

220. Memorandum to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, October 30, 1987, 3:00 a.m.

Mr. Secretary:

The Gorbachev letter² is attached, along with a copy of the analytical points³ (drawn on the key points that follow) which the NSC will pick up from Lynn Pascoe at 6:45 this morning. Following the key points, there are also some procedural points you should be aware of: some will need a decision from you early after you get in.

I. The key points of the letter are:

—Gorbachev proposes a summit meeting in the first ten days of December. Shevardnadze has authority to work out all aspects.

—At the summit the INF Treaty would be signed and START and Defense and Space would be discussed. If the President’s visit to the USSR is to be “crowned” with a strategic arms treaty, it is necessary to reach agreement in principle at the upcoming summit.

—Gorbachev is not wedded to key elements. Instructions to delegations is an acceptable form of recording the results of the summit.

—On Defense and Space, the letter focuses on the period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, with nothing new on interpretation or permitted activity. It calls for “observance” (vice strengthening) of the ABM Treaty—although it quotes an April 1985 letter from the President⁴ about strengthening “the role” of the Treaty—and says the principal remaining issue is agreement on a time period.

—On the link to START, it asserts they want “nothing more” than a ten-year commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty.

—On START constraints, the letter refers to Gorbachev’s Moscow proposal, with a slight hint of freedom to mix. This can be probed in discussions. So can the letter’s argument that with the Soviet sublimit proposals based on the triad, “certain combinations of the numerical parameters we have proposed produce a picture that is close to the one US officials at various levels have recently been outlining to us.” Backfire, the ban on mobile ICBMs and SLCMs are mentioned as artificial complications; verification is mentioned as a “natural” difficulty.

—Gorbachev proposes establishment of a channel to support the negotiations. He suggests Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors “could be” used for this purpose.

—Other arms control subjects (nuclear testing, chemical weapons, and conventional forces) are given cursory treatment.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁵

Washington, undated

Gorbachev’s Letter—Key Points

Summit

—Proposed timing: first ten days of December. Shevardnadze has authority to work out all aspects.

—Proposed agenda: The INF Treaty would be signed; START and Defense and Space would be discussed.

—Additionally, the letter notes that if the President’s visit to the USSR next year is to be “crowned” with a treaty on strategic arms, it will be necessary to reach “agreement in principle” on this score at the summit. Thus, Moscow Summit is not explicitly conditioned to agreements in principle on START/D&S at Washington Summit.

—What form this START “agreement in principle” would take is “not too important.” Key elements of a future treaty is cited as one possible way to go, but instructions to delegations is also acceptable.

Arms Control

—Notes possibility of finalizing an INF Treaty within 2–3 weeks; cites recent progress made in Moscow on resolving outstanding issues.

—On START, the letter refers to Gorbachev’s Moscow proposal on sublimits, with a slight hint of freedom to mix. Letter argues that the Soviet sublimit proposals, based on the triad, is getting closer to the U.S. proposal. Backfire, the ban on mobile ICBMs and SLCMs are mentioned as artificial complications; verification is called a “natural” difficulty.

—On Defense and Space, the letter focusses on the need to reach agreement overall on a period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, and backs away from previous Soviet insistence that the ABM Treaty be “strengthened.” Now, Gorbachev emphasizes the need to simply “observe” the ABM Treaty. There are no new details on Treaty interpretation or permitted activities: he says they stated their views on observance in Washington.

—On linkage to START, it asserts they want “nothing more” than a ten-year commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty.

Arms Control Channel

—Gorbachev proposes establishment of a channel to support and facilitate the negotiations. He suggests Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors “could be” used for this purpose.

II. Procedural Points

—Negotiating a Joint Statement. Shevardnadze told John Whitehead they have a draft, and Roz will be meeting with Bessmertnykh beginning at 8:00. She will start with the brief factual draft you have.

—Informing your Team. Lynn will be asking you for a decision on Roz’ suggestion that, as previously discussed, the group that will gather to support you be shown copies of the letter with the summit dates whited out. Shevardnadze begged John Whitehead not to leak until he gave the letter to the President; John takes the responsibility personally.

—Soviet Participation in Meetings. Shevardnadze has asked to have big teams with him: 7 Soviets including him with you, 8 with the President. (The core, in addition to him, is Bessmertnykh, Dubinin, Karpov, his personal aides Tarasenko and Stepanov, and interpreter Palazhchenko; he wants to add MFA regional expert Mamedov as notetaker with the President.) Roz should be in a position to tell Bessmertnykh where if at all to cut when he arrives at 8:00.

• Tom Simons⁶
• Jim Timbie
• Karen Puschel

1. Source: Department of State, Lot 90D397, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Box 3, 1987 OCT. Secret; Sensitive.
2. Not attached. Gorbachev’s letter to Reagan, dated October 28, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 88.
3. Not attached.
4. Presumably, a reference to Reagan’s letter to Gorbachev of April 30, 1985, which is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, January 1985–October 1986, Document 23.
5. Secret. Drafted by Simons, Timbie, and Puschel. The English translation of Gorbachev’s letter and analytical points sent to the White House were not found attached.
6. Simons initialed the paper for all three drafters in the right-hand margin beside their typed signatures.