In preparation, the Arms Control Support Group is assembling papers which
describe the basic options on all the START issues. That will put us in a position in which we
can seek prompt decisions as the situation evolves.
Attachment
Paper Prepared in the Department of
State5
MAJOR START ISSUES
Sublimits
4800 ballistic missile warheads. Within the
6000 warhead total, we propose a sublimit of 4800 ballistic missile
warheads. Without such a sublimit, the Soviets would likely have
substantially more than 4800 ballistic missile warheads (because
they rely less on bombers than we do). We would have to either cut
our ALCMs and bombers well below
1200 or accept a significant Soviet advantage in ballistic missile
warheads, a choice we don’t want to make.
—The number of ballistic missile warheads is one of the most
important measures of strategic force capability. The 4800 sublimit
would provide for equality in this key measure.
—Would represent achievement of the objective established by the
President at Eureka when START
began 5 years ago (5000 ballistic missile warheads).
—4800 is about half the current Soviet number of ballistic missile
warheads.
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—Would allow 1200 ALCMs and bombers
(e.g. 250 bombers and 950 ALCMs).
Raising (or eliminating) the 4800 would squeeze our ALCM and bomber force.
—The Soviets once proposed a similar number (no more than 80–85% of
total warheads on any two parts of the triad; 80% of 6000 is 4800).
In Moscow, Shevardnadze said he could go back to their earlier
proposal, which did not include the Reykjavik counting rule. Not a
constructive suggestion; designed to neutralize our argument rather
than solve the problem.
—The likely minimum acceptable outcome on sublimits (from the US
point of view) is 4800 ballistic missile warheads and 1540 heavy
ICBM warheads.
—Soviets resist the 4800 sublimit as unnecessary given the low 6000
total warhead limit, and an inequitable and unacceptable constraint
on their force structure.
3300 ICBM
warheads. If there is a 4800 ballistic missile warhead
sublimit, the number of Soviet ICBM warheads would likely be on the order of 3500 in
any event. (This would represent about the same ratio of ICBM to SLBM warheads as they have in their current force.) So
this proposed sublimit would not substantially change the
anticipated Soviet force beyond the effects of the 6000 and the
4800.
—ICBM warheads are presently the
most accurate, hence the greatest threat to hard targets. (At
present heavy ICBMs are the
greatest Soviet hard target threat; in the near term all ICBMs could threaten hard targets;
and in the long run all ballistic missiles could.)
—The Soviets once proposed a similar number (no more than 60% of
total warheads on one part of the triad; 60% of 6000 is 3600). The
Soviet approach would extend to SLBM warheads as well as ICBM warheads, and as with the 80–85% rule it was
proposed in a different context.
—3300 represents about half the current Soviet number of ICBM warheads.
—The Secretary had authority in Moscow to propose a level of 3600 in
the context of Soviet flexibility on other issues. This was not
used.
—JCS would strongly resist
application of a 3300/3600 limit to SLBMs, since we may want an option to deploy more
SLBMs if deployment of
survivable ICBMs proves
impossible.
—All of this implies that we should focus attention initially on the
4800. We can try as well for a 3300 ICBM warhead sublimit, and raise this number to 3600.
If we get the 4800 (and the 1540), we can drop the ICBM warhead sublimit.
1650 sublimit on heavy and highly fractionated
missiles. This sublimit was inserted into our position for
tactical reasons. It would sharply
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constrain the Soviets, with little effect on
the US. At an appropriate time, we can drop it in favor of a 1540
sublimit on heavy ICBM warheads.
(DOD, however, opposes dropping
the 1650 sublimit.)
Heavy ICBMs.
Since Reykjavik, the Soviets have offered to cut in half their
number of heavy ICBMs (to
154).
—Heavy ICBMs pose the principal
current Soviet threat to US fixed ICBMs.
—Such a cut goes a long way toward achievement of the US goal of a
50% cut in missile throw weight.
—The constraint should be expressed in warheads (1540) rather than
missiles.
