209. Memorandum From Ambassador-at-Large Nitze to Secretary of State Shultz1
SUBJECT
- Arms Control Experts Meeting, September 15
In our experts meeting last night, we addressed INF, START, and Defense and Space. We put off discussion of nuclear testing until today.2 The Soviets did not suggest experts meetings on conventional forces or chemical weapons, but might in your meeting with Shevardnadze this morning.3
[Omitted here is a discussion of INF.]
We made some headway on START. Karpov indicated the Soviets would be willing to express their offer to reduce their SS–18 force to 154 as a limit of 1540 on warheads with a no-increase commitment. Karpov also confirmed that their proposed 60% limit on any one leg of the triad did not alter their acceptance of the 6,000 warhead limit and of the bomber counting rule agreed at Reykjavik, and that the bomber counting rule would apply to the 3600 sublimit as well. We did not get very far on the 4800 sublimit although, under persistent questioning from Ron, Karpov further acknowledged that at least in theory there was a figure between 6000 and 4800 which would not require the Soviets to “restructure” their forces, i.e., might be acceptable as a sublimit on ballistic missile RVs. The Soviets said they would consider a no-increase commitment on throwweight along with a unilateral commitment to reduce throwweight by 50%. They did not move on the length of the reduction period, although Karpov suggested that the 7-year period we want would be acceptable if we accepted their proposal for a 10-year period of compliance with the ABM Treaty.
We clarified somewhat the Defense & Space proposals Shevardnadze made to you. On the list proposal, Karpov several times stated that if a space device fit within the thresholds, the Soviets would not question its purpose; if the device exceeded the thresholds, it could be [Page 906] tested only in the laboratory. This is a change from their current position in Geneva, where they have argued that any SDI device would be inconsistent with the ABM Treaty. (We are having the Soviet list translated—our impression is that at least some of the thresholds have gone up substantially from the list the Soviets tabled in Geneva, and thus might be in the ballpark.)
The situation is less clear on their proposal for a 10-year commitment to non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Karpov described the regime that would apply during this period as the “narrow interpretation” or the “original interpretation” of the Treaty. We pointed out repeatedly that there is no agreement between the sides about these. Karpov confirmed that if either party committed a “gross violation” of the Treaty, the other would be freed of its START obligations. Karpov said the Soviets would want the ABM Treaty to continue after the 10 years but would be ready to negotiate on what followed the period.
On the whole, it was a more cordial session than we have had with Karpov in the past. We agreed to reconvene the NST experts meeting today after the morning plenary. Ken will discuss nuclear testing. We do not plan to suggest a CW working group but should be prepared to have one if the Soviets want a meeting.
- Source: Department of State, Lot 90D397, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, September 1987. Secret; Sensitive. Printed from an uninitialed copy.↩
- The working group met from 10 p.m. to 12:30 a.m. the evening of September 15, and from 4 to 7 p.m. on September 16. Memoranda of conversation are in the Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Box 214, Shultz-Shevardnadze—Wash—9/87.↩
- See Document 210.↩