196. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Mission in Geneva1
145742. Subject. 5/11 Secretary-Bessmertnykh Meeting.
1. Secret–Entire text.
2. During a May 11 courtesy call on the Secretary by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh, the following points were made concerning the NST negotiations.
3. The Secretary briefly ran through the arms control agenda in the wake of the Moscow trip.
—On INF, things were proceeding, and there seemed little to add at this time to what had been said in Moscow. An intra-alliance discussion was underway on SRINF. On LRINF, we continued to feel it would make most sense to drop the remaining 100 warheads. The Secretary personally was impressed with the importance of residual systems to verification, which would in turn have significance in any ratification debate in this country. We had studied carefully Gorbachev’s strong statements on verification. It was a simple fact that verification would be better at zero than at any finite number.
—On START, both sides seemed to feel it was of central importance, and to agree that the approach hammered out in Reykjavik was a major breakthrough. We wanted to push ahead. Gorbachev had referred to [Page 864] strategic arms in his Prague speech2 as the “root problem.” We agreed and were prepared to move the subject along. The U.S. knew the Soviets liked to link START and space. We were prepared to discuss the problem, but in the meantime we should press ahead energetically on START. We had recently tabled a START draft treaty text to this end.
4. The Secretary noted that the Soviets in Moscow had suggested that the two sides be prepared at a possible summit to record areas of agreement on the issues other than INF under discussion in Geneva. We had no objection to this. But it seemed to us that the way to do that was to make progress wherever possible. Perhaps over the course of the summer we could work—possibly in the kind of working group format Bessmertnykh had launched the year before on a range of issues—on these issues, and then take stock. We had, after all, come a long way already from where the two leaders had been when they parted company in Geneva. The Reykjavik meeting had been particularly helpful.
5. Responding to the Secretary’s points, Bessmertnykh said that the Soviets generally shared his assessment.
—The Soviets knew that the U.S. preferred zero LRINF. Bessmertnykh acknowledged that zero would be easier to verify. But the residual 100 would provide a valuable opportunity to test verification techniques. On the other hand, the Soviets could consider zero INF in Asia if the U.S. were prepared to take certain steps with respect to its nuclear forces in Korea and Japan, or, for example, draw a line beyond which its aircraft carriers would not approach the Soviet Union in the Pacific. As the Secretary prepared to interject, Bessmertnykh suggested that, on balance, perhaps it would be easier to keep the 100, noting that an agreed formula seemed to exist on LRINF, with SRINF still being discussed. Bessmertnykh added that there seemed to be differing views in the West as to how long it would take to respond to the Soviet proposal on SRINF. He repeated that one had to keep in mind that time was limited. The Soviets were prepared to work the issue in Geneva.
—As for START, the Soviets had said in Geneva that they were willing to work with the new U.S. draft. They would probably have their own to present at some point. With respect to the “key provisions” idea, Bessmertnykh pointed out that the U.S. had proposed something similar, described as “basic elements,” during Dobrynin’s April 1986 visit to Washington. (The Secretary interjected that we did not object to the idea.) Bessmertnykh suggested that the two sides continue in [Page 865] Geneva to work on a draft treaty. At an appropriate time, they could see where things stood, and decide whether to continue work on a treaty or seek agreement on key provisions.
Bessmertnykh said he doubted on the basis of past experience whether it would be possible to reach agreement on a full START treaty in the time available. Similar circumstances had produced the Vladivostok agreement. Bessmertnykh said he was glad that the U.S. was considering this kind of an approach, because the Soviet concept was as Gorbachev had described it—strategic weapons were the “root” of the problem. Of course, it was equally important in the Geneva negotiations not to lose sight of the need to strengthen the ABM treaty.
- Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N870004–0336. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by McEldowney; cleared by Burton, Holmes, Parris, Clyne, Lekson, and in S/S, S, and S/S-O; approved by Ridgway.↩
- Reference is to Gorbachev’s speech in Prague, April 10, 1987, in which he reiterated his position of advocating large cuts in nuclear stockpiles. (“Excerpts From Gorbachev Talk on Arms and Social Changes,” New York Times, April 11, 1987, p. 5)↩