Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

208. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, undated

Report of the Working Group on the Nuclear and Space Talks

The Working Group met with the objective of narrowing differences where possible, and recording positions of the sides where differences remain. While not all issues between the sides were discussed, the following is a summary of the results of the 15 September discussions.²

[Omitted here is a discussion of INF.]

START

The sides discussed the question of the implementation of 50% reductions in the strategic offensive arms of the two sides.

They noted the following:

—The United States believes a 4800 ceiling on ballistic missile warheads is essential; the Soviet Union believes such a limit is unnecessary.

—The Soviet Union proposes to limit each component of the triad to 60% of the 6000 total warheads (i.e., 3600); the United States believes such a sublimit should apply only to ICBM warheads, and should limit ICBM warheads to 3300.

—The Soviet-proposed 50% cut in heavy ICBMs means a limit of 1540 heavy ICBM warheads.

—U.S. seeks a 1650 sublimit on warheads on all permitted ICBMs except silo-based non-heavy ICBMs with six RVs or less.

—Soviet missile throw weight will be reduced to 50% of the current level and will not subsequently increase. The U.S. believes this commitment should be codified in the Treaty.

—The Soviet Union proposes that mobile ICBMs be permitted. The United States believes they should be banned.

—The United States proposes that reductions in strategic offensive arms be completed over seven years. The Soviet side prefers five years but is prepared to discuss this question.

—The United States is prepared to complete a START agreement promptly without linkage to other arms control subjects, particularly defense and space which are already constrained by existing agreements; the Soviet Union links completion of a START agreement to a 10-year commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, and gross violation of the ABM Treaty would free the other party from its reduction obligation.

DEFENSE AND SPACE

The Soviet side elaborated the following proposal:

—Agreement not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for 10 years, and either:

—agree on a list of devices not to be put in space and thresholds for associated critical parameters, or

—agree to strictly abide by the ABM Treaty as it was signed and ratified in 1972.

—Under the “list” approach, a device with critical parameters below the specified thresholds could be put into space for any purpose, whether ABM-related or not. Other research on space-based ABM systems would be restricted to laboratories on earth.

—In either case, the ABM Treaty would continue after the 10-year period, but the sides would negotiate on the ABM defenses problem as a whole in light of the strategic situation which would exist by that time, including the 50% reductions in strategic offensive weapons.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Shultz Papers, Secretary’s Meetings with Shevardnadze (09/1987, 10/1987) (1). Secret. Nitze sent the paper to Shultz under cover of a September 16 memorandum: “The arms control working group met this afternoon to compile a joint report to you and Shevardnadze on the results of our discussion of NST issues. This report is attached.” A stamped notation indicates that Shultz saw Nitze’s memorandum. (Ibid.)
2. See footnote 2, Document 209.