—In this form, we should accept it.
Throw weight. The US proposes to cut ballistic
missile throw weight to an equal ceiling at 50% of the current
Soviet level. The US, with smaller missiles, is already below this
level. The Soviets say their proposed reductions would result in a
50% cut in throw weight, and have offered to make a unilateral
statement to this effect. Our task is to get the Soviets to agree to
this in a form that represents a binding obligation. (Binding does
not necessarily mean in the Treaty text; we could be flexible on how
this obligation is recorded.)
—With equal limits on the number of warheads, a gross disparity in
warhead size would give the Soviets an advantage.
—For attacking hard targets accuracy is relatively more important
than yield (which scales with weight). For barraging areas (e.g.
mobile ICBM deployment areas)
throw weight is the appropriate measure.
—Reductions in Soviet throw weight would reduce their ability to
quickly add RVs beyond the 4800
limit.
Mobile ICBMs
The US draft bans mobile ICBMs; the
Soviet draft permits them within the limits on missiles and
warheads.
—Mobile ICBMs are potentially much
more survivable than fixed ICBMs.
—When dispersed, mobile missiles are highly survivable. In garrisons,
they are quite vulnerable. Survivability hinges on the ability to
keep a portion of the force in the field in peacetime, and on the
ability to disperse the rest of the force rapidly in a crisis.
—Soviet mobile ICBMs can do both.
For the US both are more difficult. The small ICBM can probably do both; the rail
mobile M–X probably cannot deploy
out of garrison in peacetime and would take several hours to
disperse in a crisis.
—Mobile ICBMs are difficult to
verify.
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—The number of mobile ICBMs
operationally deployed can be verified with some confidence.
—The problem concerns missiles and launchers which are stored
covertly. These could be very hard to find. In this scenario,
the crews would train and exercise periodically with overtly
deployed systems.
—When we were pursuing a non-zero INF agreement, we worked out a verification approach
which involved data exchange; declaration of facilities for SS–20
production, storage, repair, etc.; the right to inspect and monitor
these facilities; and the right to inspect other facilities should
we suspect covert SS–20 activity there.
—This approach could also be applied to SS–25’s, which are deployed
in a similar manner. The rail-mobile SS–24 will require a further
evolution of these ideas.
—The US small ICBM program is a key
element of the Scowcroft package on which Congressional support for
M–X is based. The proposed ban
on this system is a problem for us in Congress.
—The State/ACDA view is that mobile
ICBMs should be permitted
subject to verification provisions along the lines of those
developed for a non-zero INF
agreement, and subject to a stringent numerical constraint (e.g.,
1000 warheads) to keep down the mobile ICBM infrastructure. This approach recognizes our need
for survivable ICBMs and the
substantial commitment the Soviets have made to these systems.
—DOD strongly supports the ban.
SLCMs. Both
sides have long-range nuclear-armed land-attack SLCMs. There is no known way to
verify constraints on the number of such weapons.
—The Soviets propose a 400 limit on SLCMs, and to confine them to specified classes of
submarines.
—In view of the verification problem, the US draft Treaty would
impose no limits on SLCMs.
—One possible solution would be for each side to make a unilateral
declaration of its SLCM plans.
This would not be a constraint, so verification would be less of an
issue.
—The US offered to resolve this issue on the basis of declarations in
the overnight experts meeting at Reykjavik.6 The Soviets turned this down, but it is still
the best solution and could be reintroduced at an appropriate
time.
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Offense/Defense
—Soviet START Treaty refers to a
defense and space agreement, and would relieve one party of its
obligations to reduce offensive forces if the other Party takes
steps that go beyond the ABM
Treaty.
—Such a clause is unnecessary. A Party can withdraw from START upon 6 months notice if it
judges its supreme interests are jeopardized.
—Linking reductions to compliance with the ABM Treaty without clarification of that Treaty risks
Congressional restrictions on the SDI program to protect reductions. Such restrictions
would not be binding on the Soviets.
